New Jersey would not recognize a common law tort of false advertising, says fed ct

Pim Brands, Inc. v. New Cibo Vita LLC, No.
25-cv-01418(MEF)(AME), 2025 WL 2938602 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 2025)

The parties compete in the market for yogurt-covered fruit
snacks, and the plaintiff alleged false advertising, including unfair
competition claim under New Jersey common law. Here, the court rules that New
Jersey does not recognize an unfair competition claim that is based, as here,
only on an allegation of false advertising that is not comparative and does not
involve passing off, and thus doesn’t assert interference with some property-type
interest. (Also, in a footnote, unfair competition can include “antitrust-type
claims” or “what amount to claims for tortious interference with contract”;
query how an antitrust claim is an interference with the plaintiff’s property.)

The court characterized the tort as relatively new (late 19th
century) in origin, but quickly assumed a definite shape: “The essence of the
wrong in unfair competition consists in the sale of the goods of one
manufacturer or vendor for those of another; and if defendant so conduct its
business as not to palm off its goods as those of complainant, the action
fails.” Howe Scale Co. of 1886 v. Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, 198 U.S. 118
(1905). Thus, the tort was about “palming off.” It protected consumers, but
only indirectly and only by protecting a company’s “brand equity.” [Not a
particularly contemporaneous term.] It differed from trademark by covering,
e.g., “palming off of what we would today call service marks” and “palming off
based on brand symbols that for one reason or another could not be formally
registered as trademarks.”

But the tort stretched “a bit” to encompass INS v. AP
misappropriation. They still shared the “core DNA” of being property-like. But “[i]f
a company engages in false advertising—if it says something untrue about its
own product—how is it potentially taking property from another company? … [L]osing
out on possible future business is a long way from being deprived of
here-and-now property (or quasi-property).”

Thus, a false advertising claim is not an unfair competition
claim. American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Manufacturing Co., 103 F. 281 (6th
Cir. 1900), was the key case involving false advertising that a washboard was
made with aluminum, rejecting a false advertising claim on the ground that “the
private right of action in [unfair competition] cases is not based upon fraud
or imposition upon the public, but is maintained solely for the protection of
the property rights of a complainant.” Courts around the country “routinely
stick to the line [American Washboard] drew.”

Thus, the court predicted that the New Jersey Supreme Court
would hold that there can be no unfair competition claim based only on a false
advertising theory, as the one relevant NJ appellate case had held. Tris
Pharma, Inc. v. UCB Manufacturing, Inc., 2016 WL 4506129 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Aug. 29, 2016).

True, the Third Circuit stated in an infringement case, pre-Tris
Pharma
, that “the federal law of unfair competition under § 43 (a) [of the
Lanham Act] is not significantly different from the New Jersey [common] law of
unfair competition[.]” But that was only true with respect to passing off (and
other things like the relevance of common-law agency principles).

Finally, the court noted, the Third Circuit has indicated
that “where two competing yet sensible interpretations of state law exist, we
should opt for the interpretation that restricts liability, rather than expands
it, until the Supreme Court of [New Jersey] decides differently.” Travelers
Indem. Co. v. Dammann & Co., Inc., 594 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 2010) (cleaned
up). [I’m not sure Chief Judge Becker of blessed memory would endorse this
view—he thought of judging as the process of doing justice, and he was willing
to evolve the common law towards that end.]

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Conspicuous Consumers, NYU Engelberg Center

Welcome and Keynote: Nancy Mahon, SVP, Global Corporate
Citizenship & Sustainability, The Estée Lauder Companies

Interesting talk; I learned that UK consumers respond well
to claims that a product decreases the company’s carbon footprint, but US
consumers aren’t interested in that and want to know about the effect on their
own carbon footprint.

Sustainability in the Eye of the Beholder

Rochelle Dreyfuss, Engelberg Center on Innovation Law &
Policy, NYU School of Law (moderator)

Anna Tischner, Jagiellonian University in Krakow: European
TM law can override sustainability despite EU’s attempted commitment to carbon
neutrality. Hermes won a case against an atelier that incorporated scarves into
new clothes. But her research shows consumers understand that refurbished etc.
goods have qualities not reflecting on the TM owner. Need more space for this. British
case didn’t allow refurbishment to convert devices to electric, but only b/c
the advertising was confusing—which is correctable, and thus perhaps a positive
sign.

Maggie Chon, Seattle University School of Law: Discussed
certification marks as ways to build consumer trust/purchase interest. Issues:
standards represented by certification mark can be opaque; hard to figure out
what they really require. Also, certifications can compete and have different
standards—consumers aren’t equipped to figure out which “fair trade” marks are
more stringent or less stringent.

Jessica Silbey, Boston University School of Law: Project
w/Mark McKenna on interviews with designers: insist on design as a process, not
an outcome; they want to unify form and function; and they consider themselves
human-focused, oriented to solving problems. In the sustainability context,
they want to act as moral entrepreneurs. Coherence, minimalism, sustainability,
accessibility, and inclusivity are goals—coherence and minimalism seem
aesthetic but they’re also about avoiding material waste. The last three are
considerations they think necessary for good designs/progress: the ability for
everyone to use the design. E.g., designing for an insulin pen that will
actually be used (many people don’t take their meds). OXO dustpan designed to
be used by all kinds of hands.

Aaron Perzanowski, University of Michigan Law School: Right
to repair and sustainability—appliances, electronics, vehicles need fixing; can
that be done outside authorized channels? Firms have strong incentives to
assert control over repair process, which can be incredibly lucrative. Fixing
cracked phone screens is $3 billion/year in US alone. Expensive repairs also
drive new device purchases. 150 million mobile phones are discarded per year;
60 million metric tons of e-waste a year. About 70% of toxic waste in US
landfills is e-waste. DMCA as a big problem; 1201 exemptions allow repair of,
e.g., tractors, but no one is allowed to distribute a tool to others to do
this, so farmers better be good programmers.

Patent law can also be an issue, as can individual component
parts covered by utility or design patents, giving power over price and
availability. Especially problematic given incredibly low standards for design
patent—big uptick in auto parts as well as home appliances. Fed Cir did away
with longstanding test for obviousness of design patents in GM v. LKQ; what
that means in long term is not yet clear but could mean fewer low value design
patents. Trade secrets are also an issue, but claimants can’t usually defend
them—the info is generally ascertainable through simple reverse engineering. We
don’t need to respect your wishes not to disclose info just b/c you’d make more
money if you kept it to yourself.

TM too (already covered by other speakers). Biggest problem
here is importation—exhaustion. But TM law prevents “material differences” and
courts are much too eager to find such differences—a difference in warranty;
existence of phone support (even for ball bearings). Nominative fair use does a
good job in its lane, though.

So far we’ve passed right to repair laws covering 100
million people in US, including in California. Also worked on National Defense
Authorization Act to get right to repair requirements in any purchase DoD
makes.

Tischner: EU design law has a repair clause for spare parts.
This allows independent manufacturers to make & sell parts that reproduce a
protected design as long as it’s genuinely for repair. The real tension comes
from TM law, not design law—the design law exception doesn’t apply horizontally
across IP, so companies use TM to block repair and control markets. Surveyed
professionals: saw logo on repair part as description of part, not indication
of origin. TM law is also normative, but results of our and similar empirical
studies should inform TM policy.

Q: do designers think about repair?

Silbey: They think about durability.

Perzanowski: there’s a tradeoff b/t durability and
repairability, which we need to recognize and educate about. Sometimes the
market recognizes this, as for cars. Not so much whether it’s designed for
repair but who gets to do the repair there. Consider relatively direct
regulatory intervention in design: mandating user-replaceable batteries on
consumer electronics, for example. If Apple was required by law to make a
swappable battery, it would probably do a really good job, but it won’t if it’s
not forced to; we’ve already seen this work with USB-C.

The Consumer Scientist

Chris Morten, Engelberg Center on Innovation Law &
Policy, NYU School of Law (moderator)

Fran Visco, National Breast Cancer Coalition: created a
science education program for patient advocates: how to analyze clinical
trials, interpret statistical information, understand the cell cycle—important
for determining endpoints.

Hilary Koch, Advocate for people living with diabetes:
continuous glucose monitors existed, but couldn’t be monitored
remotely—advocates like Koch created an open source solution for this. Likewise,
devices didn’t talk to each other; created open solution for that. Able to
sleep through the night for the first time in 10 years! Huge improvement in
diabetes management. Non-FDA approved device was better than anything on the
market b/c patients came together to make it themselves. Everyone had to make
it themselves (adding software to FDA-approved devices) to avoid FDA [and
1201?]. But someone was available to provide advice 24/7. Now there’s an FDA
approved device to talk to other devices, and one reason is b/c of the earlier
patient-based devices. Non-approved devices are also still out there and ahead
of the FDA-approved devices thanks to patient scientists.

She also had a really interesting discussion of how each
patient’s experience is different and they’re experts on their own experiences
and need more control: women want information on how their menstrual cycles
affect them and want to be able to press a button on their device to flag this;
many hospitals don’t allow insulin pumps, but today’s insulin pumps take care
of everything and this rule makes diabetics terrified to go into hospitals for
other issues.

Steve Woloshin, Dartmouth Geisel School of Medicine: patients
are often underrepresented in product design, testing, and regulatory approval.
Communication with patients to understand what the products (tests, devices,
drugs) do and how to use them is vital but it’s often an afterthought. DTC ads:
oversight is spotty and they aren’t required to tell you how effective they
are. Covid home test kits example: Although they did test the instructions,
which was good, they didn’t test whether people understood what results they
were getting—have to use Bayes’ law to understand the chance that you’re
infected, given a positive or negative test result. It’s easy to get wrong and
the instructions didn’t explain it at all. Empirical tests showed that 33% of
people in a high risk group (symptoms, exposed to someone with determined
covid) would not understand the risks of a negative result. Were able to reduce
that to 14% with revised instructions, and to decrease unnecessary quarantine
decisions. An untested communication can be as dangerous as an untested drug.

DTC ads: Billions of dollars spent on them; people see 9
drug ads/day. But they overstate benefits/downplay harms/overstate certainties.
There’s a lot of opportunity to make ads better but the system is
reactive/slow. FDA announced that it will revisit DTC ads. Dozens of warning
letters about ads, largely b/c visual messages were allegedly misleading (take
this drug and you’ll be able to climb mountains). Good start, but tip of
iceberg. Basic problem: ads fail to tell consumers how well the drug works. Often
unclear what outcomes the drug treats, or even conditions. Quantify the
outcome! Same for common serious harms.

Current regs say you have to discuss benefit, but benefit
just means indication under current rules—so if you say “decreases cholesterol”
you’re done. But does that affect your chance of having a heart attack? Does it
cut it in half from 2% to 1%? Something else? Nothing in current regs about
quantifying benefits or harms; nothing about pretesting ads for accurate
communication. Should have a drug facts box like a nutrition facts box.

Charles Duan, American University Washington College of Law:
standard IP incentive theories don’t explain open source innovations here,
which involve huge amounts of effort donated to the community. People who
change their diets to improve their health are also experimenting on
themselves—self-motivation is very important. Need to think about how to
regulate open source devices, where there isn’t a wealthy drug company behind
them.

IP Rights as a Signal to Consumers

Jeanne Fromer, Engelberg Center on Innovation Law &
Policy, NYU School of Law (moderator)

Chris Cotropia, University of Richmond School of Law: Do
patent claims matter to consumers? No, not really. There’s a false marking
provision in patent law that seems to think that they might. Patent is more
about communication between competitors/producers, less about consumers.
Patent’s justification: Incentive for invention, and for commercialization. Get
the new, useful, nonobvious thing created and produced. But can communicating
to consumer create a direct feedback effect?

Notice statute: can’t get patent damages unless infringer
has notice. Can be actual, or constructive by marking the patented product. The
audience is not the consumer, but competitors. False marking statute, though,
has consumers in mind—can’t mark product as patented or patent pending if
that’s not true; initially empowered qui tam actions. Theory was a consumer
oriented theory—that there was potential harm to the consumer. Lots of people
engaged in false marking b/c they had, e.g., plastic molds; the patent would
expire and they’d keep using the molds. Entrepreneurial lawyers started suing;
then AIA changed the law to require competitive harm from the false marking. So,
what information are consumers getting from the patent marking?

Study
by Alexander Billy & Neel Sukhatme
: convinced drugstores to let them
enhance marking on actually patented products in some drugstores and not
others; they found essentially a perfect null effect. Tried again on Mechanical
Turk with vignettes and found the same null effect. Do find that “patented”
label leads survey respondents to think that the product was more innovative;
didn’t translate into willingness to buy. Another study, Gavin Milczarek-Desai
& Derek E. Bambauer
: showed ads, some said patented, patented pending,
Consumer Reports supports, or nothing, and found no variation, but “patent
pending” may have a slight effect on reported willingness to buy. His own
study: crowdfunding campaigns. Found same (lack of) effect. Patent label didn’t
change success right, but “patent pending” had higher success rate. In lab,
people are 2x as likely to invest in a project that says “patent pending” as
opposed to “patented” or nothing. Consumers are just looking at the products and
deciding if they want to buy. Why might “patent pending” be different? Might
seem even more innovative—haven’t even had time to get a patent yet! But we
don’t know.

Jacob Noti-Victor, Cardozo Law: Copyright side—copyrights
are also not strong signals to consumers. There may be a theory that the © next
to a work confers legitimacy, but hasn’t seen empirical studies. Maybe video
game industry achieved some legitimacy by using ©? But we do know that
consumers don’t know what © means when they see it.

©’s human authorship requirement and effects of AI: enabled
or even manufactured consumer-facing signals of things consumers do care about,
such as authenticity. There’s no authorship for computer generated works as
such—long tradition of not recognizing nonhuman authorship. Trickier when
there’s a human and an AI system. Human prompting isn’t sufficient for human
authorship, CO says, even with detailed prompt engineering/iterative prompting.
Office based this on a reading of the law and the mechanics of the
technology—there’s too attenuated a connection b/t the prompt and the final
output; the prompter can’t predict or conceptualize the expressive
output—there’s no requisite causation/connection b/t idea and expression. Like
Chapman Kelly garden case where 7th Circuit says a garden is too
unpredictable to be ©able. But there can be protection for human selection,
coordination, and arrangement of AI products—curatorial decisions around AI
content, not AI content itself; will be thin copyright.

Office’s choices here are coextensive with consumer
preferences for process: preferences tied to the means of production and not
solely to the output. Fair trade coffee. Consumers are more likely to want to
buy non-AI work; this isn’t just squeamishness but ethical priorities and
desire for authenticity that affects consumer decisionmaking especially in
aesthetic contexts. Authenticity can have dark sides, but it’s also a way to
acknowledge the social role of art and its role in moral identity/self-identification.

Office requires disclaimers of AI generated material.
Registration potentially provides info to consumers. Could be a good record,
assuming copyright claimants are telling the truth. But more can be done.

Mark McKenna, UCLA School of Law: Most obvious way IP rights
might signal to consumers is by being a marketing tool: claimant advertises it
has an IP right to show the product is meritorious or unique compared to other
products, and that might work even w/o a clear idea of the content of the
right. The patent evidence is interesting; maybe there’s an analogy here to how
some colleges publicize percentage of faculty w/terminal degrees and others
don’t feel the need to do so; maybe at the top end, producers assume you know
they’re innovative (Apple) and don’t prioritize patents.

GIs: could also publicize the characteristic of a good as
being (supposedly) geographically 
unique.

What about feedback loops where existence of rights feeds
back into scope of rights? TM: b/c those rights depend on consumer
understanding, but consumer understanding can be shaped by their beliefs about
what law allows/requires. The existence of rights depends on consumer
understanding, b/c it determines whether there’s been trademark use, or
secondary meaning to make it a TM; the scope of rights depends on consumers’
beliefs about what others are allowed to do. The rules on secondary meaning
give a lot of weight by actions taken by putative owner to claim the existence
of rights: creates incentives to publicize claims—the nature of putative mark’s
presence in ads matters a lot. Matters even more when the claimed matter is
complex; courts will often condition protection on “look for” advertising—to
call it out from the background noise.

Claims of rights in relation to certain kinds of uses of TM
can also shape consumer understandings in ways that turn out to affect legal
scope. This is true at the retail level—particular uses of a particular mark,
like NFL’s assertion of extremely broad rights in “Super Bowl” TM. Threatens
bars, churches, community organizations that advertise they’ll (legally) show
the Super Bowl. Even if there’s no suggestion of sponsorship other than the use
of “Super Bowl.” These are paradigmatic nominative fair uses and shouldn’t be
w/in the scope of the NFL’s rights, but the NFL has been unbelievably
successful with these threats, so most references are to “the Big Game,” which
itself is both cause and effect of consumer beliefs. But by the same logic, NFL
can claim rights in “the Big Game.”

This effect can also work at the wholesale level—entire
categories of uses like merchandising—50 years ago no one thought universities
had the sole right to use university marks on T-shirts. Madison, like every
other college town, was full of T-shirts featuring UW marks, some of which
predated UW’s own use on t-shirts. But a major campaign branded these as
counterfeits; leveraged relationship with university bookstores to control
major apparel companies. Strategy seems to have worked; many people now believe
the law requires university permission even though no one thinks the university
is responsible for the quality of the t-shirts. PTO even made up the “secondary
source” rule: use on the front of a T-shirt functions as a mark if the mark is
known in some other setting. Created ©-like rights in anything related to them,
justified by reference to the consumer understanding they’ve created. Can also
be used for, e.g., mid-century modern design—association of design w/designer
can be leveraged into “source” claims for the actual furniture.

Consumer understanding can be shaped, and some claimants are
well situated to do so and have strong incentives to do it; but we shouldn’t
hand over the game to claimants.

Rebecca Tushnet, Harvard Law School

I decided to frame my part of this panel as “can claims of
IP rights mislead consumers in a way that triggers general advertising
law?” I’m going to start with two requirements of false advertising law that
don’t generally apply to IP rights. First, federal false advertising law
targets only false or misleading statements in “commercial advertising or
promotion.” This is probably not a big barrier for the kinds of claims at issue
here, but it’s worth keeping in mind: use instructions, as discussed in the previous
panel, might not be advertising (though it likely depends on the product). Second,
materiality: to be actionable, a false or misleading statement has to be the
kind of statement that is likely to affect consumers’ decisions, as opposed to
TM law, which doesn’t require materiality for infringement.

As we already heard, materiality is often a problem in
litigating alleged IP-related falsehoods, including false patent marking – most
of the time, consumers don’t really care about patent rights. In addition, a
Supreme Court case, Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox, limited the scope of the
federal Lanham Act in a way that turns out to be relevant to IP-related
signals. That case interpreted the language barring any “false designation
of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation
of fact, which … is likely to cause confusion … as to the origin …
of  goods” to mean only references
to physical origin, rather than the source of ideas or expressions
embodied in a product.

Lower courts have subsequently held that Dastar limits the
scope of federal false advertising law b/c representations about IP rights
aren’t representations about physical origin; thus, falsely stating or implying
that your music is properly licensed does not constitute a false representation
covered by the act. Courts also interpret many state consumer protection laws
to be coextensive w/the Lanham Act, though it’s possible to argue that some are
broader. There is also a limiting case where the representations are not just
about IP rights but also state or imply facts about the physical product:
Crocs, Inc. v. Effervescent, Inc., No. 2022-2160 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2024).

Crocs sued competitors for patent infringement; defendant
Dawgs counterclaimed for false advertising about the characteristics of the
primary material Crocs uses to make its footwear products, a material it
promoted as the “patented,” “proprietary,” and “exclusive” “Croslite.” But
“authorship, like licensing status, is not a nature, characteristic, or
quality, as those terms are used in Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act.” By
contrast, “here, the false claim that a product is patented does not stand alone.
Dawgs presents allegations and evidence that the falsity of Crocs’ promotional
statements is rooted in the nature, characteristics, or qualities of Crocs’
products.” So the question will generally be whether the statement about IP
rights conveys a factual claim about the more tangible characteristics of the
good (or service) at issue.

Finally, I want to introduce as an additional framing point
that law, including product liability law, often doesn’t require TM licensors
to take responsibility for their products even when consumers might expect that
and even when the TM probably drove the sales—arguably false advertising should
not accept this result. Example: Troncoso v. TGI Friday’s Inc., 2020 WL 3051020
(S.D.N.Y. Jun. 8, 2020)

Troncoso purchased a bag of snack chips labeled “TGI Fridays
Potato Skins Snacks,” mistakenly believing the chips to contain real potato
skins given that the restaurant chain TGI Fridays sells a Potato Skins
appetizer that includes the flesh and peel of the potato. But, even though the
TGIF branding is probably what led consumers to have a lot of their
expectations about the product, and even though the court found that the
product was plausibly deceptive, the trademark owner was off the hook. The
court said: “TGIF may be liable for that misleading labeling under GBL §§ 349
and 350 and principles of common-law fraud only if it engaged in making the
misleading labeling.” The allegation of licensing “does not suggest that TGIF
was involved in any aspects of the labeling beyond its own trademark, which
Plaintiff does not allege is misleading”

It’s an example of IP rights—the right to license the mark
to others—as false signals. I’ll end with a potentially contrasting case:
Puma v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, No. A-1-CA-38023, 2022 WL 3221810, — P.3d –
(N.M. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2022) The Pumas alleged that defendants violated the New
Mexico Unfair Practices Act based on their purchase of a Black &
Decker-branded coffeemaker.

Based on Black & Decker’s reputation, the Pumas thought
the coffeemaker would be better than the lower-priced store brand and paid more
for it as a result. However, Black & Decker did not in fact design,
manufacture, distribute, or warrant the coffeemaker. The district court, after
a bench trial, found that defendants’ conduct constituted an “unfair or
deceptive trade practice.”

Thus, the presence of the trademark plus the absence of any
disclosure on the product or the advertising could deceive reasonable consumers
about either (1) the relationship between Black & Decker and Applica; or
(2) that the product was in fact a product of Applica, rather than of Black
& Decker. The court pointed out that the name, “Black & Decker 12 Cup
Programmable Coffeemaker” “emphasized that the ‘Black & Decker’ name was an
important characteristic of the Coffeemaker; these statements tended to deceive
a reasonable consumer, and Defendants knew or should have known that potential
purchasers of the Coffeemaker would likely regard information about the
Coffeemaker being a Black & Decker product as material.”

The court emphasized that it was not holding “that the use
of a trademark by a licensee pursuant to a trademark licensing agreement by
itself constitutes an unfair or deceptive trade practice,” or that individual
or widespread licensing was “per se irrelevant” to the inquiry. Nor was
evidence of the quality of the licensed product “per se irrelevant.” Rather,
the court of appeals was simply holding that the Lanham Act did not govern the
UPA claim, “and that, under the circumstances of this case, Defendants’ knowing
and willful use of ambiguity as to material fact, which tended to deceive a
reasonable consumer, constituted an unfair or deceptive trade practice.” I tend
to believe we’d be better off if we held TM owners more clearly to their
bargain—when they license in order to make a product more attractive, we should
recognize that the TM is helping to sell the licensed product and thus hold
them jointly liable for quality.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/10/conspicuous-consumers-nyu-engelberg.html

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California’s limits on use of “doctor” in healthcare settings are constitutional regulations of commercial speech

Palmer v. Bonta, 2025 WL 2882948, No. EDCV 23-1047 JGB (SPx)
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2025)

Plaintiffs alleged that California Business and Professions
Code § 2054(a), on its face and as enforced, violates the First Amendment
because it provides, in relevant part:

[a]ny person who uses in any sign,
business card, or letterhead, or, in an advertisement, the words “doctor” …,
the letters or prefix “Dr.,” … or any other terms or letters indicating or
implying that the person is a physician and surgeon … without having at the
time of so doing a valid, unrevoked, and unsuspended certificate as a physician
and surgeon under this chapter, is guilty of a misdemeanor. No person shall use
the words “doctor” or “physician,” the letters or prefix “Dr.,” … or any other
terms or letters indicating or implying that the person is a physician and
surgeon … in a health care setting that would lead a reasonable patient to
determine that person is a licensed “M.D.” or “D.O.”

The Board of Registered Nursing supported this law only if
it allowed nurses with a terminal degree (i.e., Doctor of Nursing Practice) to
use “Dr.” “regardless of setting” so long as they indicated their profession or
specialty on their badge and in communication. Bonta, on behalf of the Board of
Registered Nursing, filed an Accusation against Erny, who is a Doctor of
Nursing Practice (DNP), for “representing to patients that she was a medical
doctor” in violation of Section 2054; the District Attorney for San Luis Obispo
County then sought an injunction, civil penalties, and other equitable relief
against her. She was ordered to pay $19,750 in civil penalties.

Plaintiff Palmer also holds a DNP. Between 2020, when she
earned her DNP, and 2023, Palmer (1) wore a clinician’s jacket embroidered with
“Dr. J. Palmer, FNP-C”; (2) introduced herself to patients, “I’m Dr. Jacqueline
Palmer. I’m a nurse practitioner”; (3) signed her name on official clinic
documents using the title “Dr.” and “FNP” as a post-nominal; and (4) was not
aware that it was illegal to use the title “Dr.” on her clinician’s jacket or
in any other way so long as she disclosed that she was a nurse practitioner.
Palmer always disclosed to patients that she is a nurse practitioner and never
practiced outside of her scope of practice for licensure.

Nonetheless, patients have assumed that Palmer was a medical
doctor. The American Medical Association’s survey results that show that 39% of
patients believe that a DNP is a physician.

After learning about the legal actions against Erny, Palmer
stopped wearing her clinician’s jacket, stopped signing official clinic
documents using the title “Dr.,” and asked others not to refer to her as “Dr.”
She would like to return to her previous practices. Other plaintiffs had
similar stories.

There is nothing that a nurse practitioner that has a DNP
can do that a nurse practitioner that does not have a DNP cannot. DNP programs
range from one to two years; they can be online with no in-person classes; they
don’t have stringent admission requirements; they may not have, and plaintiffs’
programs didn’t have, courses in, e.g., anatomy, biology, biochemistry,
immunology, physiology, pathology, or pharmacology; so too for clinical work
with patients/patient interaction.

One plaintiff testified that he believed that he would
attract more patients to his aesthetic clinic if he can call himself “Dr.
Hanson” as opposed to not using the title “doctor,” because “[i]f patients were
given the opportunity to pick between two clinics, one with Dr. Hanson and one
with Mr. Hanson written on it, most would gravitate to the former.” Plaintiffs
didn’t know whether patients know what the letters DNP, PHN, MSN, MASE, BSPT,
or FNP-C mean (all relevant terms for credentialing) and largely didn’t know the
terms until they sought more credentials.

Plaintiffs argued that Section 2054 is a content-and
speaker-based restriction on speech, and thus subject to strict scrutiny. The
court rejected this argument.

Facial challenge: Plaintiffs argued that the law “sweeps in
its ambit an array of professionals who are not physicians or surgeons but who
still can truthfully (and regularly) call themselves ‘Dr.’: psychologists
(PsyD), pharmacists (PharmD), naturopaths (ND), physical therapists (DPT), and
Ph.Ds (including honorary Ph.Ds).” In a First Amendment facial challenge, “[t]he
question is whether a substantial number of the law’s applications are
unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate
sweep.”

“The first step in the proper facial analysis is to assess
the state laws’ scope.” “What activities, by what actors, do the laws prohibit
or otherwise regulate?” The second step “is to decide which of the laws’
applications violate the First Amendment, and to measure them against the
rest.” The party bringing the First Amendment facial challenge has the burden
to show the full scope of the law’s coverage; to identify which of the law’s
applications are constitutionally permissible and which are not; and, ultimately,
to show that the law “prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech
relative to its plainly legitimate sweep.”

The California Court of Appeals has found that the “purpose
of [S]ection [2054] is to protect the public,” specifically by regulating the
use of certain professional titles associated with the medical field—i.e.,
“Dr.” and “doctor”—in healthcare-related advertising and healthcare settings. The
court found this was a regulation of commercial speech. The “use of
professional titles and certifications in advertising, yellow-pages listings,
business cards, and stationery is commercial speech.”

Plaintiffs argued the law expanded into noncommercial space
by adding the phrase “in a healthcare setting that would lead a reasonable
patient to determine that person is a licensed ‘M.D.’ or ‘D.O.’ ” Because the
patient is already seeking out care from plaintiffs by the time they use “Dr.”
or “doctor” in a healthcare setting, they argued that they were engaged in
noncommercial speech and that any commercial speech was inextricably
intertwined with fully protected speech.

Although using “doctor” in a healthcare setting wasn’t a
traditional ad format, it was still commercial speech: The “specific product” plaintiffs
sought to advertise when using “Dr.” or “doctor” in healthcare settings was “the
expertise, knowledge, and quality of services these professional titles convey
to patients and colleagues.” And they had an economic motive for the speech: “to
solicit [and retain] a patient base” and improve their professional brand.

The facial challenge failed because the law regulated
misleading speech, and even if it went beyond that, was ok under Central
Hudson
.

As-applied challenge: The Supreme Court has distinguished
between “inherently misleading” speech and “potentially misleading” speech.
When “advertising is inherently likely to deceive or where the record indicates
that a particular form or method of advertising has in fact been deceptive,”
the advertising enjoys no First Amendment protection. The government may ban
this type of commercial speech entirely. But if the speech is only “potentially
misleading,” in other words, “if the information also may be presented in a way
that is not deceptive,” Central Hudson (intermediate) scrutiny is
required.

But here, the record indicated that plaintiffs’ particular
form or method of advertising has “in fact been deceptive.”  It was undisputed that patients assumed Palmer
was a medical doctor and that plaintiff Hanson makes it a point to explain to
patients that he is not a physician when they call him “Dr.” Thus, the speech was
inherently misleading even though it communicates truthful information. Plaintiffs
conceded as much by agreeing that the use of “Dr.” or “doctor” in healthcare
settings without further clarification generally refers to licensed physicians
or surgeons. Accordingly, “[t]he assumption that substantial numbers of
potential clients would be so misled is hardly a speculative one.”

California not only regulates the title “doctor,” it
regulates the licensing and practice of physicians and surgeons. Plaintiffs didn’t
meet these statutory requirements, and thus their use of “Dr.” or “doctor” was
inherently misleading.

Even if it was only potentially misleading, the regulation
would still satisfy Central Hudson in advertising and healthcare
settings. California has a substantial interest in “protecting consumers from
those who falsely hold themselves out as licensed physicians but [who] have not
been duly licensed.” What about the fit between the legislature’s ends and the
means it chose?

Plaintiffs argued that “at least as applied to nurse
practitioners with DNPs, [who truthfully refer to themselves as “Dr.” or
“doctor,”] [S]ection 2054[ ] does not directly advance Defendants’ only stated
interest because it does not prevent fraudulent misrepresentations.”

Under Central Hudson, “the State must demonstrate
that the challenged regulation advances the Government’s interest in a direct
and material way,” which requires it to show “that the harms it recites are
real and that its restrictions will in fact alleviate them to a material
degree.” Empirical data, studies, anecdotes (whether in-state or
extra-jurisdictional), history, consensus, and common sense are all relevant.
Here, the “harms [California] recites are real” because the speech has caused
some patient confusion. And it was reasonable to infer that some consumers will
assume that Plaintiffs are licensed physicians or surgeons if they use “Dr.” or
“doctor” in healthcare settings and in advertising materials promoting medical
services even if Plaintiffs also identify themselves as DNPs, as borne out by
the AMA survey showing 39% of patients believe that a DNP is a physician and
plaintiffs’ own ignorance of what the letters DNP meant until they started
pursuing higher education.

What about less restrictive alternatives? Plaintiffs argued
that they were already required to disclose and explain their license and
credentials, and California’s false advertising and unfair business practices
laws already address concerns about patient deception. However, “[i]n
considering the restriction imposed on commercial speech, [courts] do not
require that it be the least restrictive means available.” Rather, what is
required is “a reasonable fit between the legislature’s ends and the means
chosen to accomplish those ends.”

Here, Section 2054 didn’t limit plaintiffs’ ability to
describe themselves as DNPs or to otherwise accurately state their credentials.
So there was a reasonable fit.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/10/californias-limits-on-use-of-doctor-in.html

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court allows false advertising claim based on manipulation of Amazon’s “variation” system

Corsair Gaming, Inc. v. Choice Electronics Inc., 2025 WL
2822691, No. 5:25-cv-00045-BLF (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2025)

Corsair sued Choice for alleged infringement by selling
used, unauthorized, or counterfeit Corsair computer/gaming products. This
opinion deals with Choice’s counterclaims. The false advertising part of those counterclaims
rests on Amazon’s “variation” system.

The court declined to dismiss counterclaims for declaratory
judgment of noninfringement and cancellation of Corsair’s mark for naked
licensing. Although use by a related company (here, a different Corsair entity
than the owner of record) counts as use, the allegations here were that the
entity that used the mark wasn’t supervised at all by the owner of record and
thus didn’t qualify as “related.” The Lanham Act specifically defines “related
company” as “any person whose use of a mark is controlled by the owner of the
mark with respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services on or in
connection with which the mark is used.”

False advertising: Vendors and third-party sellers can create
“variation” relationships between substantially similar products that differ
only in specific, narrow ways. Such products will appear on the same product
detail page, with each variation, e.g., color, size, or count, selectable. Because
of variations’ close similarity, the product detail page displays the total
number of ratings and the average star rating for all products in a given
variation relationship. Amazon’s  “variation policy” prohibits vendors from
grouping together fundamentally different products within the same variation
relationship.

Choice alleged that Corsair “knowingly manipulates Amazon
listings in order to show inflated and unwarranted reviews for its products by
misleadingly listing new products as ‘variations’ of pre-existing products,
instead of creating new listings for new products,” causing consumers to be
“deceived and confused into believing that Corsair Products have amassed
significant amounts of positive reviews and high ratings, when, in fact, such
reviews and ratings merely relate to a prior product.” The court agreed that
this stated a claim.

First, Choice plausibly alleged competitive harm enough to
satisfy both Article III and the Lanham Act. And, even assuming that Rule 9(b)
applied, the counterclaims adequately pled with specificity how Corsair allegedly
created a variation relationship between three different computer monitors
despite substantial technological differences. Choice wasn’t required under
Rule 9(b) to catalogue every single instance in which Corsair improperly
created a variation listing.

Related state law claims also survived, except for counterclaims
about the Corsair warranty, which was allegedly misleading to consumers but not
causally connected to harm to Choice. The warranty allegedly was unenforceable
under state law precluding sales-channel restrictions on warranties, but allegedly
misled consumers by creating the false impression that Corsair Products
purchased through Choice’s Amazon storefront were not subject to the same
protections and thus “discouraged and dissuaded consumers from purchasing
genuine Corsair Products from Choice Electronics.” But these allegations were “conclusory
and wholly speculative.” [Could a survey have fixed this?] Similarly, Choice
couldn’t sue based on the alleged legal violation under an “unlawfulness”
theory under California or New York law because it lacked sufficient injury.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/10/court-allows-false-advertising-claim.html

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court rejects affiliation confusion theory for lack of harm, declines to order tarps over P’s goods

Survitec Survival Prods., Inc. v. Fire Protection Service,
Inc., 2025 WL 2782332, No. H-21-312 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2025)

This case demonstrates exactly why harm to the plaintiff
should be explicitly a part of a trademark case that relies on extended
theories of confusion (that is, non-source confusion). It shows in great detail
why any theoretical confusion about affiliation would have been completely
irrelevant to both parties’ customers—which is why they make assumptions/don’t
bother to think about the issue.

The court introduces the case:

Survitec Group Ltd. is the parent
of a large group of corporate entities, including some that make maritime
survival equipment, such as life rafts. Fire Protection Service, Inc. sells and
services this kind of equipment. Beginning in the 1970s, Fire Protection and
some Survitec entities operated under an oral agreement allowing Fire
Protection to use Survitec-entity trademarks, trade names, and brand names and
to serve as a dealer and servicer of Survitec-branded products. Survitec Group
Ltd. terminated that agreement in 2017 after it acquired a Houston company that
serviced life rafts and could compete with Fire Protection and similar
companies in the Houston area.

Survitec here alleged that Fire Protection continued to use
its trademarks without authorization, in violation of Texas and Louisiana law
and the Lanham Act. After a bench trial, the court found that Survitec failed
to prove its claims. [There are a lot of trademarks, I assume because of a private equity rollup trying to decrease competition in the field, but it turns out their specific identities don’t matter.]

Survitec’s termination letters demanded that Fire Protection
“cease using all trademarks, trade names and brand names of Survitec and its
group companies,” with each notice listing a different, but overlapping, group
of trademarks. “The letters did not prohibit Fire Protection from accepting
Survitec-branded life rafts needing service or repairs and sending the rafts to
a certified third party to do the work. Nor did the letters require Fire
Protection to inform customers that it was outsourcing service and repair work
to certified third parties.”

To service life rafts, both the U.S. Coast Guard and the
equipment manufacturer—in this case, a Survitec entity—must certify the
servicing technician. The certifications of two Fire Protection technicians
were set to end the same month that Survitec Group Ltd. sent the termination
letters, but Survitec Group Ltd. extended their certifications through the
December 2017 termination date and immediately terminated the certifications of
a third technician.

Fire Protection tried to sell its inventory of
Survitec-branded products during the pre-termination period, including working
to facilitate the repurchase of that inventory by a Survitec entity whose
standard practice is to repurchase leftover inventory from terminated dealers. But
the Survitec delayed in doing so, including by waiting until December 2018 to
issue Fire Protection a return authorization. Because of that delay, and
because Survitec’s termination letters forbade Fire Protection from selling its
Survitec-branded inventory to third parties after the termination date, some of
the inventory expired.

The parties agreed that under the first-sale doctrine, Fire
Protection could resell genuine Survitec goods that Fire Protection had
purchased before the termination. Thus, Survitec’s actions and inactions
prevented Fire Protection from recovering the value of that inventory.

After the termination, Survitec entities filled orders from
Fire Protection for the resale of safety equipment other than life rafts, such
as personal flotation devices and worked with Fire Protection to service life
rafts for the entities’ customers. Those Survitec entities serviced life rafts
for some of Fire Protection’s customers. And Fire Protection serviced some
third-party-branded life rafts for Survitec when, for example, customers had rafts
that were subject to an exclusive servicing arrangement with Fire Protection.  

“After its termination as a licensed Survitec dealer, Fire
Protection continued to assist customers who needed Survitec-branded life rafts
serviced by subcontracting the servicing work to certified third-party
servicers…. Fire Protection would accept orders to service customers’ life
rafts; outsource the service work to a certified subcontractor; and return the
life raft to the customer with an invoice that included all the work.” Sometimes,
Fire Protection notified its customers that it was no longer a
Survitec-authorized service station and that it was outsourcing the service
work on the customers’ rafts.

Fire Protection used a brochure and line sheet that it used
at trade shows and posted to its website before the termination that included
some Survitec logos among over fifty brands for which Fire Protection offers
some good or service, which it removed when a Survitec representative notified
Fire Protection that they were still accessible online. Fire Protection also
continued to use its pre-termination stock of printed brochures at trade shows
after termination, until it ran out of brochures sometime in 2020. It also displayed
lists of domestic and international products that it sells; Fire Protection
updated its website in January 2021 to remove two remaining references.

brochure

website listing

In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard continued to list Fire
Protection as an authorized servicer of Survitec-branded products after the
termination. But the website included a disclaimer stating that the Coast Guard
is not liable for “any reliance on its [website’s] accuracy, completeness, or
timeliness.” No party told the Coast Guard to update its website until Fire
Protection did so in April 2023.

Coast Guard listing

In addition, when Fire Protection shipped customers’ rafts
to authorized service stations, the Survitec marks were on the life rafts, and
Fire Protection’s name was on the transporting vehicles. And when Fire
Protection’s subcontractors returned the Survitec-branded life rafts after
servicing them, the certificates that were required by federal regulations
included the Survitec entities’ marks as the manufacturer. Regulations required
both identification of the manufacturer and of the facility that had serviced
the life raft.

There was no evidence that any of these uses caused harm or confusion
that affected Survitec’s goodwill. Two witnesses testified that they thought
Fire Protection was still an authorized service station after the termination,
but didn’t convince the court that Fire Protection’s limited use of the
Survitec marks caused any economic or other harm to the plaintiffs.

One witness testified that her former employer used Fire
Protection to service its Survitec-branded life rafts; that she did not know
that Fire Protection outsourced the servicing work; and that she assumed Fire
Protection serviced the life rafts itself because federal regulations require
the manufacturer’s certification to service life rafts. The court gave this
(paid) testimony little weight, since she didn’t testify that Fire Protection’s
use of the plaintiffs’ marks confused her; rather, she testified that she
simply assumed Fire Protection was an authorized service dealer doing the
service work itself because it accepted a request to service Survitec-branded
life rafts. A rare and welcome intervention of causation reasoning in a
trademark case!

Her assumption that there would be no outsourcing was
unreasonable, as subcontracting is a normal part of the industry. In addition,
as part of her job, she reviewed certificates of servicing, which identify the
entity that serviced a life raft, including the certificates that Fire
Protection returned, which showed outsourcing on Survitec-branded rafts to an
authorized, third-party service provider. She had no complaints about the
quality of Fire Protection’s work or the price it charged. After she left her
company, Fire Protection told employees that it had to outsource some of their
requests for life-raft servicing, and the employees continued to use Fire
Protection to service the company’s rafts. Thus, Fire Protection did not retain
the company as a customer by failing to disclose that it subcontracted the
servicing of Survitec-branded life rafts. (The theory here is really a false
advertising theory.)

The other witness testified similarly, though he said that,
if he had known that Fire Protection outsourced the life-raft servicing, he
might have sought another service provider. But he lacked personal knowledge of
the transactions with Fire Protection, and he did not testify that Fire
Protection’s limited use of the plaintiffs’ marks caused his assumption that
Fire Protection was doing the service work itself. He also testified that Fire
Protection told one of his technicians that it had to ship their rafts to a
different facility for servicing. The possibility of outsourcing its life-raft
servicing did not cause him to look for other service providers with no
complaint about the quality or price.

Indeed, Fire Protection was the only local service station
in Corpus Christi, and ships often face a short period between docking and
their next voyage, creating the need for “tried-and-true service providers that
can service or repair life rafts in a short timeframe.” Further, “many
customers’ vessels often have life rafts and other safety equipment from
multiple manufacturers and are unlikely to use multiple service providers to
avoid outsourcing service work on life rafts from a single manufacturer.” Thus,
there was simply no causal link between use of Survitec’s marks and Fire
Protection’s sales, or any damage to Survitec. (The court also noted that, even
had some customers stopped using Fire Protection if they knew that Fire
Protection was subcontracting its servicing work on Survitec-branded rafts,
there was no credible evidence that those customers would have chosen a
Survitec-owned service station to do the work. In non-TM fields, this could be
an Article III standing problem.)

Nor was there any evidence of damage to the plaintiffs’
brand image or goodwill from the conduct at issue—the plaintiffs conceded that
Fire Protection could subcontract the work, just argued that Fire Protection
should have disclosed it. The court found no legal basis to conclude “that Fire
Protection infringed Survitec’s trademark by accepting work on Survitec-branded
rafts without disclosing to customers that it was not an authorized service
station.”

Survitec’s harm theory was that the failure to disclose
might give customers the impression that Survitec-branded rafts are expensive. But
there was no supporting evidence; “Fire Protection delivered its customers a
quality service at a price they paid without any evidence of complaints.”

Legal conclusions: Some of plaintiffs’ claims failed because
Fire Protection did not use the marks in commerce. Specifically, marks used on
the Coast Guard website weren’t use in commerce under trademark law. The
plaintiffs cannot state a claim for Fire Protection’s miscellaneous uses of
their marks. Use on a government website related to “regulatory approval,” not
to the sale of goods or services. “The Coast Guard does not accept payment for
listing information on its website, does not accept payment for individuals’
use of its website, and does not contain advertising or links to other
commercial websites. The presence of a mark on that website is not actionable,
commercial use.”

It was also not actionable to ship life rafts and resell
servicing certificates because of first sale. It was inevitable that Survitec’s
marks would be used in reselling its products. Also:

Plaintiffs’ counsel later suggested
that, to avoid infringement, Fire Protection should have draped tarp over
Survitec-branded life rafts that Fire Protection picked up from a ship and
drove to a servicing facility in a truck bearing Fire Protection’s name.
Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that the rafts had to be covered to avoid suggesting
to onlookers that Fire Protection had manufacturer and Coast Guard
authorization to service Survitec-branded rafts. This argument presents an
absurdity that the first-sale doctrine is supposed to prevent.

“In the absence of any credible evidence of confusion or
harm supporting the plaintiffs’ theory of infringement based on Fire
Protection’s transporting Survitec-branded rafts from ships to servicing
facilities, the court ‘decline[s] to expand the reach of’ trademark
protections.”

So too with Fire Protection’s use of plaintiffs’ marks on
servicing certificates that it returns to customers along with their serviced
life rafts. The servicing certificates are “valid and authentic documents,
created by life-raft manufacturers, including the plaintiffs, and sold to
authorized service stations. Federal regulations require their use and
prescribe their content and form.” Thus, the use of these certificates wasn’t
commercial use, and also subject to first-sale.

There was some potential for confusion about whether Fire
Protection was authorized to perform service work on Survitec-branded rafts
after Survitec had terminated that authorization.

The court started with the multifactor test, though it’s not
really suitable for affiliation confusion. It recognized this problem by reasoning
that nominative fair use and first sale “inform the likelihood-of-confusion
analysis.” Thus, Fire Protection would not be liable for using the plaintiffs’
marks on its website or in its brochure if doing so merely identifies the goods
or services it offers. “Fire Protection infringes the plaintiffs’ trademarks,
however, if its advertisements suggest that it is selling specific goods or
services with the plaintiffs’ endorsement.”

But the website, brochure, and line sheet weren’t likely to
cause a consumer to believe that the plaintiffs have an association with, or
endorse, Fire Protection. The court noted that the line sheet put plaintiffs’
marks among about 50 others, offered both sales and services, and also touted that
Fire Protection is the only manufacturer-authorized Viking service station in
Texas. Likewise, the website includes a long list of manufacturer names
(without logos) whose goods Fire Protection sells.

These types of “crowded, list-based advertisements, with no
other special indication of affiliation,” are the kind as to which no reasonable
jury could find affiliation confusion. Even with the special feature that, because
of federal regulation, a representation that Fire Protection services, as
opposed to merely sells, Survitec-branded rafts comes with a consumer
expectation that the service station has technicians certified by the
manufacturer, “[a] consumer is unlikely to believe that Fire Protection has
technicians certified by over fifty brands.” Few service stations are certified
by more than a handful of manufacturers. And the express statement that it was
a Viking-authorized service station “create[ed] the inference that it was not
manufacturer-authorized to service other brands.”

Plaintiffs’ failure to provide evidence of actual confusion confirmed
this finding. Their confusion witnesses “testified only that they thought Fire
Protection was affiliated with the plaintiffs because it accepted their
requests to service Survitec-branded life rafts, not because of Fire
Protection’s use of the plaintiffs’ marks. This is not evidence of confusion;
it is evidence that some consumers made faulty, and unwarranted, assumptions
that Fire Protection was not subcontracting the servicing of some life rafts.”
The relevant misrepresentation has to come from the defendant, not from some
other source, including an assumption that a seller of legitimate goods is an
authorized dealer or repair shop. “An erroneous and unreasonable consumer
assumption is not actionable infringement. The fact that this is the strongest
evidence of confusion that the plaintiffs introduced at trial generates an
additional inference against finding a likelihood of confusion.”

There was one exception—page 7 of the brochure indicated
that Fire Protection was authorized to service some of Survitech’s brands.  This was likely to lead consumers to believe
that the parties were affiliated, because only service stations with
technicians certified by manufacturers can service that manufacturer’s life
rafts. [For what it’s worth, I don’t even think that’s true, if “affiliation”
is read in its ordinary legal meaning—I’m not “affiliated” with the place I got
my driver’s license; I’m a graduate of various schools, but hardly an affiliate
of most of them.]

Page 7 claiming to service some Survitec brands

But this “technical” infringement didn’t entitle them to
actual or statutory damages. There was no proof of monetary harm, as required
for actual damages.  As discussed above, Fire
Protection neither gained nor retained customers because those customers
thought Fire Protection was authorized to service Survitec-branded life rafts. Thus,
Fire Protection was not unjustly enriched by its misrepresentation.

Also, kind of hilariously,

complicating the plaintiffs’ proof
of injury is the fact that Fire Protection used Survitec entities as
subcontractors. If Fire Protection had lost its customers, the plaintiffs could
have lost the customers that Fire Protection had referred to it. Third-party
service stations could have captured a greater proportion of the business that
left Fire Protection. In other words, Fire Protection’s subcontracting may have
helped, rather than hurt, the plaintiffs’ business.

Thus, the court could find neither actual damages nor unjust
profits from the infringement.

Survitec had another theory: Fire Protection damaged their
goodwill by accepting servicing work for the plaintiffs’ branded life rafts,
outsourcing that work, and increasing the prices the customers paid to cover
the prices that the third-party servicers charged Fire Protection for the
servicing work. This would allegedly cause consumers to believe that
Survitec-branded rafts are more expensive. [Wouldn’t it more plausibly prompt
you to find a cheaper servicer?]

The record undermined the theory: there was no evidence that
Fire Protection charged more than other raft-servicing establishments for
similar work, whether done in-house or outsourced; no one complained about the
price; and the record suggested that plaintiffs’ goodwill and reputation were
not particularly price-sensitive. In particular, Survitec didn’t control the
price that its authorized service stations charge their customers or the profit
margin the service stations may generate from servicing. “If the plaintiffs
were concerned about associating their brand with high prices, they could have
contracted to limit the prices that the authorized service stations could
charge. There is no record evidence that they did so.” As to Fire Protection
allegedly encouraging customers to switch to Viking by raising prices on
Survitec, “an authorized service station could, without infringing on the
plaintiffs’ marks or violating any other obligation to the plaintiffs, raise
the servicing prices on Survitec-branded rafts to influence customers to select
other brands. Generally, switching customers from one brand to another is not
improper business behavior; the law favors competition among manufacturers
selling different brands of the same type of product.’”

Ultimately, the plaintiffs didn’t tie their damages theory
to their theory of trademark infringement.

What about counterfeiting and statutory damages? The marks/uses
remaining in the case didn’t qualify. Two marks were unregistered; one was
registered, but not for the services at issue, only for the underlying life
rafts.

Dilution: Ugh.  Survitec
argued that Fire Protection’s failure to disclose to customers that it was
subcontracting the service work on Survitec-branded rafts gave customers the
impression that Survitec-branded rafts were expensive.

First, there was no federal fame. Slightly misstating the
law, the court says that marks must be both registered and famous, not just
distinct, so the unregistered marks couldn’t qualify. Even for the registered
marks, they introduced no proof that those marks were “famous,” that is, “widely
recognized by the general consuming public of the United States.”

Texas dilution: there was no proof of tarnishment via Fire
Protection’s acceptance of requests to service Survitec-branded rafts or Fire
Protection’s outsourcing of that work. The fact that the plaintiffs did not
control the prices that authorized service stations could charge also weighed
against any finding that Fire Protection charged prices that tarnished the
plaintiffs’ reputation.

False designation of origin/reverse passing off (because the
subcontractor provided the services): The traditional concern in a
reverse-passing-off case is that the actor “misrepresent[s] the relative
capabilities or accomplishments of the parties, thus creating the likelihood of
a future diversion of trade to the actor.” Thus liability attaches “only if the
actual producer can establish both the fact of a misrepresentation and a
likelihood of harm to its commercial relations.”

Most of the Survitec entities lacked standing, only the ones
Fire Protection used as a subcontractor and whose servicing work Fire
Protection allegedly passed off as its own. Plus, there was no proof of passing
off. “The case law does not recognize an affirmative duty on the part of a
seller to disclose the identity of the manufacturer or producer of goods
offered for sale; liability is imposed only on the basis of an express or
implied misrepresentation that the goods have been produced by the actor or a
third person.” Fire Protection hadn’t been shown to represent to customers that
it did the servicing work on Survitec-branded life rafts in-house. Whatever
witnesses assumed, Fire Protection always provided its customers with the
servicing certificates that clearly identified the entities that serviced the
Survitec-branded rafts. Customers are required by regulation to maintain these
certificates, which customers review “to ensure that they show that the life
rafts are properly serviced and to log the date of inspection so that the life
raft is serviced again at the proper time.” Because the service station name
and number are conspicuously next to the date of inspection, a Fire Protection
customer “would immediately know that a subcontractor—in this example, Donovan
Marine—serviced the rafts.”

certification example
big Survitec stamp on document provided to customer

Finally, the plaintiffs didn’t show harm.  In a subcontracting situation, there is a stronger presumption that the subcontractor “implicitly consented to sales under the seller’s trade name or trademark.” The plaintiffs didn’t try to protect its commercial interests through contractual arrangements with Fire Protection. They sent to Fire Protection and its customers certificates that identify Survitec Survival Products, with special stamps to clearly mark that a Survitec entity serviced the raft:

No reverse passing off.

False advertising:

The market for life raft services had multiple players, so there was no presumption of damage from false comparative advertising. And there was no evidence of harm from Fire Protection’s failure to change its brochure after the termination to remove the statement that it was an authorized service station, nor of unjust enrichment to Fire Protection. Plaintiffs’ damages expert provided no causation analysis.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/10/court-rejects-affiliation-confusion.html

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Second Circuit reverses literal falsity finding based on dispute over meaning of “brand”

Zesty Paws LLC v. Nutramax Laboratories, Inc., — F.4th
—-, No. 24-1810, 2025 WL 2810078 (2d Cir. Oct. 3, 2025)

The court of appeals reverses the district
court opinion discussed here
, which had granted a preliminary injunction on
Zesty’s Lanham Act false advertising claim about Nutramax’s “#1 brand of pet
supplement” claims, remanding for re-analysis of both literal and implied
falsity. A concurrence would have remanded only on implied falsity.

The district court reasoned that Nutramax is a brand, and it
is undisputed that the combined sales of Nutramax pet supplement products
exceeded the combined sales of Zesty Paws pet supplement products. The district
court therefore concluded that Zesty Paws’s advertising claims were likely
literally false. The court of appeals agreed with Zesty that its #1 brand
advertising claims were not unambiguously false given that they were at least
reasonably susceptible to the interpretation that they compared Zesty Paws’s
combined sales to the sales of each individual brand of Nutramax’s pet
supplement products, such as Cosequin and Dasuquin.  

It was undisputed that the sales of each of Nutramax’s
individual products do not exceed Zesty Paws’s aggregate product sales. (Gotta
admit, I’m on Nutramax’s side here. Burger King isn’t the number one fast food
brand even if it sells more Whoppers than McDonald’s sells Big Macs.)

The court of appeals began with the proposition that, “if
the language or graphic is susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation, the advertisement cannot be literally false.” The district
court erred by focusing exclusively on whether Nutramax had shown that Nutramax
is a brand. But “Nutramax had the burden of showing not only that the #1 Claims
could have referred to Nutramax, but that, to a reasonable consumer, they
unambiguously did so.” But the district court didn’t explain why Zesty Paws’s
proffered interpretation—namely, that the #1 Claims compared the Zesty Paws
brand to only the individual brands of pet supplements Nutramax sells, such as
Cosequin and Dasuquin—was unreasonable. (Because it’s apples to oranges?)

Also, the district court did not sufficiently address “much
of Zesty Paws’s evidence” supporting the reasonableness of its interpretation
it advances, such as evidence that Nutramax’s product packaging featured
Dasuquin and Cosequin labels in larger font, while simultaneously displaying
the Nutramax label in a smaller font, referring to Nutramax as the “Company,”
or relegating the Nutramax label to the back of the product packaging. Internal
Nutramax documents also showed that Nutramax employees viewed Nutramax’s
individual named products, not Nutramax, as its “principal brands.” “The
strength (or lack thereof) of the Nutramax brand is probative as to whether a
reasonable consumer could understand the #1 Claims to compare the Zesty Paws
brand to only Nutramax’s individual product brands, rather than to Nutramax
itself.” Thus, the district court should address on remand whether the #1
Claims are so unambiguous that a reasonable consumer could not share Zesty
Paws’s interpretation. It could also analyze implicit falsity.

Judge Menashi concurred in the judgment, reasoning that, on
this record, the #1 Claims cannot be literally false, because “brand” was
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation given the parties’
divergent branding strategies—Zesty Paws’ “branded house” strategy versus Nutramax’s
“house of brands.” “Even if it would be reasonable to regard Nutramax itself as
a brand—and to understand the #1 Claims to compare all Zesty Paws products to
all Nutramax products—the record forecloses the conclusion that the #1 Claims
are susceptible only to that interpretation.”

After all, Nutramax’s own marketing materials distinguish
between these “brands” and the parent “company” Nutramax. The packaging for
Cosequin prominently identifies Cosequin as the “#1 Veterinarian Recommended
Brand,” but Nutramax appears only in small print on the back of the bottle. Dasuquin
likewise touts itself as the “#1 Joint Health Brand Recommended by
Veterinarians,” with a Nutramax logo in smaller print at the top, and it
specifically refers to Nutramax as the “#1 Veterinarian Recommended Supplement
Company.” Nutramax internally referred to its “house of brand[s],” a portfolio
of “16 brands” with “1 national brand of scale (Cosequin).” Its internal
analyses identified Cosequin and Dasuquin as brands that compete against Zesty
Paws and admitted that Zesty Paws “holds the #1 brand spot in supplements.” Thus,
the concurrence would have remanded only for implicit falsity.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/10/second-circuit-reverses-literal-falsity.html

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A couple of Third Circuit amicus briefs (AI training and false advertising harm)

Thomson Reuters v. Ross, arguing that training is fair use. With Edward Lee of Santa Clara Law, Matthew Sag of Emory University, Pamela Samuelson of UC Berkeley School of Law, Christopher John Sprigman of New York University School of Law.

And an amicus with Alexandra Roberts in support of a petition for rehearing in CareDX v. Natera, discussed here. The argument is that circumstantial evidence of harm can suffice in a Lanham Act false advertising case.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/10/a-couple-of-third-circuit-amicus-briefs.html

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HomeVestors opinion shows that post-JDI Rogers v. Grimaldi can’t give security to titles

HomeVestors of America, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Discovery, Inc.,
2025 WL 2301911, No. 22-1583-RGA (D. Del. Aug. 8, 2025)

Rogers v. Grimaldi no longer provides a path to early
dismissal for many expressive uses in titles. For titles, it might be an
affirmative defense, though even there the path seems rather narrow.

HomeVestors, which has registrations for THE UGLIEST HOUSE
OF THE YEAR, WE BUY UGLY HOUSES, and UGLY HOUSE?, and uses THE UGLIEST HOUSE OF
THE YEAR in connection with a yearly home renovation contest for its
franchisees, sued defendant WBD for its TV show, “Ugliest House in America.”

The court held that the Rogers defense required a
trial on whether the use was source-identifying. HomeVestors argued that
Ugliest House in America must be source-identifying because it is the title of
a television series, because WBD and its production company have characterized
it as source-identifying in contracts with each other and with the host of the
show, and because the titles of many of WBD’s other television shows are
registered trademarks. WBD argued that none of those things were legally
relevant, and that it presented unrebutted evidence—survey data—indicating that
the public does not associate Ugliest House in America with HGTV or WBD.

The court found a material factual dispute on use as a mark.

Specifically, HomeVestors alleges that the marks are similar
(how does this bear on trademark use by WBD?), that both parties run a
contest related to ugliest homes (how does this bear on trademark use by WBD?),
that internet searches for HomeVestors’ marks return results for WBD’s show
(how does this bear on trademark use by WBD?), that promotional materials for
the show emphasize the words in common with HomeVestors’ marks (at least
plausibly relevant to whether WBD is making trademark use), that WBD,
either itself or through its agent, initially sought to take advantage of
consumer recognition of HomeVestors’ brand for casting purposes (maybe relevant),
and that WBD is actively competing with HomeVestors franchisees for houses and
homeowners (ditto).

But how are these things to be weighed against the survey evidence
or the principle “TV show titles are trademarks”? The court says: “Where, as
here, a program’s title plainly describes its subject matter, a reasonable
fact-finder could conclude that the title is not source-identifying” (citing Down
to Earth Organics, LLC v. Efron, 2024 WL 1376532, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31,
2024) (concluding at the pleading stage that the program title “Down to Earth
with Zac Efron” merely “identif[ied] the subject matter and tone of the
[s]eries” and was therefore subject to the Rogers test)). WBD also
offered evidence that it chose the title Ugliest House in America solely for
its descriptive value, along with survey evidence suggesting that “consumers do
not associate the title ‘Ugliest House in America’ with a specific source.” 

The well-recognized problems with trademark use
inquiries—necessary as they may be—are on full display here, especially since “use
to describe the nature of the show” gives people reasons to watch the show or
participate in the show. That is, descriptive use can promote the show! Thus it is very difficult to disentangle from
“trademark use.”

The same reasons prevented summary judgment on descriptive
fair use.

The court also rejected WBD’s trademark misuse/unclean hands
defense, because asserting trademark rights, even if unjustifiably, doesn’t
constitute misuse or unclean hands.

Confusion: There was a genuine dispute because there was “some
visual similarity, including the emphasis on UGLIEST HOUSE,” and similarity is
the most important factor. 

HomeVestors mark

WBD ads

In addition, there was evidence that could be actual
confusion evidence, though WBD disputed its meaning. Specifically, HomeVestors
argued that the National Association of Realtors confused the names of WBD’s
show and HomeVestors’ contest” and that “one of HomeVestors’ own marketing
vendors confused the names of WBD’s show and HomeVestors’ contest.”

Finally, intent was disputed, because “WBD’s predecessor
entity published an article on HGTV’s website … discuss[ing] HomeVestors and
its famous ‘We Buy Ugly Houses’ billboards[,]” and that “[i]n November 2020,
the title clearance report provided by [the production company WBD hired] to WBD—before
the show premiered—identifies HomeVestors UGLY HOUSES marks.” Although
knowledge of the mark alone is insufficient, the fact that WBD’s production
company explored a collaboration with HomeVestors “could plausibly suggest that
WBD sought to trade on HomeVestors’ goodwill.”

Even though there’s no way HomeVestors’ marks are household
names among the general consuming public, the court also denied summary
judgment on dilution, holding that the parties just repeated their arguments on
confusion.  

The court also left disgorgement for trial (that bench trial
has now occurred) as well as objections to proposed expert testimony. Issues of
intent and delay were contested for disgorgement. For the expert testimony, I
noted WBD’s objection to testimony that the houses featured on UHIA would make
for good HomeVestors purchases, and thus that the parties compete. WBD argued,
in my view correctly, that (in this specific context) this claim wasn’t
relevant to the issue of confusion. “[W]hether the parties compete at all might
be probative of whether they compete in the minds of consumers.” In the TV show
v. home flipper situation, though, whether the houses were actually suitable
for both parties’ purposes doesn’t seem connected to whether reasonable consumers
would think that HomeVestors operates or endorses a TV show.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/10/homevestors-opinion-shows-that-post-jdi.html

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We have (less of) the meats: court mostly denies Arby’s motion to dismiss in misleading photos case

Alongis v. Arby’s Restaurant Group, Inc., 2025 WL 2772810, 2:23-cv-6593
(NJC) (LGD) (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2025)

The court declines to dismiss claims under the NY GBL that
Arby’s photographs misrepresented (1) whether its roast beef was rare rather
than fully cooked and (2) the amount of meat in a sandwich by at least 100%. The
photos are on Arby’s website, on menu ordering boards located within the store,
and in the drive-through at every Arby’s store location in New York such that,
plaintiff alleged, “every customer will view said photographs prior to the time
of the purchase.”

advertised/actual

Rare roast beef:  It
was plausible that the photos would mislead reasonable consumers, since they visually
depict reddish, light-colored meat, which is associated with rare, rather than
fully-cooked, roast beef. The claim could not be dismissed as puffery; the
photos weren’t “subjective statements of opinion which cannot be proven false.”
Rather, it can be readily determined whether the meat actually used in the
photographs consisted of rare meat. Nor was the photo “patently hyperbolic” and
thus unreliable. Even in the context of a relatively lower priced and fast meal,
it was plausible that a reasonable consumer would believe they’d receive rare
roast beef. Thus, “a fact-intensive inquiry on how a reasonable buyer would
react” was required. The court distinguished cases where an ingredients list
would disclose the truth, as well as cases involving verbal statements that
were puffery, because the photos here were “both provable as true or false and
also plausibly deceptive and misleading.”

Unlike some other courts, the court here also allowed the
plaintiff (at this stage!) to include online purchasers in his proposed class
definition, because the alleged misrepresentations were identical.

Volume misrepresentation: Similar reasoning with respect to
non-half pound sandwiches. “The advertisements of the Half Pound Roast Beef and
Half Pound Beef ‘N Cheddar sandwiches consist not only of the photographs of
these Sandwiches, but also their names, which are additional affirmative
statements communicating that each of these two Sandwiches contain a half pound
of meat.” It was implausible that a consumer ordering a Half Pound Sandwich
could do so without actually using the name, and there was no allegation that
they received less than a half a pound of meat. For the other sandwiches, “in
each photograph used in the advertisements, the meat in the sandwiches
plausibly appears to constitute at least double the amount of meat in the
sandwiches actually purchased.” Other cases involving only photos of single
ingredients were inapposite.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/10/we-have-less-of-meats-court-mostly.html

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court dismisses popcorn calorie/slack fill claims for failure to account for popcorn’s compressibility

Borgen v. Hershey Salty Snack Sales Co., 2025 WL 2753734,
No. 24-cv-1635-BJC-JLB (S.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2025)

I just like the facts here: Plaintiffs alleged that
defendants’ SkinnyPop popcorn has too much slack fill. In particular, they alleged
that the brand name and package info led them to believe that “they could
consume the portion sizes described on the bag and in the number of servings
described in the bags.” But their personal experience and investigation allegedly
show that the SkinnyPop bags contain “less popcorn than what Defendants
promise” and thus short-sells the consumer. If the nutrition facts are correct,
based on the actual popcorn present in the bags, they alleged that “there are
significantly more calories per serving … than advertised,” and the
“SkinnyPop” name and the amount of calories in each serving is false and
misleading

The court dismissed the claim as implausible, because
reasonable consumers understand that weight is more important than volume when
it comes to packaged popped corn, since kernels might disintegrate in the bag
and thus pack more tightly, changing a serving size’s volume.

The court first rejected a preemption argument. Plaintiffs
weren’t challenging a measurement technique or the nutrition facts as such, but
arguing that the labeled approximation of cups included on the nutrition
information was woefully inaccurate compared to the actual measure of cups
contained in a bag of SkinnyPop. They alleged that their sampling of 11 bags of
SkinnyPop showed “up to approximately 43% less than what is labeled and
promised.” This theory didn’t seek to impose any requirement non-identical to
federal law.

The court also rejected defendants’ argument that the use of
“about” to qualify the serving size information precluded liability.  “SkinnyPop may not escape liability for
providing far less product to consumers by using disclaimers such as ‘about’ or
‘approximate.’”

However, the remaining argument—that plaintiffs failed to
allege whether the weight of the popcorn differed from what was claimed
on the bag—succeeded. “[T]o accurately consider whether or not less product is
indeed being delivered, weight is a relevant consideration given that the
volume of popcorn is more likely to change based on the popcorn’s configuration
when purchased.” The court relied on “the common understanding that popcorn’s
configuration is highly mutable.”  In
particular, “a reasonable consumer purchasing pre-popped popcorn would
understand that while the volume may vary depending on whether the popcorn is
in whole or broken pieces, the weight is likely to remain consistent.”
Plaintiffs couldn’t state a claim by focusing solely on the highly variable
volume, without addressing the actual weight. If a consumer noticed a volume
discrepancy, but also found that the weight matched the representation on the
bag, “a reasonable consumer, using common sense, would likely assume that any
difference in volume was due to the popcorn being broken into smaller pieces
during transit.”

Leave to amend was granted if the plaintiff could make weight-based allegations.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/10/court-dismisses-popcorn-calorieslack.html

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