calling an accepted Rule 68 offer a judgment of infringement could be defamatory

Double Diamond
Distribution Ltd. v. Crocs, Inc., 2024 WL 1051951No. 23-cv-01790-PAB-KAS (D. Colo.
Mar. 11, 2024)

I have a
long-running interest in Rule 68 offers of judgment, and this case involves an
interaction with false advertising law! The parties compete in the shoe market.

In 2006, Crocs sued now-plaintiff
Double Diamond and Dawgs, its affiliate. Trial was scheduled for 2022 (!), but then-defendants
sent offers of judgment to Crocs. Double Diamond’s offer stated: “This offer is
made for the purposes specified in Rule 68 and is not to be construed either as
an admission that Double Diamond is liable in this action or that Crocs has
suffered any damage.” Dawgs’ offer was similar (though it offered $6 million, where
Double Diamond offered $55,000, and contemplated bankruptcy).  Crocs accepted.

Crocs then issued a
press release, “Crocs secures long sought-after judgment of infringement
against USA Dawgs and Double Diamond Distribution.” The press release announced

a judgment of infringement against USA Dawgs and Double Diamond
Distribution as a result of both companies’ sales of imitation Crocs shoes. In
conjunction therewith, Crocs also obtained $6 million and $55,000 in damages,
respectively, against the companies.

This case is the culmination of years long battles between the parties
after USA Dawgs and Double Diamond Distribution began selling shoes that
infringed Crocs’ patents in 2006. Both USA Dawgs and Double Diamond
Distribution have since conceded the validity of Crocs’ patent rights.

“We are fiercely protective of the Crocs brand and our iconic DNA. We
have zero tolerance for infringement of our intellectual property rights or for
anyone who tries to benefit off the investments that we have made in our
brand,” said Daniel Hart, Executive Vice President and Chief Legal & Risk
Officer at Crocs. “This judgment not only reinforces the validity of our patent
rights, it also reinforces our unrelenting determination to take forceful steps
to protect our brand equity.”

This judgment of infringement comes nearly one year to the day after
Crocs filed lawsuits against 21 companies alleging infringement of its
registered trademark rights in its clog designs. …

The court declined
to dismiss Double Diamond’s resulting defamation claim. This was not a case
where the “gist” was true on the facts alleged. A Rule 68 offer of judgment
does not require an admission of liability, which may be disclaimed. If that
happens, the court’s judgment does not constitute a finding of or an admission
of liability against the defendant.

The statements that
Crocs obtained “a judgment of infringement against USA Dawgs and Double Diamond
Distribution as a result of both companies’ sales of imitation Crocs shoes” and
“[t]his judgment…reinforces the validity of [Crocs’] patent rights” were
plausibly false because the statements would have a “different effect on the
mind of the reader” from that which the Rule 68 offer of judgment would have
produced. And they were plausibly material because the statements would likely
cause reasonable people to think “significantly less favorably” about Double
Diamond than they would if they knew the truth. Unlike the difference between “stalking”
and “harassment,” this was not “a minor, technical error in legal terminology.”

Trade libel claims
survived for the same reason.

Lanham Act false
advertising: Crocs argued that the press release was not “commercial
advertising,” because (a) the press release was directed at investors, not the
relevant purchasing public; and (b) Double Diamond never alleged that the press
release promoted Crocs’ shoes to consumers. However, Crocs published the press
release on its website and had the press release published to 440,000 websites,
newsrooms, and direct feeds using PRNewswire. And it stated that Crocs “is a
world leader in innovative casual footwear for women, men, and children,
combining comfort and style with a value that consumers know and love.” This
was enough to plausibly allege commercial advertising, along with the allegation
that Crocs made the statement in order to obtain increased sales and brand
differentiation; the press release repeatedly referred to Crocs’ brand and
products and included the invitation “To learn more about our brands, please
visit http://www.crocs.com or http://www.heydudeshoesusa.com or follow @Crocs or
@heydudeshoes on Facebook, Instagram and Twitter.” Because the websites that
posted the press release have a combined viewership of 6 billion people per
month, the allegations were sufficient to show that the statements were “disseminated
sufficiently to the relevant purchasing public.” This also allowed a claim
under the Colorado Consumer Protection Act.

Intentional
interference with contractual relations failed, however, because there was no
identified specific relationship with a third party.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/03/calling-accepted-rule-68-offer-judgment.html

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reasonable consumers aren’t required to know collagen can’t be vegan

Kandel v. Dr. Dennis
Gross Skincare, LLC, 2024 WL 965621, No. 23-cv-01967 (ER) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5,
2024)

Similar
California litigation at a later stage
. Kandel alleged that Gross Skincare deceptively
labeled and advertised its skincare products as containing collagen when, in
fact, they do not.

“Collagen is a
protein found exclusively in humans and animals that has been linked to
youthful skin, hair, and nails. It is composed of thousands of amino acids
intertwined in a specific, unique sequence. Without being sequenced this way,
amino acids do not confer the same benefits as collagen.” The products at issue
are uniformly branded with the phrase “C + Collagen.” The list of ingredients
includes “Collagen Amino Acids”; some products also feature the term “collagen
amino acids” in a separate section on the package titled “What It Is”/“What’s
In It For You.”

one of the packages at issue: C + Collagen Deep Cream

One side of each package
also contains a small symbol indicating that the product is vegan—making “collagen”
content impossible. Gross Skincare allegedly knows that consumers will pay more
for skincare products that contain collagen and intends for consumers to infer
from the “Collagen” branding that the products do so.

C + Collagen package sides with small blue arrow pointing to small vegan symbol at bottom and blue underline of "collagen amino acids" in ingredient list
blue lines/arrows added by court to highlight relevant terms

NY GBL claims were
sufficiently alleged. Gross Skincare argued that the “C + Collagen” phrase didn’t
imply that the products contain collagen, but instead that the Vitamin C in the
products increases natural production of collagen in the user’s skin. It
claimed that the rest of the package clarified that the products contain
“collagen amino acids” and are vegan. Because of the label “vegan,” it argued, a
reasonable consumer would understand that they do not contain collagen.

This interpretation of
“C + Collagen” was “certainly less intuitive than Kandel’s.” Even considered as
a whole, the complaint alleged misleadingness. The use of “collagen amino acids”
“likely only reaffirms that collagen is an ingredient” and was itself arguably
confusing; the label did nothing to explain it.

Even if one accepts
Gross Skincare’s definition of “collagen amino acids” as “the building blocks
of collagen,” the court did not assume that a reasonable consumer understands
that collagen is a protein composed of amino acids. So too with “vegan.” Even
if the consumer noticed this small symbol, they’d have to know that collagen
comes exclusively from animals.  This
certainly couldn’t be assumed on a motion to dismiss.

Breach of warranty
and unjust enrichment claims under New York law, however, failed, as well as
claims on behalf of a nationwide class.

Kandel did have
standing as to four products she didn’t buy but that contained the same alleged
misrepresentations.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/03/reasonable-consumers-arent-required-to.html

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small competitor lacks standing against big one’s nondisparaging advertising

HomeLight, Inc. v.
Shkipin, — F.Supp.3d —-, 2024 WL 940089 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2024)

Sometimes, courts
are very generous to competitors in presuming Lanham Act standing—as with the recent Meta ruling—and sometimes they aren’t. I have yet to detect a real
pattern across facts/circuits, but suggestions welcome.

Previous
ruling
.
Shkipin’s amended
false advertising counterclaim fails again. Although Shkipin alleged commercial
injuries—“network effects and ad revenues, and also … goodwill value associated
with its 100% free services to real estate agents and consumers” but there wasn’t
sufficiently direct causation. None of HomeLight’s statements allegedly
disparaged or even referred to Shkipin’s business.

To establish that HomeLight proximately caused HomeOpenly to suffer a
loss of sales, Mr. Shkipin would need to show how deceptive statements about
HomeLight directed at shoppers on HomeLight’s own website necessarily caused
advertisers not to buy ads from HomeOpenly. Even assuming that there is a
direct relationship between the number of shoppers who use or visit HomeOpenly
and its ability to sell ads, and that HomeLight’s deceptive statements resulted
in some reduction in the number of shoppers visiting HomeOpenly’s website, this
connection is too attenuated to establish proximate cause. This is especially
true given the countercomplaint’s other plausible explanation for why online
home shoppers might find HomeLight’s website but not HomeOpenly’s: HomeLight’s
heavy spending on various forms of online and TV advertising that Mr. Shkipin
characterizes as “highly effective.”

These causation
problems also defeated his state UCL claim. The allegedly unlawful/fraudulent
conduct underlying the UCL claim—that HomeLight received illegal kickbacks in
violation of RESPA—wasn’t sufficiently linked to the injuries Shkipin claimed.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/03/small-competitor-lacks-standing-against.html

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Second Circuit affirms holding that asterisk/fine print sufficiently clarifies ambiguous claim

Montgomery v. Stanley
Black & Decker, Inc., 2024 WL 939151, No. 23-735-cv (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 2024)

Plaintiffs sued
defendant (Craftsman) for deceptive business practice claims under both the New
York General Business Law (NYGBL), and the Virginia Consumer Protection Act
(VCPA), as well as asserting warranty and common law claims. They alleged that the
“Peak HP” labeling on the packaging of Craftsman vacuums is misleading because
the vacuums are unable to achieve the advertised horsepower. The District Court
dismissed the complaint because the dagger or asterisk symbol next to the “Peak
HP” label directs the consumer to fine print explaining that “Peak HP” is the
horsepower achieved in laboratory testing, not ordinary use. The court of
appeals affirmed.

Based on the entire
packaging, a reasonable consumer would not be misled because of the fine print
explanation. Plaintiffs didn’t allege the “Peak HP” label was false, and though
their interpretation was one reasonable one, the fine-print meaning was also
reasonable, and the dagger/asterisk “would alert a reasonable consumer to the
fact that certain caveats may apply to the ‘Peak HP’ designation.” Just because
it was in fine print didn’t mean it couldn’t clarify an ambiguous label. There
were no allegations that a consumer couldn’t see it or that its terms were
confusing.

 

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/03/second-circuit-affirms-holding-that.html

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local ad company has Lanham Act standing against Meta for allegedly overstating ad reach

Metroplex Communic.,
Inc. v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 2024 WL 940127, No. 22-cv-1455-SMY (S.D. Ill.
Mar. 5, 2024)

Metroplex, a local
advertising company, brought a putative class action against Meta for unfair
competition. Although Meta argued that Metroplex was an ad purchaser for two of
its local media properties (a news site and an FM radio station), given that it
has advertised on Facebook dozens of times in the last few years, Metroplex
argued that it was a Meta competitor.

Metroplex alleged
that sells and places digital and targeted advertisements on its local news
website, its “Best of Edwardsville” website, radio advertisements for its FM and
AM radio stations, and print advertisements that are placed in local newspapers
and in the “Best of Edwardsville” magazine. Metroplex also allegedly develops
tools and systems for managing and optimizing advertising campaigns for
businesses.

Meta allegedly drew
buyers away from its local news outlets by (1) using the word “people” in
statements related to advertising on Meta and (2) overestimating the number of
people on Meta’s apps and reachable by ad campaigns, and contends that Meta’s
users were “not actually people,” because some accounts were false and some
people have more than one account. It asserted claims under the Lanham Act and
the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act.

Metroplex satisfied Lexmark
by alleging that the parties compete directly for the same customers and Meta’s
false or misleading statements were material to advertisement buyers. Lost
sales could be plausibly inferred by these allegations.

As for stating a
claim, Meta noted that most of the challenged statements weren’t “advertising.”
They were numerical estimates taken from Meta’s SEC filings or provided to
individual advertisers for particular ad campaigns, and generic references to
“people” on informational webpages. But the plaintiff did enough to satisfy Rules
8 and 9(b).

A reasonable
consumer could be confused despite Meta’s alleged disclaimers or qualifying
statements in SEC filings or in icons that led to popup windows, given the
allegations of falsity, just as the back label of a product can’t correct false
statements on the front. Given allegations that Meta allegedly inflates
audience estimates and reach metrics and such audience size figures can be over
30% of the actual number, it would be plausible for consumers to be deceived.

The IUDTPA claim
also survived because Metroplex, an Illinois company, alleges it was damaged as
a competitor in the Edwardsville and greater Metro East region in Illinois.

The court also
rejected Meta’s motion to compel arbitration; these claims, asserted in its
capacity as Meta competitor, were outside the scope of the agreement Metroplex
signed to run its Facebook pages.
 

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/03/local-ad-company-has-lanham-act.html

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Bank has Lanham Act standing to assert disparagement claim against former customer (itself a service provider)

SouthState Bank,
N.A. v. Qoins Technologies, Inc., — F.Supp.3d —-, 2024 WL 911075, No.
1:22-CV-5020-MHC (N.D. Ga. Mar. 1, 2024)

“Qoins is a
financial technology company that collects funds from its customers and
disburses payments to designated creditors in order to help its customers pay
off their debts.” Customers inform Qoins of their outstanding debts that they
wish to pay and transfer money to Qoins “on a regular basis to satisfy such
debts over time.” In 2019, Qoins entered into a Master Disbursement Services
Agreement with Atlantic Capital Bank to establish a banking relationship, which
included creating bank accounts that contained customer funds. SouthState is
ACB’s successor in interest. Under the agreement, Qoins was the bank’s customer
(and Qoins customers weren’t). It set up custodial accounts for holding
customer funds—not to be used for operations; an operating account; and a
reserve account. Qoins customers would make deposits to custodial accounts;
Qoins would make payments to creditors and then reconcile deposits and
payments. Qoins agreed to ensure that custodial accounts had sufficient funds
to carry out the payments and to cover any fees related to the transactions,
and to keep records of its transactions and provide accurate information to the
bank.

In June 2022, “SouthState
documented the mutual agreement” reached by Qoins and SouthState that the
banking relationship between them would terminate, effective July 20, 2022. SouthState
was unable to complete the transition process to a new bank partner (Evolve)
because “ACH requests to SouthState for Qoins’s Customers’ funds [ ] exceeded
the amounts in Qoins’s accounts with SouthState.” Qoins initiated an ACH
request in the amount of $150,000 from the Custodial Accounts to Evolve;
however, because the Custodial Accounts were overdrawn, SouthState denied the
request. SouthState allegedly eventually had to charge off the negative
balances of Qoins’s accounts in an amount in excess of $33,000.”

SouthState alleged
that the custodial accounts were improperly “used in multiple instances by
Qoins to fund Qoins’s other accounts at SouthState”; custodial accounts were
frequently funded by the operating account; Qoins’ earnings weren’t sufficient
to maintain operating capital; and funds from the different accounts were commingled.

In early December
2022, Qoins published an announcement on its website informing customers that
it “recently switched to a new bank partner” in order to “provide additional
services,” but “[u]nfortunately, however, some of our customers have not been
able to migrate their accounts due to ongoing issues with SouthState Bank.”

The announcement
included a question, “Why can’t I access my money?” and provided the following
answer:

If you never attempted to migrate, or if you received an error message
during the migration process (including a message that says your account is “on
hold”), your funds are still at SouthState Bank. SouthState Bank is unable to
release your funds, so we have been unable to migrate your account or refund
your money. We continue to work with SouthState Bank to resolve this matter
expeditiously. While we have seen some customers reach out to SouthState Bank
directly, customers have had no luck. Some customers have also reached out to
our new bank partner, but they are not in a position to help.

Qoins’s announcement
also provided a link to the FDIC’s Customer Assistance Form and informed any
aggrieved customers that a Qoins representative would assist in helping the
customer file a complaint against SouthState with the FDIC. Qoins also referred
to SouthState in its responses to customer reviews, saying it was responsible
for withholding funds. This was all allegedly false and misleading (given that
Qoins customers were not SouthState customers, they weren’t FDIC insured). “Numerous”
Qoins customers allegedly filed complaints against SouthState “with relevant
federal agencies,” even though SouthState was not responsible to Qoins’s
customers and SouthState did not possess any records of the customers’
interactions with Qoins.

The court mostly denied
Qoins’ motion to dismiss the resulting claims, including breach of contract and
libel.

False advertising/false
association: SouthState lacked standing to bring a false association claim against
Qoins because there were no allegations of passing off, and in fact Qoins
allegedly identified SouthState as a banking partner. Thus, SouthState didn’t
fall within the zone of interests for false association. [I think what the
court meant was that Lexmark’s zone of interests/proximate cause test
applies to §43(a)(1)(A) claims, as I think it would have to, but that the zone
of interests/proximate cause analysis differs as between false association and
false advertising.]

But SouthState did
have standing for a false advertising claim. “Because SouthState is alleging
reputational injuries, no direct competition is required and SouthState has
pleaded with sufficiency that it has standing to sue because the alleged false
representations about SouthState could impact its business reputation.”

Were the Qoins
statements made in commercial advertising or promotion? Qoins argued that they
were answers to customer questions and not intended to influence customers away
from SouthState or targeted at SouthState customers. The Eleventh Circuit has
adopted Gordon & Breach’s test (probably as modified by Lexmark).

Qoins’s argument that the statements were not made to the purchasing
public is unavailing because SouthState has alleged that Qoins made the
representations on its website and in response to customer reviews on online
application stores. Importantly, these representations are alleged to be
public-facing and widely accessible. “[W]hen statements are so broadly
disseminated, they are much more likely to constitute commercial advertising.”

Drawing all
inferences in SouthState’s favor, “Qoins’s statements were made to pacify
customer concerns and to influence customers to start or continue their
relationship with Qoins. A reasonable inference also can be made that Qoins’s
statements were intended to influence customers to purchase its service,
because such issues were not attributable to the new banking partner.” That
sufficed.

Interestingly, the
court also found that SouthState sufficiently alleged materiality in two
independent ways: (1) allegedly false representations that SouthState continued
to hold customers’ funds concerned “the essential characteristic of its
business as a bank” and (2) because consumers
allegedly filed complaints against SouthState based on Qoin’s
representations, it was plausible that those representations affected consumer
decisions about SouthState.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/03/bank-has-lanham-act-standing-to-assert.html

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Two hospitals can both be best, and use purple ads (for now at least)

NYU Langone Health
Sys. v. Northwell Health, Inc., 2024 WL 898941, No. 23-CV-5032 (VEC) (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 1, 2024)

NYU Langone sued
Northwell for trade dress infringement, unfair competition and false
designation of origin, and false advertising under the Lanham Act, as well as
related claims under the New York GBL and New York common law. The core
allegation is that Northwell copied its advertising to trade off the good will
and reputation of NYU Langone. The court dismissed the complaint—the false
advertising claims with prejudice.

The parties are both
nonprofit health systems in New York and advertise to the same market, with NYU
Langone having recently expanded its presence on Long Island, where Northwell
is headquartered.

NYU, including NYU
Langone and other subsidiaries, has used the color purple in its signage and
branding for over 100 years. NYU Langone’s 2017 style guide suggests the
distinct shade of purple be “prominently feature[d]” with white font and accent
colors like teal and orange, like so:

NYU Langone ad with purple background and white sans serif text

another similar ad on a billboard

NYU Langone alleged
the existence of advertising trade dress (e.g., teal and orange) and photos,
… [and the] use of purple, white, and accent color combinations in words and
phrases in the ad headlines.”

Before 2019,
Northwell advertisements allegedly featured a logo with blue letters and
multicolored arrows on a white background:

ad with patient picture on top and orange and blue text on white background

teal and white background, white and black text

In 2021, Northwell’s
advertisements allegedly changed and now use white letters and arrows on a
purple background:

Northwell ad with purple background and blue and white text

similar ad but some of the background is teal

NYU Langone failed
to adequately allege a protectable trade dress. “To state a claim for trade
dress infringement, a plaintiff must first clearly articulate the design or
combination of features that make up the trade dress. The articulation must
provide a ‘precise expression of the character and scope of the claimed trade
dress.’” Clarity and specificity are “imperative because courts cannot ‘shape
narrowly-tailored relief if they do not know what distinctive combination of
ingredients deserves protection.’” Further, “[t]rade dress descriptions with
too many possible combinations are not specific enough to state a claim.”

The allegations here
were

confusing and expansive. The Complaint provides a laundry list of
elements, some introduced by “e.g.” and some connected by “or,” that
encompasses such a wide variety of features that it would be difficult for
competitors to know whether their advertisement falls within the trade dress.
NYU Langone defines its trade dress as follows:

the prominent use of a distinctive purple color, the use of particular
accent colors (e.g., teal and orange) and photos, specific font types, colors
and headline styles (i.e., all cap sans serif white headlines, as well as white
font with certain words and phrases emphasized in the same or similar accent
colors), use of purple, white, and accent color combinations in words and
phrases in the ad headlines, and specific layouts in terms of placement and use
of accent colors, all of which create a distinctive look and feel.

Photos in the complaint
of the alleged trade dress “vividly illustrate how features such as font,
color, and layout vary across ads. Even among ads that are predominantly
purple, the shade of purple varies; some have all cap white writing; some have
all white sentence case writing; and some have a mix of white and other color
writing.”

subway ad as described by court

Facebook ad on purple background with white and orange text

Other ads had “just
a splash of purple”:

Mostly teal background with white text and then some purple at bottom

mostly pink background with white and purple text and purple at bottom

Some ads were split
between photos and text, with the text varying in color and case and with the
split sometimes being vertical and sometimes horizontal:

photo of basketball players on left, purple background and white/blue text on right

purple background with white text on top, photo of runner on bottom

The court couldn’t
identify specific fonts, colors, or headline styles that were part of the trade
dress, other than that they were sans serif fonts. “Categories of features”
were insufficient.

The current
definition was too general, contained too many “or” connectors and “for
example” phrases, and “overall encompasse[d] too many possible permutations and
combinations to constitute a singular distinct trade dress,” though the court
would allow an amended complaint.

False advertising: NYU
Langone alleged that a Northwell ad falsely claimed that one of its hospitals
“is NYC’s only hospital in the Nation’s Top 50” and “offer[s] the best care in
Manhattan.” This claim was based on rankings from Healthgrades and included the
Healthgrades logo directly underneath the claim. NYU Langone alleged that
Healthgrades’ rating methodology lacks transparency and relies on inaccurate
and incomplete reporting, and that the claim was false because U.S. News &
World Report ranked NYU Langone “#1 in New York State and in the New York City
Metro area” in its “Best Hospitals Honor Roll.”

ad as described with Healthgrades logo on bottom

The statement that
Lenox Hill is the only NYC hospital in the Nation’s Top 50 wasn’t literally
false because Northwell cited the Healthgrades rating. Questioning Healthgrades’
underlying rating methodology didn’t falsify the claim that Lenox Hill was the
only NYC hospital rated in the Top 50 in that particular list.

Nor did NYU Langone
sufficiently allege misleadingness. It was not enough to allege only that “Northwell’s
false or misleading statements actually deceived or have the tendency to
deceive a substantial segment of consumers.” “While proof of confusion is not
necessary at the pleading stage, factual allegations that would allow the Court
plausibly to infer that the advertisement caused confusion are. NYU Langone’s
single conclusory sentence is insufficient.” And “best care in Manhattan” was
puffery.

Under NYGBL § 350,
“a disclaimer or similar clarifying language” can defeat a claim of false
advertising as a matter of law, and the Healthgrades rating did so here.

Amendment would be
futile because no reasonable jury could conclude that consumers were misled or
confused by an add bragging about Lenox Hill’s Healthgrades rating and boasting
that it offers the “best” care in the city. “Consumers are familiar with this
common type of advertising, in which businesses tout that they are the best
according to some newspaper, magazine, blog, Yelp or Google review, poll, or
other rating system.” In fact, NYU Langone does the same:

NYU Langone ad also claiming to be #1 in outcomes with logos of rating entities

Both of these claims
can be true.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/03/two-hospitals-can-both-be-best-and-use.html

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“it appears difficult for a defendant, innocent or not, to defend himself in a claim for disgorgement of profits”

Newborn Bros. Co. v. Albion Engineering Co., No. 12-2999, 2024 WL
887785 (D.N.J. Feb. 29, 2024)

Previously, after a bench trial, the
court found Albion liable for falsely advertising its caulk dispensing guns as
“Made in the USA.”
Now it’s disgorgement time.

After more evidence, the court found that Albion
adequately supported its unclean-hands defense—that Newborn had also made false
USA origin claims—until early 2007.

Although this wasn’t a two-player market, the
evidence (including trade organization membership and Albion’s own offers to
distributors) suggested that Newborn and Albion were direct competitors. Many
distributors carry just one vender; many parties who sell private label
products use only one manufacturer.

Albion saw a strategic advantage in
presenting itself as an American manufacturer, e.g., in a meeting with an
end-user/owner of a caulking company, its director of marketing noted that
Newborn guns were made in China, to which the owner responded “[t]hat’s how we
got into this economic mess,” and the marketing director noted in the contract
management system that “Made in U.S.A. could become even more important during
this economy.” A former Newborn customer switched to Albion based on its claim
of US manufacture. After Albion added hard-to-remove country of origin
markings, Newborn’s sales increased fifty percent.

In fighting disgorgement, Albion pointed to
other factors driving sales. Many Albion caulking guns were priced forty
percent higher or more; Albion argued that this was evidence that the products do
not compete in the marketplace and cited survey data and testimony that
consumers’ American-made preference cannot account for purchases made despite
such cost disparities.

Because the court had already concluded that disgorgement
was appropriate, it was Newborn’s burden to prove Albion’s sales and Albion’s
burden to prove costs and other deductions from that amount.

Newborn’s expert calculated Albion’s total
revenue from relevant products to be nearly $32 million, and profits a bit over
$15.5 million, meeting Newborn’s burden. Although “it would be inequitable and
contrary to [the court’s] responsibility under the Lanham Act to disgorge
profits unrelated to Albion’s offending conduct,” the court rejected “any
interpretation that places the burden of proof of the sales attributable to
specific representations or consumer confusion affirmatively on Newborn.” Indeed,
the court cited with approval another court’s statement that “it appears
difficult for a defendant, innocent or not, to defend himself in a claim for
disgorgement of profits.”

Moreover, this burden shifting

allows for, and in some instances encourages,
parties to argue past one another to the collective detriment of themselves and
the Court. A plaintiff’s minimal obligation to prove sales and a defendant’s
heavier burden to deduct costs, demonstrate a lack of competition or confusion,
and make other showings to subtract from the sales figure do not naturally
result in apples-to-apples comparisons.

So, Albion didn’t focus on its costs
associated with its sales, but rather whether the parties’ products competed
and whether there was actual consumer confusion. The court partly agreed: customers
who repurchased after the country of origin marking was corrected showed “a
disregard for country of origin as a deciding factor.”

However, the court declined to rely on
testimony that consumers would only pay a 15% premium for American-made
products (meaning that sales of products with a greater premium weren’t
attributable to the false country of origin claims).  It was “clear that Albion saw value in
representing itself as an American manufacturer and sought to distinguish
itself from competitors, particularly Newborn, on that basis. Finding for
Albion on this issue would risk, at least in some instances, unjustly giving
Albion the benefit of excluding relevant products based on markups.” Without
definitive evidence quantifying the value of American manufacture, the court
erred on the side of Newborn. The court also included private-label sales,
because it couldn’t find that the private-label sales were unrelated to
American manufacture.

The court set disgorgement at a bit over $1.6
million plus prejudgment interest. Deterrence couldn’t justify increasing the sum—that
would be a penalty.

Injunctive relief was also appropriate. Albion
ceased placing markings on the relevant products representing Albion’s
eighty-year history of American manufacture after the lawsuit was filed. It
added a “Made in Taiwan” label to handles, later replaced by a stamp on the
recoil plate. Still, Albion guns stamped or otherwise marked to indicate
American manufacture are presently displayed across the country. One
distributor continued to advertise a relevant product as American made until
October 2023, and there were other scattered similar references online.

Thus, there was continued irreparable harm. (I
didn’t see discussion of the TMA’s
presumption.)

And legal remedies were inadequate, since
they couldn’t prevent future violations. “The inadequacy of compensation for
past harm is all the more apparent, in the Court’s view, in light of the
continuing misrepresentations and lack of clarity in the market despite
Albion’s assertion that it has engaged in corrective efforts for more than a
decade.” Thus, the balance of equities and the public interest also favored
injunctive relief.

Albion was ordered to mail a letter and a
copy of the court’s order to each distributor it has sold a caulking gun to
within the past five years requesting that any samples, displays, or other
materials referencing “Phila. PA.” or referring to Albion caulking guns being
“Made in USA” be returned. Albion had to remove from the inventory of its
distributors any B-line guns that bear markings describing Albion’s history as
an American manufacturer and offer to replace any returned materials at its own
cost. It was also required to provide notices to be displayed at each location
at which Albion products are displayed:

A judge of the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey has ruled that Albion Engineering Corp. has
previously misrepresented that certain products were “Made in USA,” through
product mismarking and statements in advertising, promotional materials,
websites, and to customers. Newborn Brothers Co. Inc. v. Albion Engineering
Co., No. 12-Civ-2999 (NLH).

The Court has ordered Albion to comply with
all applicable country-of-origin marking and disclosure requirements. The Court
has ordered Albion to provide to its distributors copies of this notice so that
they may be displayed at all distributor sales locations.

Yikes!

Also, “until such time that Albion seeks and
receives confirmation from United States Customs and Border Protection as to
the marking requirements of its specific manufacturing processes, the packaging
of each Albion caulking gun with any foreign component shall list each
component of the caulking gun and its country of origin.”

 

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/03/it-appears-difficult-for-defendant.html

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Falsely advertising “ghost guns” as legal in NY is actionable

State of N.Y. v. Arm
or Ally, LLC, 2024 WL 756474, No. 22-CV-6124 (JMF) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2024)

The AG sued sellers
of “unfinished frames and receivers” — also known as “80% lowers” or “receiver
blanks” —designed to evade restrictions on gun sales. The court explains the
allegations:

A “frame” is the core part of a handgun or pistol, and a “receiver” is
the core part of a rifle, shotgun, or other long gun. An “unfinished” frame or
receiver requires an extra step to be rendered usable: usually the drilling of
a few required holes or the filing of excess plastic.

This step is,
according to one of the defendants, “ridiculously easy” and can be done by an
amateur in under an hour with only basic tools. Some of the defendants make it
even easier by shipping their products in a “jig,” a plastic setting that
enables a customer to easily convert an unfinished frame or receiver into a
firearm. As one defendant said to customers when linking to an instructional
video: “There’s no complicated setup because the jig that came with your slide
keeps everything properly aligned as you make simple cuts with the included
drill bits. Wait, it can’t be that simple? Yes, it is.”

The completed
products are allegedly functionally and visually indistinguishable from frames
or receivers one could buy at a gun store, but they are effectively untraceable
because manufacturers, distributers, and purchasers generally do not comply
with the registration and serialization requirements applicable to “firearms,”
making them “ghost guns.” Lawmakers in New York City and New York State banned
the sale of unfinished frames and receivers in 2020 and 2022, respectively.

During the relevant
time period, defendants allegedly marketed and sold unfinished frames and
receivers “directly to consumers without following any of the federal or state
laws and regulations that apply to the sale of guns, and in particular without
conducting a background check, placing a serial number on the gun, or entering
it into a federal database so that it can be traced back to its source if used
in a crime.” Defendants made at least 100,000 shipments to consumers in New
York not registered as federal firearms licensees (FFL), including undercover
agents employed by the State. Defendants who had federal firearms licenses had
access to, but did not use, the National Instant Criminal Background Check
System before selling unfinished frames and receivers to New York consumers,
while some defendants weren’t licensed to sell firearms at all.

The advertising bit:
Defendants allegedly misled New York customers into “believing that unfinished
frames and receivers are legal workarounds to New York’s gun control laws, as
well as federal law.” Defendants’ websites claimed, among other things, that
unfinished frames and receivers could be sold and purchased with “No FFL
Required,” could “be shipped straight to a customer’s home without an FFL,” were
“not subject to the same regulations as any other complete firearm[s],” were
“completely unregistered and legal,” allowed consumers to “build a completely
legal handgun without any ‘government oversight’ ” and to “legally own a
firearm that does not have to be ‘registered,’ ” were “[a]pproved” by the ATF, and
were considered by the government to be mere “pieces of metal and/or plastic
and not guns.”

Among other claims,
the AG brought NYGBL Sections 349 and 350 claims against them. Defendants
contended that marketing unfinished frames and receivers as “legal” was
protected by the First Amendment. It was not.

First, the marketing
was commercial speech: “NO FFL Required!” came in the midst of other
advertising language, such as “Various colors available,” and “no RED TAPE …
NO Registering … No Transfer fees … Ships right to your door.” Labeling
unfinished frames and receivers as “ATF Approved” on sales websites or touting “Ban
Reversed on All of Our Products!” next to pictures of unfinished frames and
receivers constituted proposing a commercial transaction.

I assume because
Sections 349 and 350 don’t themselves make the sales illegal, the court didn’t
point to the part of Central Hudson
that makes clear that ads for
unlawful products can simply be banned. But that part also says that false or
misleading ads can simply be banned.

And that was
sufficiently alleged: Defendants allegedly continued to market unfinished
frames and receivers as “legal” to New York consumers even after the State and
New York City banned the sale or possession of ghost guns. The complaint
plausibly alleged that at least some defendants knowingly evaded federal and
state laws. On Halloween Day in 2022, one defendant posted a facetious photo of
one of its products dressed as a “ghost gun,” showing that it understood that
“its unfinished frame and receiver products have only one use — to make
untraceable ghost guns.” Various other defendants allegedly touted the
“untraceable” and “unregistered” nature of ghost guns as a major selling point.

a ghost gun–get it?

The defendants
mostly argued that their statements were merely “expressions of legal opinion.”
The question is whether the customer “understood [the statement] merely as an
expression of opinion.” Nat’l Conversion Corp. v. Cedar Bldg. Corp., 23 N.Y.2d
621, 628 (1969) (finding it important that the “tenant’s lawyer was persuaded
not to verify” the truth of the landlords’ statements about the law on account
of the landlords’ authority and the certainty with which they spoke); see also
Lukowsky v. Shalit, 110 A.D.2d 563, 567-68 (1st Dep’t 1985) (“[A]
misrepresentation of law is actionable if the representation is made by an
individual possessing superior knowledge.”). Defendants marketed their
unfinished frames and receivers as “completely” legal “from a position of
superior knowledge as established merchants in the gun industry.”

 

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/02/falsely-advertising-ghost-guns-as-legal.html

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US News rating was mere opinion except as to school that intentionally submitted bad information to it

Favell v. Univ. of
Southern Cal., 2024 WL 751006, No. CV 23-3389-GW-MARx (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2024)

Plaintiffs alleged
that defendants conspired to inflate the US News ranking of USC Rossier School
of Education by submitting inaccurate or incomplete data to US News and market
the resulting ranking to the public. USC had a business relationship with 2U,
an education technology startup, to develop an online Master of Arts in
Teaching program. This was the first of USC Rossier’s online degree programs
and went live in June 2009; 2U received an undisclosed percentage of the
tuition revenue.

US News calculates
its education school rankings using eleven criteria, including “student
selectivity,” which accounts for 18% of the school’s total score and is
comprised of three objective sources of admittance data: (1) the school’s
doctoral acceptance rate (6%); (2) mean GRE quantitative scores (6%); and (3)
mean GRE verbal scores (6%).

During the relevant
period—through 2021—US News didn’t distinguish between in-person and online programs.
However, USC submitted student selectivity data only for USC Rossier’s highly
selective, in-person Ph.D. program, but not from its less-competitive EdD
program (which was offered online after 2015). From the 2009 rankings to the
2010 rankings, USC Rossier’s reported acceptance rate dropped 40 percentage
points (from 50.7% to 10.5%), and its ranking rose 16 places (from #38 to #22).
US News began publishing a specialty ranking of online master’s degrees in
education in 2013, when USC Rosier’s online Master of Arts in Teaching program
ranked #44. USC didn’t appear on the list after that.

Defendants allegedly
heavily marketed USC Rossier’s rapidly rising ranking to the public to boost
enrollment in the online programs. USC allegedly orchestrated this scheme
through its submission of false/incomplete data, and then advertised the
resulting rankings knowing that they were misleading. 2U allegedly helped “push
the rankings out on a much broader scale,” and knew or should have known that
the rankings were fraudulently procured. For example, 2U engaged in online
advertising to promote USC Rossier’s ranking; it spent more than half of its
revenue on program sales and marketing. USC likewise regularly touted USC
Rossier’s ranking (and that USC Rossier was “top-ranked”) in press releases, on
social media, on the Rossier Website, and in other promotional materials.

Fortunately for 2U,
the court thought it was accused only of puffing. The court considered two kinds
of statements: (1) statements that USC Rossier was “top-ranked,” and (2)
statements which included the specific numerical ranking assigned by US News.

The first category
was “textbook puffery.” A claim that a school is “top-ranked” is both “vague
[and] highly subjective” and lacks “the kind of detailed or specific factual
assertions that are necessary to” test the truth of the claim.

Some ads included a
specific numerical US News ranking. For example, USC published a “News Alert”
on the Rossier Website celebrating the fact that it “ha[d] just been ranked
22nd in U.S. News and World Report’s 2010 edition of America’s Best Graduate
Schools.” On an earlier motion to dismiss, the court had found that this was
potentially actionable because the allegations

do not target US News’ selection or weighing of the objective criteria
which determine the rankings…. Instead, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants
knowingly reported false data to US News. Those underlying data are entirely
falsifiable, and the weight that they were to be assigned by US News was
predetermined. The fact that such data were considered alongside other
subjective considerations to produce a final ranking does not render USC’s
promotion of the allegedly fraudulently obtained ranking non-actionable. As
Plaintiffs note, if the law were otherwise, “any business that submits false
information to get a certification … could not be held liable because each of
those certifications would have at their core a methodology based on an opinion
as to which data points should be considered.”

2U argued that, since
it didn’t knowingly provide false data, this reasoning didn’t apply to
it. Plaintiffs responded that they still weren’t targeting US News’ choices
about how to rank, only the underlying false data, and that false advertising
is strict liability. The court, I think wrongly, agreed with 2U: to proceed,
plaintiffs needed to allege that 2U knew of that falsity or lacked a good faith
belief in the accuracy of the rankings. And since rankings and ratings are “almost
universally” treated as statements of opinion, “even if [one] could draw any
fact-based inferences from [the] rating, such inferences could not be proven
false because of the inherently subjective nature of [the] ratings calculation”
as long as the party expressing the opinion honestly entertained it and didn’t
have superior knowledge or special information.

Although US News is
the one with the opinion here, a reasonable consumer could construe defendants’
affirmation of that opinion as implying that the defendants “held some good
faith belief in its accuracy (i.e., that it was not fraudulently obtained).”
Plaintiffs plausibly pled lack of good faith as to USC, but not as to 2U;
alleged negligence was insufficient.

Although there’s no
mens rea requirement in California’s consumer protection statutes, that goes to
a separate issue:

Although Plaintiffs are correct that the negligent dissemination of a
false statement of fact would suffice, Plaintiffs do not allege that 2U’s
advertisements were literally false, nor could they. The question here,
therefore, is whether 2U’s advertisements are even actionable in the first
instance – i.e., are they misleading because they imply any false assertions
upon which a reasonable consumer could rely? In most instances involving
statements of opinion, the answer to that question will be “no.” In some cases,
however, a statement of opinion may “reasonably ‘be interpreted … as an
implied statement’ that the speaker ‘knows facts sufficient to justify him in
forming’ the opinion, or that he at least knows no facts ‘incompatible with
[the] opinion.’ ” If and only if that implied statement is false – and the
speaker does know of undisclosed fact incompatible with the opinion – is the
opinion is misleading. In other words, requiring that Plaintiffs allege
knowledge of the falsity underlying US News’ opinions in not contradicted by
the absence of a mens rea requirement under the statutes ….

Nor did plaintiffs
successfully plead joint/secondary liability. Liability under the UCL and CLRA
“cannot be predicated on vicarious liability.” It “must be based on [defendant’s]
personal ‘participation in the unlawful practices’ and ‘unbridled control’ over
the practices that are found to violate [the UCL] or [FAL].” In making this
determination, courts have focused on various factors such as whether the
defendant: (1) “issued [its] own advertisements” or merely repeated the
deceptive statements of another, (2) “controlled the language” or “reviewed or
monitored the representations” made by another, or (3) had notice of the
violating conduct.

The service
agreement between the parties wasn’t enough to make 2U liable. Under the
agreement, “USC was required to (1) market the online programs ‘in a manner
comparable to’ the in-person programs; (2) ‘consult with [2U] in the
development of additional Promotional Strategies’; and (3) provide 2U ‘with
access to information pertaining to both classroom-based and online students’
admissions, performance, and post-graduation outcomes.’ ” Although plaintiffs
alleged that 2U bought ads, they didn’t allege that 2U actually issued or
authored any of the advertisements upon which they relied. The mere fact that
under the agreement, USC was required to market the online programs “in a
manner comparable to” the in-person programs and “consult with [2U] in the
development of additional Promotional Strategies” didn’t show that 2U
controlled the statements at issue here. “USC maintained the main Rossier
website” where the allegedly misleading statements were posted, and any
marketing materials 2U made were “subject to USC’s written approval prior to
any use.”

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/02/us-news-rating-was-mere-opinion-except.html

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