slack fill claims proceed because protein powder is harder to understand than cookies

Cody v. Gainful Health Inc., 2026 WL 1428888, No. EDCV
25-01373-KK-SPx (C.D. Cal. May 19, 2026)

Gainful sells protein powder nutritional supplement products;
plaintiff alleged unlawful slack fill. Cody bought a “28 Servings” package that
“included two pouches or bags,” each weighing 14.8 ounces and “contain[ing] 14
servings per container,” and 28 “Flavor Boost” packets. Each pouch was “opaque”
and did “not allow the customer to fully view its contents.” The nutrition
label on the back of each pouch indicated a serving size of “1 scoop (30 g).” She
saw the image online, which “depicted a totally opaque Product container that
did not allow Plaintiff … to see the fill level within such container.” The
image also showed the “Flavor Boost” packets, “which indicated the far greater
size of the Product’s container by comparison.” The Amazon product listing
disclosed 28 servings, weight of 30 ounces, and package dimensions of 10.47 by
9.92 by 4.76 inches. But it did “not disclose any … disclaimer such as a
reference to a fill line or other caveat disclosing that the Product’s
container was not packaged to be substantially full of protein powder.”

The court found the claims sufficiently pled under the relevant
California statutes
and common-law fraud. Cody sufficiently alleged an
affirmative misrepresentation by using an opaque and “oversized” container,
“which implied … that the container had more protein powder than it actually
contained,” and failure to disclose the non-functional slack fill in violation
of California law.

“Because a consumer viewing the Product listing on
Defendant’s online storefront has no ‘reasonable opportunity prior to purchase
to shake or otherwise manipulate’ the Product to determine whether the
Product’s packaging ‘is filled to the brim,’ they “may reasonably rely on the
size of the packaging and believe that it accurately reflects the amount [they
are] purchasing.’” Here, the packaging as depicted on the online storefront
conceals that the “actual product only occupies approximately 60 [percent] of
the exterior space represented by the Product’s packaging container.”

What about the quantity disclosures that did exist? First,
it was unclear whether the listing included the back label, making any
information on that label “irrelevant to determining whether a reasonable
consumer is likely to be deceived.” Listing dimensions, weight, and number of
servings “do[ ] not necessarily provide the reasonable consumer a meaningful
metric for how much powder is in the container,” as a reasonable consumer is
“not necessarily aware” of how a product’s weight and number of servings
“correlate[ ] to the product’s size.”

Even if Cody saw the back label, deception was still plausible.
Gainful cited several cases finding “no reasonable consumer would be plausibly
deceived” where a package “provide[s] a consumer with a ‘rough estimate’ of the
amount of final product that can be made from its contents.” But each of those
cases “involved products that were discrete, countable goods, the number of
which were disclosed on the label.” The instructions on the back label did not
indicate how much protein powder a consumer should mix with 8 oz of milk or
plant-based milk or blend with 8 oz of the consumer’s “favorite beverage.” Nor
did the instructions indicate how much “Flavor Boost” a consumer should mix
with milk, blend into a smoothie, or add into a baked good. While the back
label suggested a consumer could “[a]dd a scoop” of the Product to their
“favorite baked good recipe,” it didn’t specify the type or amount of baked
goods to which a scoop of the Product should be added. Without that, a “scoop”
of protein powder “is not an intrinsically meaningful metric of quantity,” even
when “the consumer can calculate the approximate weight of each scoop.” As
another court said: “A label that states a cannister contains 20 scoops of
protein powder communicates materially less information to a consumer than a
label stating that a cannister contains 20 cookies.”

She also sufficiently alleged that the slack fill was
nonfunctional. It sufficed to allege that (1) “[t]here is no risk of the powder
breaking or sustaining damage if there was less empty space in the Product’s
container,” (2) “the machines used for enclosing the contents of the package
have the capacity to add more content to the containers used to enclose the
contents of the Product,” and “[a]t most, a simple recalibration of the
machines would be required,” (3) “any settling” of the Product “occurs
immediately at the point of fill” because of “the Product’s density, shape, and
composition,” (4) the Product’s packaging “contains no instructions to
consumers that they should mix together the Product’s whey protein powder with
any Flavor Boost within the Product’s pouch container,” (5) “[t]he package is
intended to be discarded immediately after the Product is consumed” and is not
a “durable commemorative package” or “promotional package,” and (6) “Defendant
can easily increase the quantity of the Product in each package (or,
alternatively, decrease the size of the packages) significantly.” These plausibly
alleged that none of the safe harbor provisions in California’s slack fill law applied.

from Blogger https://tushnet.blogspot.com/2026/05/slack-fill-claims-proceed-because.html

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contract, 230, and lack of specificity defeat “chat scam” claims against OnlyFans

N.Z. v. Fenix Int’l Ltd., 2026 WL 1425183, No.
8:24-cv-01655-FWS-SSC (C.D. Cal. May 19, 2026)

Plaintiffs sued OnlyFans (Fenix) and other entities who
manage OnlyFans models based on allegations that they concealed the fact that
plaintiffs weren’t authentically chatting with OnlyFans models, despite the
centrality of the promise of authentic personal interaction to OnlyFans. One of
OnlyFans’ “Core Values” is the following: “Giving creators control to own and
monetize their content and to foster authentic relationships with their
followers and fanbase.” Also, OnlyFans urges Fans to subscribe to specific
Creators using the following language: “SUBSCRIBE AND GET THESE BENEFITS: Full
access to this user’s content [/] Direct message with this user [/] Cancel your
subscription at any time.”

The agency defendants allegedly “sell their services to
OnlyFans Creators with promises that they can increase a Creator’s revenue
exponentially—without the Creator ever having to actually do what OnlyFans
promises: ‘directly connect’ with Fans.” They allegedly “contract with
‘Chatters’ to conduct most, if not all, of the communications between the
Creators and the Fans. Without the Fans’ knowledge, the Chatters impersonate
the Creators when direct messaging with Fans.” “Agencies even provide Chatters
with actual ‘scripts’ similar to those used by telemarketers and call center
employees, which give Chatters a specific workflow to follow in order to
maximize the amount of money extracted from any given Fan.”

In recent years, agencies have allegedly developed
specialized tools to facilitate the use of a single OnlyFans account by a team
of Chatters. Further alleged: “OnlyFans is either aware of, or intentionally
ignorant to, the use of CRM software on its platform—not least because its use
violates OnlyFans’ Terms of Service—but chooses to do nothing to prevent the
use of this software because of the increased revenues that CRM software
facilitates.” And: “OnlyFans knew, and should have known, that its Creators
were using Chatters to engage with Fans— including based on the revenue being
generated by those Creators; the number of direct messages with Fans; the
number of different login sessions to a given Creator’s account, often from
many different locations and IP addresses; and the number of Fan complaints
(which OnlyFans ignored).” As a result, they alleged, “the ‘Chatter Scams’
involve massive breaches of confidentiality and privacy violations in which
intimate communications and private and/or personal information about
Fans—including photos and videos—are distributed and/or accessible to numerous
unauthorized parties.”

Plaintiffs sought to assert various claims against OnlyFans
and the agencies, including RICO, VPPA, breach
of contract, fraud, and California
UCL/FAL claims
.

§ 230: The VPPA and RICO claims against OnlyFans were barred
because they sought to hold OnlyFans liable solely for facilitating, or failing
to moderate, communications through the OnlyFans platform. (The other RICO
claims failed because they were RICO claims.)

However, the breach of contract claim depended on claims of breach
of  a contractual promise that OnlyFans
“will use reasonable care and skill in providing OnlyFans” by collecting “data
sufficient to identify Chatter-operated accounts—including multiple
simultaneous logins from disparate geographic locations—and failed to act on
this information.” That wasn’t seeking to hold OnlyFans liable solely for
facilitating communications but rather to require it to ensure the users are
operating OnlyFans properly and that OnlyFans acts on the simultaneous logins. (Eric
Goldman will hate that!)

And, to the extent that misrepresentation claims were based
on OnlyFans’ own representations that users can “ ‘direct message’ …, chat ‘1
on 1’ …, and build ‘genuine’ and ‘authentic’ connections” with Creators,
those weren’t barred. The claims wouldn’t require OnlyFans to monitor
third-party communications to avoid liability. (But the breach of contract
claim would!) Anyway, although “content moderation [may be] one possible
solution” for OnlyFans to fulfill its alleged duties, “the underlying duty
being invoked by the Plaintiffs … is the promise” or representation itself.

VPPA: The VPPA provides that “[a] video tape service
provider who knowingly discloses, to any person, personally identifiable
information concerning any consumer of such provider shall be liable to the
aggrieved person.” The Ninth Circuit has adopted the ordinary person standard
to determine what constitutes PII, holding that “personally identifiable
information means only that information that would readily permit an ordinary
person to identify a specific individual’s video-watching behavior.” Under the
TOS, plaintiffs agreed and acknowledged that their “[c]ontent may be viewed by
individuals that recognise [their] identity” and that OnlyFans is “not in any
way … responsible” if Plaintiffs “are identified from [their] Content.” And plaintiffs
failed to sufficiently allege OnlyFans’ knowledge.

However, they sufficiently pled that the agency defendants
knowingly disclosed PII: they alleged that they shared personal information in
chats with Creators, including their full legal name and photos of their face,
and that the Chatter Scams function by “creating a communication history
viewable by Chatters” which consists of “intimate knowledge of the Fan’s
personal information, conversation history, and preferences,” and most
importantly, “the specific content that they requested and/or viewed.” The agency
defendants allegedly disclosed PII from Fans to Chatters by sharing login
information or via CRM software.

Under the VPPA, “A video tape service provider may disclose
personally identifiable information concerning any consumer … to any person
if the disclosure is incident to the ordinary course of business of the video
tape service provider.” At this stage, that exclusion didn’t require dismissal.

Breach of contract: the statement “ ‘Direct message with
this user [Creator]’ ” wasn’t part of the TOS, which contained an integration
clause stating that users have “[n]o implied licenses or other rights are
granted to [them] in relation to any part of OnlyFans, save as expressly set
out in the Terms of Service” and that the TOS “form the entire agreement
between [Fenix International] and [the user] regarding [the user’s] access to
and use of OnlyFans,” and “govern [Plaintiffs’] use of OnlyFans.”

Failure to provide the platform with reasonable care and
skill: It wasn’t enough to allege that OnlyFans allowed management agencies to
use Chatters to impersonate Creators because this theory of liability imposed a
monitoring obligation on Fenix Defendants. Nor was merely designing and
providing tools for OnlyFans users sufficient to allege a breach; plaintiffs didn’t
allege how tools such as Fan spending analytics and “inter-shift notes features”
enable, or were specifically designed for, the Chatter Scam.

Implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing: Failed
because plaintiffs sought to impose duties beyond those incorporated in the
specific terms of the alleged contract.

Also, fans were not third-party beneficiaries of the Creator
TOS, which required Creators to be individuals and safeguard their accounts
given its express language saying there weren’t any third-party beneficiaries.

Fraud and deceit: Also failed against OnlyFans. OnlyFans made
explicit disclosures about the use of third parties, its inability to control
how Fan content is used, and the materials provided to Fans.

UCL/FAL: Not sufficiently alleged against agency defendants
because plaintiffs didn’t allege the specific representations at issue.

from Blogger https://tushnet.blogspot.com/2026/05/contract-230-and-lack-of-specificity.html

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CFP: Ninth Junior Faculty Forum on Law and STEM

Call for Papers

Ninth Junior Faculty Forum on Law and STEM

Stanford Law School, November 6-7, 2026

The
Northwestern, Penn, and Stanford law schools are pleased to announce a
Call for Papers for the Ninth Junior Faculty Forum on Law and STEM,
which will be held at Stanford on November 6-7, 2026. The Forum is
dedicated to interdisciplinary scholarship focusing on the intersection
of Law and Science-Technology-Engineering-Mathematics (STEM). We are
seeking submissions from junior faculty in any discipline interested in
presenting papers at the Forum. The submission deadline is June 15, 2026.

A
group of junior scholars will be chosen on a blind basis from among
those submitting papers by a jury of accomplished scholars with
expertise in Law and STEM. One or more senior scholars, not necessarily
from Northwestern, Penn, and Stanford, will comment on each paper. The
audience will include the participating junior faculty, faculty from the
host institutions, and invited guests. Participating junior faculty are
expected to stay for the full duration of the Forum.

Our
goal is to promote interdisciplinary research exploring how
developments in STEM are affecting law and vice versa. Preference will
be given to papers with strong interdisciplinary approaches integrating
these two areas of study.

We
invite submissions on any topic related to the intersection of law and
any STEM field. Potential topics include (but are not limited to):

  • Artificial intelligence
  • Autonomous vehicles
  • Biomedical research and drug development
  • Biometrics
  • Bitcoin and other blockchain technologies
  • ChatGPT and large language models
  • Climate change technologies
  • Computational law and algorithmic decisionmaking
  • Cryptocurrency and NFTs
  • Digital health and health data
  • Genetics, epigenetics, and gene editing
  • Machine learning and predictive analytics
  • Nanotechnology
  • Neuroscience and law
  • Online security and privacy
  • Personalized medicine
  • Regulation of online platforms
  • Robotics
  • Spectrum policy
  • Synthetic biology
  • Virtual and augmented reality

There
is no publication commitment. Northwestern, Penn, and Stanford will
cover presenters’ and commentators’ travel expenses, though
international flights may be only partially reimbursed. Authors of
accepted papers are expected to attend the conference and present their
work in person.

QUALIFICATIONS:
To be eligible, authors must be teaching at a U.S. school of higher
education in a tenured or tenure-track position or as a Visiting
Assistant Professor or Fellow and must have received their first
tenure-track appointment no more than seven years before the conference.
Authors in tenured and tenure-track positions will be given priority.
American citizens or permanent residents teaching abroad are also
eligible to submit provided that they have held a faculty position or
the equivalent, including positions comparable to junior faculty
positions in research institutions, for less than seven years, and that
they earned their last degree within the past ten years. We accept
jointly authored submissions so long as the presenting coauthor is
individually eligible to participate in the Forum and none of the other coauthors
has taught in a tenured or tenure-track position for more than seven
years. Papers that will be published prior to the meeting are not
eligible. Authors may submit only one paper.

PAPER
SUBMISSION PROCEDURE: Electronic submissions should be made through
this website. Please remove all references to the author(s) in the
paper. The submission deadline is June 15, 2026.  We will notify
applicants as soon as practicable thereafter whether their papers have
been selected.
https://forms.gle/PPPn823V1DmYwQvP6

Any questions about the submission procedure should be directed to Professor Lisa Ouellette (ouellette@law.stanford.edu).

FURTHER
INFORMATION: Inquiries concerning the Forum should be sent to Lisa
Ouellette at Stanford Law School, David Schwartz at Northwestern
University Pritzker School of Law, or Christopher Yoo at University of
Pennsylvania Carey Law School.

from Blogger https://tushnet.blogspot.com/2026/05/cfp-ninth-junior-faculty-forum-on-law.html

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Lanham Act requires less in the way of injury from competitors than California FAL/UCL

Eight Sleep Inc. v. Orion Longevity Inc., 2026 WL 1243359, No.
2:26-cv-02460-SB-KS (C.D. Cal. May 4, 2026)

Eight Sleep “developed and patented the Eight Sleep Pod, a ‘bio-tracking
mattress cover’ that optimizes sleep by using biometric measurements to
automatically adjust the temperature of the user’s bed.” Defendant Orion developed
a competing temperature-regulating mattress cover with similar features. Eight
Sleep sued for patent infringement, which I will not discuss (the patent claims
survive), and false advertising, which I will.

Orion allegedly made false and misleading statements about
the Orion Sleep System’s features and availability, including by representing,
during development, capabilities not borne out in the product released to the
market, in violation of the California UCL
and FAL
. Orion argued that there was no statutory standing.

Both statutes “require[ ] that a plaintiff have ‘lost money
or property’ to have standing to sue,” which requires the plaintiff to
“demonstrate some form of economic injury.” The economic injury must also be “
‘as a result of’ the unfair competition or a violation of the false advertising
law,” which requires the plaintiff to show “a causal connection or reliance on
the alleged misrepresentation.”

Eight Sleep relied on the Ninth Circuit TrafficSchool
case’s statement that courts have “generally presumed commercial injury” when
the parties “are direct competitors and [the] defendant’s misrepresentation has
a tendency to mislead consumers.” But that decision addressed the Lanham Act,
which requires only likely injury. Under the UCL and FAL, actual monetary loss
is required.

The complaint only conclusorily alleged that as a result of
Orion’s false advertising, Eight Sleep’s goodwill was damaged, and it “lost
sales because customers who would have otherwise purchased its products,
instead purchased Orion.” That wasn’t enough: “First, the law is unsettled as
to whether injury derived from a customer’s reliance on fraudulent
advertisements may support a false-advertising claim by a competitor who did
not rely on the fraud.” Federal district courts are increasingly accepting
reliance by deceived consumers rather than the competitor-plaintiff, but, even
under that more permissive approach, the complaint was insufficiently detailed.
Similarly, allegations Orion “repeatedly approached investors with false
claims” about the parties’ products and Eight Sleep’s profits and margins, and
that Eight Sleep “lost investment opportunities that would otherwise have been
available from investors who would have, but for Orion’s false statements to
investors, invested in Eight Sleep” didn’t identify specific misrepresentations,
even if it were clear that statements to investors are actionable as
advertisements under the UCL and FAL.

What about Lanham Act claims?  At least one false statement was plausibly
alleged: a chart purporting to compare the features offered by “Eight Sleep”
and “Orion,” suggesting that Orion offered all 10 of the features listed while Eight
Sleep offered only one (embedded sleep sensors). One of the features identified
for Orion’s product was “5-Stage sleep tracker,” which the complaint alleges
“never existed.” The false statement was posted on Orion’s during “some of the
busiest shopping dates in the United States, including Black Friday.”

from Blogger https://tushnet.blogspot.com/2026/05/lanham-act-requires-less-in-way-of.html

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high sugar content doesn’t make “Breakfast Essentials” name or health claims misleading

Testori v. Nestlé Health Science US Holdings, Inc., —
F.Supp.3d —-, 2026 WL 1282540, No. 1:25-cv-01318-JLT-CDB (E.D. Cal. May 11,
2026)

The court dismissed California
claims
against Carnation Breakfast Essentials Nutritional Drink. The drink
label highlighted its 10g of protein per serving, while “fail[ing] to disclose
with equal prominence that the Product’s first two ingredients are water and
… 11 grams of sugar per serving.” Reasonable consumers would allegedly not
expect a product marketed as ‘Breakfast Essentials’ to contain more sugar than
protein.

The court first addressed preemption. Health or nutrient
content claims are regulated by the FDA, but not every statement is a health or
nutrient content claim. “Based on the FDA’s express decision to not recognize
sugar as a disqualifying nutrient, various district courts have now adopted the
finding that ‘any claim under state law solely premised on the notion that [a
product’s] high sugar content made its health or implied nutrient content
claims misleading is preempted.’”  

In this case, the “nutritional drink” statement was right
above four additional statements stating: “10g protein,” “21 vitamins +
minerals,” “3x vitamin vs. milk,” and “2x calcium vs. Greek Yogurt.” The
context of the packaging thus “implies that the reason that the drink is a
nutrition drink is that it contains the nutrients … listed directly below
that phrase on the bottle.” In Clark v. Perfect Bar, LLC, 816 F. App’x 141 (9th
Cir. 2020) (Mem.), the court said: “Allowing a claim of misbranding under
California law based on misleading sugar level content would ‘indirectly
establish’ a sugar labeling requirement ‘that is not identical to the federal
requirements,’ a result foreclosed by our precedent.” Clark dealt with facts
almost on all fours with the facts alleged here. The complaint was filled with
contentions related to “health” and “nutrition.” Thus, preemption applied.

Even if it didn’t, plaintiff failed to state a claim. Although
consumers should not be expected to ignore the misleading representation on the
front label and discover the truth on the back label, here, “none of the
challenged statements reference the sugar content of the product[ ] … [or]
even mention[ ] sugar.” Any ambiguity was cured by the accurate reporting of
the sugar content on the Nutrition Facts Panel, especially because the product
didn’t make any assertion about overall “health” or “balanced/healthy diet.” The
product didn’t become less—or cease to be—“nutritional” due to the added sugar.
The reference to “10g protein,” “21 vitamins + minerals,” “3x vitamin vs.
milk,” and “2x calcium vs. Greek Yogurt” was not a claim that the product was
“nutritionally balanced.” Nor did the front label mention or suggest anything about
added sugar.

In a footnote, the court commented that “Modern
advertisements frequently use phrases like, ‘You need this,’ ‘You have to use
this,’ or ‘This is essential for your health.’ A reasonable consumer would
understand the need to view such statements with a grain of salt, and not take
an expansive, strenuous, and atextual interpretation of them ….”

from Blogger https://tushnet.blogspot.com/2026/05/high-sugar-content-doesnt-make.html

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plaintiff can use UCL against healer claiming advanced degrees and magical powers

Dwarakanath v. Priyanka, — F.Supp.3d —-, 2026 WL 1215667,
No. 5:25-cv-06465-PCP (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2026)

Dwarakanath sued Vaidyaji Priyanka (VP), AUM Ayurveda (AUM),
and some Does, alleging among other things false advertising. VP allegedly ran
a cult and encouraged Dwarakanath’s daughters and then-wife to file frivolous
domestic violence restraining order applications against him. Although he was
granted custody, his now-ex-wife allegedly violated multiple court orders by
retaining improper custody of the girls and refusing to deliver them to him, encouraged
by VP.

The court allowed UCL
claims to proceed under all three UCL prongs, alleging unlawfulness from violation
of RICO and various fraud statutes, unfairness because defendants caused him to
both relinquish his parental control over his young daughters and pay for
unnecessary medical care, and fraudulence because defendants’ untrue and
misleading representations about their holistic care practices allegedly deceived
him and other members of the public.

Although an earlier false advertising claim failed because plaintiff
didn’t allege misrepresentations that were directed to the public rather than
to just one individual, the UCL provides standing to people injured by
prohibited practices, as alleged here.

Nor did defendants identify specific statements that were
nonactionable puffery. Several of the statements Dwarakanath pled were
sufficiently specific to preclude a finding of nonactionable puffery.

For example, VP claims to have
“multiple degrees in business, medicine, and Ayurvedic medicine, from
prestigious institutions like Kings College in London and Columbia University,”
and yet allegedly lacks any relevant degree or other qualifications to be a
medical doctor. She claims to be in her mid-sixties and has two young children,
which she offers as evidence that she “has magical powers that can preserve
youth and fertility.” She claims she can cure manic depression, bipolar
disorder, and schizophrenia using herbal treatments and prayer. And she claims
that she cured [plaintiff’s ex-wife] of cancer three separate times through
“healing” massages.

These statements were specific enough: they clearly
identified “an illness or health issue (schizophrenia, fertility troubles,
cancer) and a promise to cure them,” and claims to be a licensed medical professional
were also not puffery. “Defendants might have been more successful if they had
argued that it was unreasonable to rely on certain statements, like the claim
that VP could cure fertility troubles because of her ‘magical powers,’” but
didn’t raise that—and the FTC at least thinks that targeting vulnerable people
with magical claims can be deceptive. Historically, courts have not found the
First Amendment to be a barrier to fraud claims against healers who solicited
money from sick people to heal them through mystical or magical powers. I don’t
know whether that pattern would continue today in our fraud-forward economy.

from Blogger https://tushnet.blogspot.com/2026/05/plaintiff-can-use-ucl-against-healer.html

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unauthorized sales of books as “new” don’t violate the Lanham Act, even with default

Global Brother SRI v. Altun, No. CV-25-00426-TUC-SHR, 2026
WL 1413605 (D. Ariz. May 20, 2026)

I don’t blog many false advertising default judgment
opinions; this one is different because it denies the motion. Global alleged
that it publishes books, including The Lost Book of Herbal Remedies and The
Lost Book of Herbal Remedies II. Altun allegedly, without authorization,
advertised and sold these books online, including through Amazon and other
marketplaces, labeling their condition as “new” and selling them at a
“significantly inflated” price, thereby misleading consumers to believe “the
listing reflects a premium authorized version or a limited official release.” Global
alleged false advertising in violation of the Lanham Act because they are
“likely to mislead a significant portion of consumers” and “resale of these
works without Plaintiff’s quality control, branding oversight, or packaging
integrity renders the products materially different.”

Factors for evaluating whether default judgment should be
entered include the merits of the substantive claims: a court must ask whether
the complaint stated a claim.

Global failed to show that using “new” to describe the books
was literally false. It pointed to no actual differences in defendant’s copies
or dissatisfied customers. Global’s lack of authorization or involvement in
resales, without more, wasn’t a violation of the Lanham Act.

from Blogger https://tushnet.blogspot.com/2026/05/unauthorized-sales-of-books-as-new-dont.html

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“toddler drink” plausibly misleads about suitability as next stage after infant formula

Castro v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., — F.Supp.3d —-,
2026 WL 184533, No. 25 CV 377 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2026)

Abbott makes Similac, a milk-based formula powder drink for
infants and toddlers. “Go & Grow Toddler Drink by Similac” and “Pure Bliss
Toddler Drink by Similac” purport to meet the nutritional needs of children
between the ages of twelve and thirty-six months. The labels were allegedly
similar to the labels for infant drink formula and indicate that toddler drinks
are the next step drink following infant formula. Plaintiffs sought to
represent consumers from Illinois, Massachusetts, Florida, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, New Jersey, New York, and Washington.

The toddler drink cans’ similarities to the infant drink
cans allegedly falsely represent “that the toddler drink is the logical next
nutritional step in formula, even when doctors and experts do not necessarily
recommend toddler formula drinks.” The labels were also allegedly false and
misleading “because they focus on the products’ purported health benefits while
omitting information regarding the health harms of their added sugar content.”

The toddler formula label includes the words “Stage 3,” and
that label is visually similar to the infant formula label containing the words
“Stage 1” and “Stage 2.” Abbott argued that a reasonable consumer would not
ascribe the “next stage” meaning to the label because the similarity of the
labels and the words “Stage 3” are not nutritional recommendations.  The court disagreed, given the pleading stage.
“Stage” can plausibly indicate a progression. “And the similarity of the cans,
as well as their placement on the same shelves as the infant formula, could
lead a reasonable consumer to conclude that the toddler formula is
nutritionally recommended for children aged twelve to thirty-six months in the same
way that infant formula is nutritionally recommended for children up to twelve
months.”

The court distinguished Martelli v. Rite Aid Corp., No.
21-CV-10079 (PMH), 2023 WL 2058620 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2023), which dismissed a
similar claim, but there the label also included a disclaimer stating that the
product was “intended to supplement the solid-food portion of the older baby’s
diet” and was “not intended to replace breast milk or starter formulas.” Whether
the disclaimer made a difference was an issue for later.

Additionally, plaintiffs alleged that Abbott’s representations
about the health benefits of the drink were misleading because the formula
contains four grams of added sugars, which are decidedly unhealthy. The cans
did disclose their sugar content on the back labels, but again it was plausible
that a reasonable consumer could think they didn’t have to consult the back.

This reasoning also allowed a claim for breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability: plaintiffs alleged that “a balanced,
nutritious diet excludes sugar-sweetened beverages for children above 12
months, and otherwise limits added sugar to less than 5% of calories, whereas
regular consumption of the Toddler Drinks is detrimental, rather than
beneficial to health.” They sufficiently alleged that the toddler formula is
not “fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used,” namely, to
provide a healthy supplement to a toddler’s nutrition.

from Blogger https://tushnet.blogspot.com/2026/05/toddler-drink-plausibly-misleads-about.html

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“complete nutrition” claims for supplements are obviously untrue, but GLP-1 related claims could live again

Cavallaro-Kearins v. Grüns Nutrition Inc., 2026 WL 1398422,
No. 25-cv-4998 (LJL) (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2026)

The court dismissed this California & New York false
advertising claim against Grüns based on its Superfood Greens Gummies for
Adults and Grüns Cubs for Kids, challenging its claims to offer a
“comprehensive” and “complete” solution for daily nutrition, to provide “100%
of kids’ daily nutrition,” “all-in-one” support for GLP-1 users, and to act as
a replacement for essential nutrients. In this specific context, these claims
were unbelievable and demanded reference to the ingredient list, which would
clarify matters. Grüns also advertised Grüns Adults as containing “more fiber
than 2 cups of broccoli per pack,” the same amount as “9 cups of raw spinach,”
and as containing more than 6 grams of fiber, stating that “you’d need a whole
salad bar to match the fiber in just one pack of Grüns.” Grüns Kids also
claimed it was the “very best way to get all the vitamins, minerals, fruits and
veggies growing kids … need” and specifically targeted parents of children with
sensory processing difficulties.

But protein, fats, and omega-3 fatty acids are necessary
nutrients that aren’t included. Also, the Gummies “contain only minimal amounts
of other key minerals like iron and lack others such as calcium altogether.”
And the daily recommended amount of fiber for an adult is 28 grams of soluble
and insoluble fiber per day, whereas Grüns contain only six grams of “soluble
fiber”; the fiber contained in real fruits and vegetables is allegedly
fundamentally different from that contained in Grüns, which “may aggravate
rather than relieve the very conditions it claims to solve.” Grüns also claimed
testosterone benefits that were allegedly misleading, as were claims to multiply,
enhance, or substitute for protein. Without calcium or magnesium, the gummies
were allegedly not even qualified as a standard multivitamin.

While these challenges (and others) are serious, the court
focused on the “comprehensive nutrition” and similar claims. And because it’s
obvious that you can’t get complete nutrition from gummies, those claims
weren’t plausibly deceptive: combining puffery with ambiguity doctrine, a
reasonable consumer would have had to look at the ingredients to figure out the
actual nutrient profile:  

Plaintiffs do not contend that the
language of the package should be taken literally—that the Gummies provide
either complete or comprehensive nutrition such that a person who eats a pack
of the Gummies need not eat anything else in order to survive. That is what the
plain text read in isolation states. … Such a representation might be
reasonably credited if made by a wellness resort or health food spa about the
program it offers for visitors. When made by a purveyor of gummies, it is
plainly hyperbolic, and no reasonable consumer could understand that a small
packet of gummy bear supplements that weighs .7 ounces and that is advertised
as a “Dietary Supplement” could replace the need to eat any other foods.

The court thus distinguished Weinstein v. Rexall Sundown,
Inc., 2024 WL 4250353 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2024), which found plausible
misleadingness when the advertiser touted “complete multivitamin gummies”
accompanied by the language that the product contained “B Vitamins” and “13
Essential Nutrients” but the product did not in fact contain Victims B1, B2,
and B3. Likewise, Cabrera v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC, 2019 WL 1146828 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 6, 2019), held that the claim that a product was a “complete” multivitamin
was plausibly misleading when the product was missing 13 vitamins that the body
requires. In both cases, the adjective “complete” modified the noun “vitamin.”

Do reasonable consumers understand that, on gummies,
“nutrition” literally means all the macro and micronutrients we need?
Plaintiffs walked into this problem by talking about fats, protein, etc. They
offered the argument that a reasonable consumer would understand that Gummies
supply “all essential nutrients,” or “essential nutrients such as calcium and
magnesium,” or “all other supplements,” or that the “Gummies provide what
fruits and vegetables provide—the same nutrition, in another form.”

But, the court reasoned, if the term “comprehensive
nutrition” is not understood by its dictionary definition, then it is
ambiguous. [I’m more sympathetic to the “all essential [micro]nutrients”
interpretation because that’s what you’d expect from a “comprehensive”
supplement: one pill to take! At least I can imagine a substantial number of
ordinary consumers thinking that.] And we know that, when there’s ambiguity, a
reasonable consumer must consult the ingredient list (and apparently keep track
of things like magnesium and iron being missing). I think this is an example of
why “ambiguity” is troublesome: the court doesn’t ask whether a reasonable
consumer
could read the claim as unambiguous and not seek further
information, but only whether there’s ambiguity in the abstract.

“No reasonable consumer could understand from the package as
a whole that the Gummies contained ‘key macronutrients like protein and fat,’
that it contained adequate “amounts of critical nutrients like fiber and iron,’
or that it contained ‘calcium and omega-3 fatty acids,’ much less that it could
‘replace the nutritional complexity of fruits and vegetables and all other
targeted supplementation.’”

As for the off-package claims, they mostly “parrot” the
language of “comprehensive nutrition,” or use the adjective “comprehensive” “in
an even less specific manner than on the packaging.” They could not save the
claim.

What about the specific health issues touted? Some were mere
puffery: “Gut health that fits in a lunchbox” and “#1 energy hack.” Grüns also advertises
that the Gummies “help reduce colds by 70%,” result in “stronger hair in just
30 days,” and “boost T-levels,” but neither plaintiff alleged that she relied
on those ads.

A subset of statements were plausibly misleading: those targeting
GLP-1 users in particular. “Even if the advertisements could be understood to
be ambiguous, there is no surrounding context that would dispel a reasonable
consumer’s understanding that the Gummies contain the nutrients needed to fill
gaps created by the medication.” However, plaintiffs failed to sufficiently
plead that use of GLP-1 medications creates specific nutritional gaps and that
the Gummies do not in fact fill those gaps. It wasn’t enough to allege that the
“formulation is not tailored to the specific needs of GLP-1 users and lacks the
dosage strength, clinical targeting, or comprehensiveness to meaningfully
address the deficiencies it invokes.” This part of the claim was dismissed
without prejudice.

from Blogger https://tushnet.blogspot.com/2026/05/complete-nutrition-claims-for.html

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it doesn’t infringe to use a similar concept in ad photos

Kitsch LLC v. Viori Beauty PBC, 2026 WL 1356424, No.
2:25-cv-10830-SPG-AGP (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2026)

Kitsch is “a leading beauty product and accessories
manufacturer and sells its products in major retail stores and online through
its website and third-party websites, such as Amazon.” It sells solid shampoo
and conditioner products, marketed on Amazon with a photograph depicting the
shampoo and conditioner placed on top of the packaging, with images of the
ingredients contained in the bars scattered below the packaging.

L: defendant; R: plaintiff. Obvious substantial similarity, right?

Viori also sells solid shampoo and conditioner, including
through Amazon’s online marketplace. Its advertising is allegedly highly
similar to Kitsch’s, in that “both feature the products shown next to each
other with the physical products being placed on top of the packaging and with
images of the ingredients contained in the bars scattered below the packaging,”
and its packaging contains wording shown in the same order as Kitsch’s
packaging, with the same words in larger font.

Viori allegedly didn’t use this ad style until after Kitsch
entered the market. Kitsch also alleged that there’s no need for it because
other sellers display their products in distinct ways, and that Viori didn’t
use this photo on its own website, only on Amazon. 

Plaintiff’s examples of noninfringing packaging

Further, purchases from
Viori allegedly arrived in different packaging.

All of this allegedly was in the service of confusing
consumers, so Kitsch alleged claims for false advertising under the Lanham Act,
copyright infringement, and violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law.
The court dismissed the complaint because look at those pictures.

Kitsch didn’t plausibly allege any false statement of fact,
which defeated both federal false advertising and state UCL claims. Among other
things, the product shown in the supposedly different packaging was not the
same product as the product shown in the Viori photo. “Viori Hidden Waterfall
Shampoo and Conditioner Bar Set Made with Rice Water” is not “Viori Shampoo Bar
& Conditioner Bar + Bamboo Holder.” They didn’t show that Viori’s
advertised packaging is any different from the actual product. Where, as here,
“the allegations of the complaint are refuted by an attached document, the
Court need not accept the allegations as being true.”

Even if the actual packaging differed from that in the
image, that didn’t plausibly injure Kitsch. Kitsch argued that it was injured
because Viori copied its advertising. “Thus, it would make no difference to
Plaintiff’s alleged injury whether Defendant’s products arrive in the same
packages as advertised.”

Copyright infringement: Not always resolvable at the motion
to dismiss stage; very much so here. The photos here received relatively thin
protection: a “commercial product shoot” allows for only a “narrow range of
artistic expression.” None of the photos contained any particularly unusual
elements that defy “the conventions commonly followed” in such photos. Indeed,
the competitors’ submitted photographs “bear numerous similarities to the
parties’ photographs”:

(1) all five photographs depict a set of two products,
including both solid shampoo and conditioner; (2) all five photographs depict
both the packaging and the shampoo and conditioner outside the packaging; (3)
all five photographs are set against an off-white background with no other
foreground or background features; and (4) three of the five photographs
include images of the ingredients contained inside the products. Thus, these
elements appear to be standard features commonly associated with such advertising
images.

Given the thinness of the copyright, only “virtual
identical” copies would infringe; those were not present:

Most significantly, while Plaintiff’s photograph places the
products directly on top of the packages, Defendant’s photograph places the
products behind the package, suspended in mid-air and partially obscured by the
package. Defendant’s image also contains reflections underneath the packaging
and ingredients, while Plaintiff’s image contains no reflections. Further,
Defendant’s photograph contains a larger foreground and places the ingredients
closer to the packaging than Plaintiff’s photograph.

For some reason, the court grants leave to amend.

from Blogger https://tushnet.blogspot.com/2026/05/it-doesnt-infringe-to-use-similar.html

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