Initial decision in FTC 1-800 case finding that anti-keyword agreements violated antitrust law

Agreed-on limits on advertising, like agreed-on limits on other inputs, risk being a per se violation of the antitrust laws.  Here, a blanket ban, including a negative keyword requirement (so that someone bidding on “contacts” wouldn’t get ads run against “1-800-Contacts” based on broad matching), was not justified by fear of trademark infringement/confusing consumers.  The ALJ also notes that 1-800’s extensive evidence that people often can’t distinguish between organic and paid results has nothing to do with whether they can distinguish between results for 1-800 and results for its competitors.  Initial ruling here.  NB: I testified for the FTC, but the ALJ doesn’t rely on my testimony.

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Public disclosure of private facts

Setting FERPA aside, does Taiwan Jones have any claim based on the viral tweet about his failed midterm?  (Skepticism here.)

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Website copying allegations allow potpourri of claims

DHI Group, Inc. v. Kent, No. 16-1670, 2017 WL 4837730 (S.D.
Tex. Oct. 26, 2017)
DHI and Oilpro compete in the market for websites for oil
and gas professionals that include job postings. DHI filed a lawsuit against
Oilpro and others asserting that the defendants hacked into their system, and
Oilpro counterclaimed for DHI’s alleged copying from Oilpro’s own website,
alleging multiple claims, which the court refused to dismiss on grounds that
give lots of leeway to website owners to make breach of contract, copyright,
CFAA, and DMCA claims.
Breach of contract: Oilpro had a browsewrap agreement on its
website, not requiring affirmative assent to access the website.  To enforce a browsewrap, “it is necessary to
show the user had actual or constructive knowledge of the terms and conditions
to prove a valid contract exists between the user and the owner of the
website.” Oilpro plausibly alleged such knowledge by alleging that DHI “knew or
should have known that Oilpro’s Terms and Conditions prohibited this conduct
because [DHI’s] terms of use for [its] own website prohibit this same sort of
conduct.” This was enough, where both parties were “sophisticated businesses
that use browsewrap agreements on their websites.”
 
Copyright: DHI argued that Oilpro didn’t identify any
material, information, or work that was both subject to copyright protection
and actually copied by DHI. However, Oilpro alleged that it owned a valid
copyright to its website and that DHI accessed it and copied data, member
profiles, and other information from the website. Under the Twombly/Iqbal
plausibility standard, it was enough to plead that the entire Oilpro website
was an original work that includes a “distinctive page layout, design,
graphical elements, and organization of member profile pages….” and that DHI
“improperly downloaded data, member profiles, and other information from the
Oilpro Website” and “then published information from the Oilpro Website on a
website owned by DHI Group called Dice Open Web….” Since Oilpro alleged
ownership of the entire website, and that DHI published Oilpro’s copied
information on its own website, Oilpro stated a plausible claim for copyright
infringement. [No no no—owning the overall layout doesn’t mean owning
everything that might be copied.  The
proper allegation would be that DHI copied copyrightable elements.]  DHI’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation to deny its motion to dismiss the copyright infringement claim
is OVERRULED.
The court also denied DHI’s motion to dismiss Oilpro’s DMCA
counterclaim because it alleged that it “had technological measures in place,
including a robots.txt file, monitoring software, and firewall software, to
prevent automated technologies from accessing the website” and DHI “circumvented
these technological measures to access the Oilpro website and download material
that was then published on [DHI’s] own website.” Specifically, robots.txt was
plausibly a technological measure, as other cases have held.  But note: The statute also requires that the
measure “[e]ffectively controls access to a work” defined as a measure that,
“in the ordinary course of its operation, require[ ] the application of
information, or a process of treatment, with the authority of the copyright
owner, to gain access to the work.” How does robots.txt require the application
of information to gain access, as opposed to provide extra information to
potential accessors?
Trademark infringement: Oilpro successfully alleged that it
had a protectable mark that DHI used to cause confusion about the
authorization/sponsorship of the DHI site. 
[The court then proceeds to confuse nominative and descriptive fair use,
applying the standards for descriptive fair use.] DHI argued that it used
Oilpro’s mark to acknowledge Oilpro as the source of certain information, but
the fair use defense was not available on a motion to dismiss because the
complaint didn’t indicate on its face that DHI used the mark on its website in
good faith—which, of course, is not an element of a nominative fair use
defense.
CFAA and the coordinate state Texas Harmful Access by a
Computer (THACA):  The court held that
Oilpro’s allegations of a knowing violation of the terms and conditions of the
website are sufficient to state a claim under both the CFAA and the THACA.
Misappropriation: Oilpro did enough by alleging that it
expended time, skill, and financial resources to create the website and
information on the website, that DHI wrongfully accessed the site without
authorization and obtained Oilpro’s data without having the expend the same
time, skill, and financial resources, that DHI was free-riding on Oilpro’s
investment, that Oilpro has had to expend even more time and resources because of
this alleged unfair competition, and that Oilpro has been and will continue to
be damaged by the misappropriation. [However, there seems to be a serious
copyright preemption problem with this misappropriation claim.]
Tortious interference: also ok.

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Likely success & irreparable harm still doesn’t justify ex parte TRO against false ad. given counterspeech

Verified Nutrition, LLC v. Sclar, 2017 WL 4785948, No. 17-cv-07499
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2017)
Verified sells ProstaGenix, which is “an all-natural
supplement with a proprietary form of Beta-sitosterol” (BetaRexin). Verified
primarily advertises ProstaGenix through an infomercial featuring Larry King,
available on Verified’s website, Prostate Report.  Prostate Report also provides “reviews” of
various prostate supplements on the market, including Verified’s product
ProstaGenix and defendants’ competing product, Prostate Miracle. Plaintiff
Buckley also publishes a magazine called “The Men’s Guide to Prostate
Supplements,” which provides similar reviews. The website allegedly discloses
that Buckley is the inventor of ProstaGenix and writes the reviews on the
website, and that Verified Nutrition sponsors the website. Buckley claims he
has “spent approximately $150,000 to have five reputable and independent
laboratories conduct more than 280 laboratory tests on over 150 different
prostate supplements.”
On Prostate Review, Buckley wrote about his determination that
his product was superior to Prostate Miracle because ProstaGenix contained
almost twice as much Beta-sitosterol.  He
included Prostate Miracle’s ingredient list on Prostate Review (which the court
suggests might be the source, however unjustified, of defendants’ “plagiarism”
claim).
Defendants began operating three websites: http://ift.tt/2hgbLls,
http://ift.tt/2i9plGT, and http://ift.tt/2hgbLSu. They
take images directly from the Larry King infomercial and superimpose negative
text over them. [Verified also sued for copyright infringement; even if the
claims are false, it’s hard to see how this isn’t fair use—the problem if any
is in the falsity, not in the exploitation of a market to which Verified has a
right.] Defendants’ claims allegedly include: 1) calling ProstaGenix and
Buckley’s business a “total scam;” 2) claiming that Verified Nutrition “does
not exist;” and 3) calling Buckley a “liar, plagiarist, and conman,” a “career
huckster,” a “slimeball,” a “serial fraudster,” a “career con artist,” a
“despicable schmuck,” and a “sociopath.” They also accuse Buckley of pretending
to be an “independent, unbiased 3rd party” reviewer, “fraudulently selling one
bogus product after another, since 2005,” and having a “long history of
defrauding consumers.”
Verified alleged that these negative statements were false
and had an adverse effect on their sales and goodwill. Searches for “Larry King
prostate,” among others, returned links to defendants’ websites, and a YouTube
video that is also embedded on the websites, which states, among other things,
that “In the Larry King Prostate report, Larry King stages a fake interview
with career huckster Fred Buckley and partner in crime, wife Corinne Buckley.”
Verified sought the TRO based on its claims for false
advertising, defamation, trade libel, and unfair competition.  The court found that falsity appeared likely,
and that the allegedly false statements were material, because “statements that
certain reviewers or distributors are fraudsters would be material.”  Plaintiffs submitted evidence that Verified
Nutrition exists as a Nevada limited liability company, disproving the claim
that it is a “fake company,” as well as evidence that they spent approximately
$150,000 in testing the ingredients of prostate supplements to review them on
Prostate Report, which goes to the “fake review” statements.
Thus, the court found likely success on the merits for false
advertising, as well as for the defamation/trade libel claim, though I’m not
sure where the special damages are alleged/proved—claims about general
goodwill/reputation are usually insufficient to plead special damage. This is
what happens when only one side shows up to litigate—which is why it’s good to
be nervous about ex parte proceedings. 
Plaintiffs were also likely to succeed on their UCL claim.
Plaintiffs claimed irreparable harm to their reputation and
also the decline in sales of their product, but lost sales “is just the type of
harm that could be remedied by monetary compensation after a full trial on the
merits.” So, was potential harm to reputation enough?  Many of plaintiffs’ allegations of harm relied
on the fact that defendants’ websites were “gaining traction on the Internet,
and rising in the results when Buckley entered certain search terms on Google,
which typically would have resulted in Plaintiffs’ websites being on the top of
the list.” [At some point, courts are going to have to note the importance of
personalized results—if Buckley clicked on defendants’ websites before, they’re
going to come up again for him, but
that’s less helpful evidence about what J. Random Searcher will see.]  In order to counter this false advertising,
plaintiffs alleged that they’d have to spend a lot of money on ads, but money
could be recovered after a full trial on the merits.  Only 400 people had seen the YouTube video at
the time of filing, after about 30 days (so much for “rising in the results”).
The court found that reputational harm could increase over time, tipping the
irreparable harm factor in favor of plaintiffs. 
[Not clear how this is less speculative than in other cases, but ok.]
Balancing the equities/public interest. The harm to defendants
seemed limited, “given they do not have a right to disseminate allegedly false
statements.” As for the public interest, “while the public has an interest in
not being exposed to false information, currently the public is able to view
both Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ advertisements regarding their respective
prostate supplements, and can come to their own conclusions. Much of the
information Plaintiffs use to demonstrate their claims are true and that
Defendants’ are false, is also available on Plaintiffs’ website, Prostate
Report, and thus also available to consumers to weigh the parties’ claims
themselves.”  This reasoning is
interesting and troubling in equal measure; it seems to suggest that the
parties ought to fight it out in the marketplace of ideas—but will consumers
actually consult both websites?  The
answer might well be yes, if this is the kind of product that consumers do seek
to educate themselves a bit about, but applied outside the TRO context it would
seem worrisomely in conflict with the basic premises of false advertising law.  However, applied to the ex parte TRO, where
the speech ultimately might be true/nonactionable, caution is more
understandable—and consistent with a First Amendment tradition of protecting
speakers from speech-suppressive orders they have not been able to contest.

As the court noted, none of the defendants had yet appeared,
and plaintiffs hadn’t filed proofs of service for the individual defendants.
There’s no requirement of formal service of process before a TRO can issue, but
the court was troubled by the possible lack of notice. On balance, the court
found that a TRO was not indicated, but they did provide sufficient evidence warranting
an order to show cause as to statements that Verified Nutrition “does not
exist”; ProstaGenix is ineffective and “just a cheap imitation of Prostate
Miracle”; Prostate Report is a “fake review site” using “fake lab tests” and
fake lab reports, promoted through a “gang of fraudsters”; and Buckley is “a
liar, plagiarist, and con man” as well as a “sociopath” who publishes
plagiarized and “fake review magazines” promoting his business and ProstaGenix.
[Query whether “sociopath” can be proven true or false, and thus capable of defamatory
meaning.]

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9th Circuit rules failure to recognize labeled ads as such “implausible”

Novation Ventures, LLC v. J.G. Wentworth Co., No. 16-55289, 2017
WL 4711477 (9th Cir. Oct. 19, 2017)
District
court opinion discussed here
. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal
of this case against J.G. Wentworth arguing that its use of different names to
advertise structured settlement products, creating the appearance of
competition but allowing Wentworth to charge higher prices/driving competitors
further down in search results, was misleading and anticompetitive.  Novation failed to allege antitrust injury;
merely having a harder time competing isn’t actionable, and any harm to
consumers would have made it easier for Novation to compete on price. Also, “the
whole advertising market was open to Novation—that market was not Google alone,
and, at any rate, Novation could compete for Google advertising.”
And here’s a quote that defense lawyers will like a lot: “the
assertion that consumers are not wise enough to recognize labeled
advertisements for what they are, or to scroll down farther than the first
three entries they see, is itself not plausible.”  This indicates why the false advertising
claim was doomed; Novation didn’t plead any literally or implicitly false
statement by the ads, only that the separate entities didn’t advertise their
affiliations. And it was implausible that consumers seeking to sell future payments from structured settlements would fail
to exercise a relatively high degree of care in considering ads from structured
settlement companies.

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9th Circuit rules inability to trust future representations provides standing for injunctive relief

Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 2017 WL 4700093, — F.3d
–, No. 15-16173 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 2017)
Rejecting a number of district court decisions, the Ninth
Circuit finds standing to seek injunctive relief under California consumer
protection laws even when the named plaintiff now knows the truth: “A
consumer’s inability to rely in the future upon a representation made on a
package, even if the consumer knew or continued to believe the same
representation was false in the past, is an ongoing injury that may justify an
order barring the false advertising.” 
This case involves wipes advertised as “flushable” which allegedly are
not. Davidson would like to buy truly flushable wipes, if such actually exist.
The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 9(b))
because it concluded that Davidson failed to adequately allege “why” the
representation that the wipes were flushable was false; she didn’t allege that
she personally experienced problems with her home plumbing or the relevant
water treatment plant.  The court of
appeals reversed, finding her allegations sufficient and plausible.  Davidson alleged that flushable means
“suitable for being flushed,” requiring an item to be capable of dispersing
within a short amount of time. This definition of flushable was supported by
dictionary definitions and Kimberly–Clark’s own statement on its website that
its flushable wipes “are flushable due to patented technology that allows them
to lose strength and break up when moving through the system after flushing.”  Davidson alleged that the actual wipes she
purchased failed to “disperse and disintegrate within seconds or minutes” and “did
not break up in the toilet bowl like toilet paper but rather remained in one
piece.”  To the extent the district court
dismissed the original complaint because Davidson failed to allege facts
“showing how she came to believe that the [Scott Wipes] were not ‘flushable,’ ”
that was wrong, because the complaint otherwise satisfied Rule 9(b).
The district court also held that Davidson didn’t allege
damages, in that she hadn’t pled “facts showing that her use of the wipes
damaged her plumping, pipes, or septic system.” But that wasn’t required—paying
a premium for a falsely advertised product is sufficient harm to maintain a
cause of action.  Davidson alleged that,
without the misrepresentation, she wouldn’t have bought the wipes or would have
paid less for them; that was enough.
Article III standing for injunctive relief: A plaintiff must
demonstrate constitutional standing separately for each form of relief
requested. The courts that have found no standing to seek injunctive relief generally
reason that “plaintiffs who are already aware of the deceptive nature of an
advertisement are not likely to be misled into buying the relevant product in
the future and, therefore, are not capable of being harmed again in the same
way.” The court of appeals disagreed:
Knowledge that the advertisement or
label was false in the past does not equate to knowledge that it will remain
false in the future. In some cases, the threat of future harm may be the
consumer’s plausible allegations that she will be unable to rely on the
product’s advertising or labeling in the future, and so will not purchase the
product although she would like to. In other cases, the threat of future harm
may be the consumer’s plausible allegations that she might purchase the product
in the future, despite the fact it was once marred by false advertising or
labeling, as she may reasonably, but incorrectly, assume the product was improved.
This result also prevents the untoward result that,
otherwise, removing a case from state to federal court—as happened here—would
enable a defendant to get rid of a remedy otherwise available.  After all, “the primary form of relief
available under the UCL to protect consumers from unfair business practices is
an injunction.” Without injunctive relief, “California’s consumer protection
laws would be effectively gutted.”  Or
there could be a “perpetual loop” of “plaintiffs filing their state law consumer
protection claims in California state court, defendants removing the case to
federal court, and the federal court dismissing the injunctive relief claims
for failure to meet Article III’s standing requirements.”
Given Davidson’s allegations, she adequately alleged a
desire to buy flushable wipes and an inability to rely on Kimberly-Clark’s
representation of flushability, which was enough to constitute a “threatened
injury [that is] certainly impending,” thereby establishing Article III
standing to assert a claim for injunctive relief.
Judge Berzon concurred, noting that the majority assumed
that it was required to perform a separate standing analysis for each “form of
relief.”  She disagreed that this
assumption was a requirement of the “case or controversy” requirement of
Article III, and argued that it was instead “an artifact of the discredited
practice of conflating the prerequisites for injunctive relief with the Article
III prerequisites for entry into federal court.” Instead, “we have a single
dispute—a single case, a single controversy—giving rise to multiple forms of
relief.”  Where “state law clearly
envisions those remedies as the product of a single adjudication of a single
issue,” to proceed otherwise in federal court “fundamentally undermines,
substantively, the enforcement of state laws in federal court.”  A remand to state court on injunctive relief
alone was motivated by the same desire not to let defendants strip plaintiffs
of their state-law remedies through removing a case over which there is clearly
Article III jurisdiction, but was not an acceptable solution. 
Citing Lexmark,
she contended that federal courts “have a history of improperly elevating the
prerequisites for relief to the status of jurisdictional hurdles.” In Judge
Berzon’s reading, the Supreme Court case on which the 9th Circuit
relied to require separate Article III analysis of each remedy in previous
cases, Lyons, did not actually make
the jurisdiction/remedy mistake, but rather inquired into whether the
nonjurisdictional requirements for equitable prospective relief were met, and
concluded they were not because of the absence of irreparable harm. This is of
little consequence in most cases following Lyons,
because where the availability of injunctive relief is governed by federal law,
the common-law prerequisites for injunctive relief “must eventually be
satisfied, and largely mirror the standing prerequisites.” But that’s not good
enough when this interpretation “imposes substantive limits on the availability
of relief under state law, in the service of constitutional interests that
aren’t actually under threat.” 

Still, Judge Berzon concurred fully, recognizing that the 9th
Circuit en banc opinion interpreting Lyons
the other way does require a separate standing analysis with regard to
prospective relief. 

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When the specifics are misleading: medical test stats draw false advertising claim

Quidel Corp. v. Siemens Med. Solutions USA, Inc., 2017 WL
4654644, No. 16-cv-3059 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2017)
Quidel is a “diagnostic healthcare manufacturer” that
“developed, promotes and sells the Thyretain TSI Reporter BioAssay,” which is
“intended for the qualitative detection in serum of thyroid-stimulating
immunoglobins (TSI).” Quidel alleged that Thyretain “is the only commercially
available assay that detects TSI only, as opposed to those that fail to
differentiate between thyroid-stimulating and thyroid-blocking immunoglobins” (TBI),
commonly known as “TRAb” assays. Siemens sells the IMMULITE 2000/2000 XPi TSI
assay, which is intended to compete with Thyretain. In 2016, Siemens obtained FDA
clearance to market IMMULITE, under a “substantial equivalence” finding through
the Section 510(k) premarket notification process.
Quidel cited seven scientific studies and alleged that IMMULITE
detects both TSI and TBI, and therefore “compares similarly to other TRAb assays,
detecting but not differentiating between stimulating and blocking antibodies.”
E.g., one study found that while IMMULITE was “about as sensitive and
consistent as the Thyretain bioassay,” it did not “consistently distinguish[ ]
between stimulating and blocking activities in 20 selected cases of hypothyroid
Hashimoto’s thyroiditis.”  Thus, Quidel
challenged Siemens’ claims about its ability to differentiate TSI from TBI,
e.g., “Unlike TRAb (TSH receptor antibody) assays which detect both stimulating
and blocking antibodies, the Siemens TSI assay specifically detects only
thyroid stimulating antibodies, which are the hallmark of Graves’ disease.”  The “only” claim was later discontinued (though
the press release and marketing statements that included that word have not
been removed from the web), but the current product description claims that
IMMULITE detects TSI with 98.5% specificity, contrasting that to TRAb assays
that detect both TSI and TBI, thus allegedly implying that IMMULITE is TSI
only.  (What I can’t tell from the specificity claim, and I haven’t looked up the underlying documents, is whether this applies when there’s TBI but not TSI present, which would affect how similar IMMULITE is to Thyretain.)  Given that IMMULITE costs less and
works faster than Thyretain, Quidel alleged that this falsity caused it damage,
including the loss of at least one lab customer at a cost of $250,000 a year
and corrective advertising costs.
The court found that Quidel had sufficiently pled falsity
and misleadingness to satisfy Rule 9(b) for its Lanham Act and California state
law false advertising claims, as well as with intentional interference with
economic advantage.  Likewise with
materiality for false advertising: given the alleged cost and time differences,
it is reasonable to infer that an equivalence claim would influence purchasing
decisions.  Siemens argued that
materiality was inadequately pled because labs are sophisticated parties and
are required to independently verify an assay’s performance data, but that’s a
matter of reliance at most, not materiality.

Siemens argued that the FDCA precluded the Lanham Act claim
because the FDA pre-approved Defendants’ product name and performance data and
required Siemens to include that information on the IMMULITE label and
packaging insert. Moreover, Siemens couldn’t IMMULITE’s name or alter its
specificity and sensitivity data without prior FDA approval.  Under Pom
Wonderful
, this argument failed. It’s still true that “a private action
brought under the Lanham Act may not be pursued when…the claim would require
litigation of [an] alleged underlying FDCA violation in a circumstance where
the FDA has not itself concluded that there was a violation.”  However, the claim here didn’t implicate FDA
determination of whether the premarket approval was ok.  Quidel didn’t challenge the product name and
performance data in the labeling, but rather the marketing statements (including
the use of specificity to distinguish IMMULITE from TRAb assays).  Thus, the court’s evaluation of Siemens’
similarity claims/failure to disclose the similarity of IMMULITE to TRAb assays
wouldn’t intrude on FDA’s exclusive enforcement authority.  Likewise, it would not be impossible to
comply both with the FDCA and state false advertising law.  “Removing the phrase ‘TSI only’ from
Defendants’ marketing materials or adding a disclaimer that IMMULITE does not
differentiate between stimulating and blocking antibodies does not reasonably
lead to Defendants being forced to change their assay’s name or performance
data such that Defendants would first need FDA approval.”

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Reading list: scientific claims and anti-fraud laws

Shannon Roesler, Evaluating Corporate
Speech About Science
(forthcoming, Geo. L.J. 2018)
Pull quote: “[C]onsumer protection laws should encourage accurate
representations of contemporaneous scientific knowledge, rather than lucky guesses
about the state of scientific knowledge in the future.”  Amen.
Abstract: How should courts
evaluate the truth or falsity of corporate speech
about science? This question is
critical to antifraud actions like the ongoing state
investigations into whether
ExxonMobil misrepresented scientific knowledge regarding
global climate change. ExxonMobil
claims that these investigations chill scientific
inquiry and burden speech on a
matter of public concern in violation of the First
Amendment. Of course, the notion
that scientific progress depends on the free exchange
of ideas is uncontroversial. But
although the free-market approach to scientific discourse
has firm foundations, this Article
suggests that it is a misguided approach to the question
of when corporate speech about
science is misleading.
Too often, courts and commentators
assume the truth of corporate speech about
science, an assumption that
inevitably results in First Amendment scrutiny. The
reluctance to analyze the truth of
such speech is understandable given the nature of
scientific knowledge itself.
Scientific knowledge is not easily described in terms of truth
or falsity. But corporate speech
that uses the inherent uncertainty of scientific inquiry to
mischaracterize scientific
knowledge is not participating in scientific discourse.
Moreover, when courts treat such
speech as part of a larger scientific debate, they
threaten to undermine the deterrent
function of antifraud laws and shift the costs of

misleading speech onto the public.

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Undisclosed, and disclosed, influence when going to the mattresses

Fast Company has a great story about the intricate operations and arguable shenanigans of mattress reviewers who are also paid affiliates.

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Consumer’s ability to trust future representations provides standing to seek injunctive relief

Delman v. J. Crew Group, Inc., 2017 WL 3048657, No. 16-9219
(C.D. Cal. May 15, 2017)
This is another factory outlet false advertising case. The
J. Crew Factory Website sells clothing and other items at what appears to be a
significant discount. It used two prices for each item: the “Valued At” price
and “Your Price.” A reasonable consumer would allegedly believe, falsely, (1)
that the Valued At price was the original price of an item sold at one of J.
Crew’s higher priced stores and/or (2) that the item is similar to one sold by
other merchants at or near the Valued At price. Instead, while the items
resemble those sold at non-outlet J. Crew stores, they’re of inferior quality
and were never offered, at a J. Crew store or anywhere else, for sale at the
Valued At price. “Despite the promise of a discount implicit in the comparison
between the Valued At and Your Price sales prices, J. Crew is in fact selling
the goods available on the Factory Website at full price.” 
J. Crew maintained in a previous lawsuit that the Valued At
price represented the price at which other retailers offered the same or
similar goods. Delman hired an expert who investigated to see whether the same
or similar goods were available for purchase from other retailers at or around
the Valued At price, but did not find comparable goods available at the Valued
At price.  Instead, many (if not all) of
the goods could be bought at or below the Your Price price.
The court found that Delman’s allegations satisfied Rule
9(b), both as to the implied discount-from-regular-J. Crew claim and the
“Valued At means prevailing market price for a similar item” theory. J. Crew
argued that her decision to plead two theories of deception made her
allegations fatally vague, but “there is no reason why a pricing scheme that is
purposely ambiguous could not also be deceptive or misleading.”  If a reasonable consumer could interpret the
Valued At price to mean one of multiple, mutually exclusive things, all of
which are untrue, that states a claim. 
Nor were the theories so implausible that no reasonable
consumer could be misled.  J. Crew argued
that “value” could only reasonably be interpreted to mean the defendants’
subjective opinion of the worth of the goods, based on dictionary
definitions.  But the dictionary wasn’t
the end of the matter, when the issue was “how a reasonable consumer would
interpret the phrase ‘Valued At’ in the context of the specific commercial
interaction that Plaintiff has challenged.” In context, “the great esteem in
which J. Crew holds its wares” was not the only interpretation a reasonable
consumer could give the term. As the court pointed out, the Valued At price was
located right next to the Your Price sales price, and was struck out.  “Why place the two prices next to one another
if they are not meant to be compared? And why strike out the Valued At price,
if not to suggest to the purchaser that he or she is getting a bargain of some
sort?”  This “visual language,” the court
wisely noted, “could easily be understood to mean that the Valued At price
refers to a real, objective price, which the Factory Website has discounted for
the benefit of its customers.”
Plaintiff did fail to provide proper notice as required to
bring a breach of contract claim in California, and also had to wait to bring a
CLRA claim given the notice requirement of the CLRA.
J. Crew argued that Delman suffered no damages, because she
received the goods that she paid for at the agreed-upon price.  But courts have rejected this argument under
California law.  “[A] bargain hunter is,
in fact, economically harmed when the seller inflates the perceived value of
its products” (citing Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., 718 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2013)).

Finally, J. Crew argued that Delman lacked standing to seek
injunctive relief because she no longer risked being deceived by J. Crew’s
deceptive pricing. However, Delman alleged that she would purchase more apparel
from J. Crew if it were to cease making its false representations.  The issue wasn’t whether policy concerns for
the enforcement of California law could trump Article III, but rather that
Delman alleged irreparable injury in the future: she couldn’t ascertain, from
J. Crew’s pricing scheme, the true value of the items she’d like to buy, and
thus she can’t trust its bargain claims. 
This continued inability to trust was a sufficient likelihood of future
injury to confer Article III standing.

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