Second Circuit holds that allegations of “systematic” underweighing plead injury in fact for specific individual

John v. Whole Foods
Market Gp., Inc., 858 F.3d 732 (2d. Cir. 2017)
John filed a
putative class action under GBL §§ 349-350 alleging that New York City Whole
Foods grocery stores systematically overstated the weights of pre-packaged food
products and overcharged customers as a result. The court of appeals reversed
the district court’s holding of lack of Article III standing on the pleadings.
John alleged that he
“routinely shopped” for two years at two Whole Foods stores in Manhattan and
made “regular[ ] purchase[s]” of pre-packaged products, including “pre-packaged
cheese and cupcakes approximately one or two times per month.” The complaint didn’t
identify a specific food purchase as to which Whole Foods overcharged John, but
described pervasive overcharging of pre-packaged food throughout Whole Foods’
stores in New York City. The complaint a June 2015 press release of the New
York City Department of Consumer Affairs announcing preliminary findings that
Whole Foods’ New York City stores “routinely overstated the weights of its
pre-packaged products—including meats, dairy and baked goods”:
DCA tested packages of 80 different types of pre-packaged products and
found all of the products had packages with mislabeled weights. Additionally,
89 percent of the packages tested did not meet the federal standard for the
maximum amount that an individual package can deviate from the actual weight,
which is set by the U.S. Department of Commerce. The overcharges ranged from
$0.80 for a package of pecan panko to $14.84 for a package of coconut shrimp.
The DCA’s findings,
the press release continued, “point to a systematic problem with how products
… are weighed and labeled” and “suggest[ ] that individual packages are
routinely not weighed or are inaccurately weighed, resulting in overcharges for
consumers.” The investigation took place during the same period as John’s
purchases and focused on the eight Whole Foods stores in NYC, including the two
stores he patronized.  Whole Foods confirmed
that cheese and cupcakes were among the pre-packaged products that the DCA
alleged were mislabeled.
Because Whole Foods brought
only a facial challenge to John’s allegations of standing, John had no
evidentiary burden at the pleading stage. The district court thought that John
didn’t plead injury in fact, which consists of “an invasion of a legally
protected interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical.”
The court of appeals
disagreed. It was undisputed that overpaying for a product results in a
financial loss constituting a particularized and concrete injury in fact. But
the critical basis for John’s claim that he was overcharged was the DCA’s press
release announcement that 89 percent of Whole Foods’ pre-packaged products tested
by the DCA were mislabeled, and the press release’s conclusion that the
mislabeling was “systematic” and “routine[ ].”  The district court didn’t think that was
enough, but it failed to draw all reasonable inferences in John’s favor.  It wanted “an investigative finding of
ubiquitous, systematic over-weighting at Whole Foods’ New York City stores,”
“invariable incidents of this deceptive labeling practice,” and
“across-the-board overcharging so as to embrace, other than by conjecture, the
cheese and cupcakes … that John … occasionally bought in 2014 and 2015.” It
also wanted a description of the DCA’s methodology.

But the DCA’s press
release asserted that the mislabeling was “systematic” and “routine[ ],” and a
facial attack on the pleadings wasn’t the right place to test the DCA’s
sampling methods.  His alleged facts made
his alleged injury plausible.  The
district court was concerned over evidentiary obstacles on the merits, but
targeted discovery might be able to address those. 

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What I said to the USTR

Thanks for the
opportunity to participate.  I’m here on
behalf of the Organization for Transformative Works, a nonprofit which has over
770,000 registered users who have created more than a million works, and our
website receives over 115 million page views per week.  Our users, who are the creators of the next
generation and today, come from all over, including substantial numbers in the
US, Canada, and Mexico, and we have a strong interest in preserving a balanced
copyright regime.
Copyright’s limitations
and exceptions are vital to creative practices and to creators as well as to
educators, journalists, and ordinary citizens. 
Any renegotiation should ensure flexible limitations and exceptions,
including the highly successful model of American fair use and Canadian
protections for user-generated content and educational uses.
It’s also important
not to repeat the SOPA/PIPA debacle through the trade route.  SOPA and PIPA tried to change the online
copyright rules in ways that would have harmed America’s advantage in internet
innovation; the ideas don’t get better when suggested as trade policy.  Negotiations shouldn’t be based on the
prospect of tampering with internet service provider protections that have
proven so successful for American companies operating worldwide.  The Section 512 safe harbors for internet
service providers who respond expeditiously to notices of claimed infringement
have enabled American internet companies to thrive and remain innovative.  Section 512 and Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, which provides a broader safe harbor for
non-intellectual property related claims, are far from perfect.  But that just makes them like democracy—the worst
possible regime except for all the alternatives that have been tried or
proposed.  Proposals in some of the
submissions to change the law to require filtering after a notice of
infringement would shut down huge sections of the internet, and piracy would still
continue as it always does. 
Similarly, requests
to require more countries to create quasi-copyright anticircumvention rights
for digital locks hamper innovation and would make American products less
attractive—why would a farmer buy a John Deere tractor when he knows he won’t
be able to repair it himself because of the digital locks that only Deere can
release?  The Copyright Office only last
week proposed loosening the rules on
anticircumvention measures.  Imposing
rules on other countries we already know aren’t working well would be a
mistake.  At a bare minimum, anticircumvention
provisions should require a nexus to copyright infringement and exceptions to
anticircumvention rules should be explicit and flexible, like fair use.

Likewise, we oppose negotiating
with Canada to extend its domestic copyright term or restrict its limitations
and exceptions and with Mexico, with its very different legal system, to impose
significant statutory damages in domestic infringement cases—when statutory
damages are already desperately in need of reform in the US.  Balanced copyright policy is an important
goal that shouldn’t be sacrificed in any negotiations.

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Testimony before USTR on NAFTA

I’ll be testifying later today on behalf of the Organization for Transformative Works, based on this submission (for which Betsy Rosenblatt deserves primary credit, though she couldn’t fly across the country to attend–a stark reminder that not everyone gets a voice in these discussions).

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Reading list: right of publicity

Mark Bartholomew, The Political Economy of Celebrity Rights 
Whittier Law Review, Forthcoming

Abstract:

This essay discusses how the right of publicity became such a robust property right — much more far-reaching than analogous rights in copyright or trademark. One cannot explain the accretion of celebrity publicity rights as a matter of legal logic or simple reaction to the growing economic value of celebrity endorsements. Instead, the essay explains the right’s expansion from the perspective of political economy. Critical innovations to the right of publicity occurred in the particular political environment of the 1980s and 1990s. Despite some groups’ resistance to new, specialized entitlements for celebrities, the conditions were right for a particular coalition of interest groups to push through new vigorous interpretations of the right of publicity. I also discuss the right’s expansion from the perspective of a different political actor: judges. At the end of the twentieth century, the political optics of celebrity changed in a way that provided more comfort for judges who were once hostile to the anti-democratic implications of publicity rights. Judges confronted a changing social definition of celebrity that was no longer linked to merit or inner greatness. Anyone, it was now argued, had the potential to become famous. This change in the meaning of fame made celebrity legal protections seem less like a perk for a rare few and more like a fundamental right available to all.

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Copyright Office issues 1201 report

Available here.  It’s a lot to go through, but on first inspection they seem to be trying to address persistent problems, though in the main not by accepting the advice that participants had for them (like scheduling 1201 exemption proposals in a way that makes sense for law school clinics, and performing administrative factfinding rather than treating this as an adversarial procedure where the Office’s role is to adjudicate).  One immediate thought: even if the goal of making it possible to participate in the rulemaking without counsel were achieved, that won’t help if the exemptions continue to get ever more complex, so that you need counsel to use them.

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Slightly cooler take on Tam

I will have some more thoughts in Tam in a forthcoming amicus brief arguing that dilution is
unconstitutional.  I think this was about the least harmful affirmance the Court could have written, though for precisely that reason it leaves a lot up for grabs.  Right now, I will just
say a few things: (1) It is now even harder to distinguish between content- and
viewpoint-based regulation.  I thought
that disparagement should be deemed content-based but not viewpoint-based
because it was impossible to identify a disadvantaged “side”—whereas even in Rosenberger, one could identify a set of
religious perspectives that were excluded from university funding.  I don’t think there’s a distinctive subset of
disparaging perspectives in the same way. 
(Justice Kennedy’s rejoinder, that this logic would allow bars on
criticizing any government official, is particularly silly: because not
everyone is a member of the category “government officials,” that’s not a level
playing field at all.  Everyone is a
member of the category “persons,” Eric Trump notwithstanding.  Marty Lederman talked a bit about
this issue at Balkinization
.)  But how this
plays out in non-tarnishment/disparagement situations remains to be seen.
(2) The opinion for four Justices rejecting the “government
program” argument is hard for me to understand. It’s true to say that most of
the decisions on which the government relied almost all involved cash or their
equivalent, but the opinion does a poor job of explaining why that
matters.  The main argument is: well,
fire and police protection are services too, and you couldn’t deny them to
users of disparaging marks.  The answer
to which—completely unaddressed in the opinion—is “that’s what unconstitutional
conditions doctrine is for.”  Denying
trademark registration because a trademark is disparaging is a far cry from
denying police protection to the user of the mark.  Also, the opinion distinguishes two non-money
subsidy cases involving unions by saying they were very different.  That’s nice … why?  The opinion’s language suggests a kind of
speech/conduct distinction (“lawmakers chose to confer a substantial non-cash
benefit for the purpose of furthering activities that they particularly desired
to promote but not to provide a similar benefit for the purpose of furthering
other activities”), but not a very persuasive one, unless—again—we do an
unconstitutional conditions analysis.

(3) I’m glad the Court didn’t say anything about the
relationship between unregistrable marks and §43(a) protection, and highlighted
that it was not doing so. While I believe that the issue deserves resolution
one way or another, this was a poor vehicle for the question because so much
else was going on.  (But here’s a
question: after this decision, can the common
law
engage in the viewpoint discrimination entailed in denying registration
to immoral/disparaging marks by denying common law protection to such marks, as a number of states at least arguably do?)

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Court approves conjoint analysis to determine damages in consumer class action

Morales v. Kraft Foods Group, Inc., 2017 WL 2598556, No. CV14-04387
(C.D. Cal. Jun. 9, 2017)
Plaintiffs alleged that they were misled by Kraft’s use of
the term “natural cheese” on its “Natural Cheese Fat Free Shredded Fat Free
Cheddar Cheese,” bringing the usual statutory California claims. The court previously
certified a California class.  Here the
court partially decertifies the class but rejects Kraft’s challenge to
plaintiffs’ expert, who performed a conjoint analysis to try to determine the
incremental value to consumers of “natural.”
Dr. Anand V. Bodapati has been a Professor of Marketing at
the UCLA Anderson School of Management since 2000, teaching “Marketing,
Consumer Psychology, Consumer Behavior, and Statistical Methods for making
inferences from data on how consumers respond to product offerings, pricing,
advertising, and other marketing activity in the marketplace.”  He surveyed California buyers of Kraft
shredded cheese, presenting them choices between images of (a) the marketplace
offerings of some leading manufacturers, (b) Kraft’s shredded fat free cheddar
cheese product as it was offered in the marketplace with the “natural cheese”
label, and/or (c) a digitally altered image identical to the Kraft image except
without the “natural cheese” label. Each respondent chose between options 14
times, with price differences between the products ranging from $0.80 to $4.50,
randomly assigned.  The survey results
showed that 26% of consumers would pay more than $1 extra for a product with
the “natural cheese” label, and 12% would pay more than $2 extra for such a
product. Bodapati concluded that, on average, customers would be willing to pay
$0.747 more for a product with that label.
Kraft marshalled several experts in response.  Key challenges: (1) Was the proper group
surveyed?  Kraft argued that its fat free
cheese product was a niche product, so surveying all shredded cheese buyers was
inappropriate.  The court found that this
didn’t justify exclusion.  Bodapati explained
why he chose Kraft shredded cheese buyers—he didn’t have any reason to believe
that the value of “natural” would differ as between fat free and non-fat free
buyers, and he didn’t want to make the study more arduous.  Also, some of the evidence Kraft cited indicated
that consumers varied—its category review indicated that fat content was only
the third most important factor cited by consumers, while the use they intended
and the form of the cheese were more important; the review also said that
“[c]onsumers buy more than one health segment for different uses, household
members and taste preferences.” Thus, the markets didn’t seem that distinct.
Kraft then argued that the survey was irrelevant because it
didn’t calculate damages.  The survey
calculated the value to consumers, which was relevant to damages.  Kraft contended that a price premium theory
was the only allowable model for false advertising damage, and conjoint
analysis couldn’t be used. The court disagreed. Dourts frequently admit evidence
based on a conjoint analysis.
Additional challenges to survey methodology could be
addressed on cross.  Though the experts
disagreed about whether conjoint analysis could be used to compare products
with only one nonprice attribute, Bodapati testified that “having one attribute
only is good for the conjoint analysis in the sense that it reduces cognitive
overloading and thereby increases the fidelity of the decision making.”  As for whether the survey telegraphed its
purpose to respondents, Bodapati explained that respondents’ attempts to pick
the “right” answer weren’t worrisome to him because, in conjoint analysis,
there is no “right” answer. He also testified that he elected not to show the
back of the packaging out of a concern for verisimilitude—how consumers
actually understand the products.  And he
didn’t provide a none of the above option because, he said, conjoint analysis
works without that.  These and other
criticisms went to weight, not admissibility.
Decertification: willingness to pay can measure restitution
damages, but under California law restitution  is confined to restoration of any interest in
“money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of
such unfair competition.” But the conjoint analysis provided only evidence of
loss to the plaintiffs, not of gain to Kraft. While injunctive relief was still
possible, the court decertified the Rule 23(b)(3) class and sought additional
briefing on whether the class would be re-certifiable under Rule 23(b)(2). This
was possible because, under California law, deception and materiality need not
be proved as to every member of the class. Bodapati’s report and testimony showed
a triable issue as to materiality under the CLRA.

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Will B&B preclusion become typical?

Buzz Seating, Inc. v. Encore Seating, Inc., No. 16-cv-1131
(S.D. Ohio Jun. 16, 2017)
This case suggests that B&B
is quite a broad decision, despite some cautionary statements in the Court’s
opinion—you can avoid B&B
preclusion if you sell goods other than
those in the refused registration
, but otherwise, watch out. 
Buzz, a maker of office chairs under the mark FLITE, sued
Encore, which also makes an executive chair under the mark FLITE for trademark
infringement and related claims. They allegedly advertise in the same
publications, attend the same trade shows, and hire the same dealers and  sales representatives.
Encore applied to register FLITE for “Office furniture,
including chairs” in 2011; Buzz opposed and filed its own application in
2013.  The TTAB sustained Buzz’s
opposition because the marks were identical and the goods and channels of trade
were legally identical (describing Buzz’s use as “for stacking or side
chairs”).  Instead of appealing, Encore
abandoned its first application and filed for a concurrent use application,
allowing use in 24 states and concurrent use by Buzz in Ohio.  Buzz sued, and Encore answered and
counterclaimed seeking a declaration of noninfringement and an order directing
the PTO to reject Buzz’s application.
B&B preclusion
applied to likely confusion, given that Encore had already argued before the
TTAB that “there is no likelihood of confusion because Buzz Beating’s FLITE
stacking chairs are vastly different from Encore’s FLITE executive chairs, are
not sold to the same customers, and do not compete in the marketplace.” Encore
argued that the TTAB considered only whether the broad category of goods identified
in its application were likely to cause confusion, but here it was arguing that
the specific executive chairs actually sold under the FLITE mark are not likely
to cause confusion when compared to Buzz’s side chairs. But B&B says that preclusion will apply
“[i]f a mark owner uses its mark in ways that are materially the same as the
usages included in its registration application.”  The description of the class of goods
encompassed the specific goods, executive chairs, Encore was selling, and thus
there were no material differences between the usage identified in the
application and actual usage.  Comment:
under this reasoning, it’s hard to see why B&B
wouldn’t always demand preclusion in this posture. 
The court pointed out that the TTAB already rejected this
nonconfusion argument; Encore to told the TTAB that its chairs were “premium
executive chairs sold to corporate customers for use  behind a desk or in a conference room,” and
that “a person purchasing a stacking chair such as [Buzz Seating’s] Flite chair
would not buy an executive chair and vice-versa.”  Of course, a “crucial” fact in the TTAB’s
rejection was that Encore didn’t limit its identification of goods to executive
chairs, but the TTAB also held that the differences didn’t avoid a likelihood
of confusion, because the question was not whether the chairs would be confused
but rather whether there’d be source confusion, and the evidence showed that
executive chairs and side chairs were closely related, and sold by the same
dealers or distributors to the same customers. 
Indeed, Buzz sold both executive chairs and side chairs, and used the
same mark at least once.
Even if the court found the differences material under B&B, Encore’s claim would still be
barred under claim preclusion, because the issue could have been raised before
the PTO.  Encore offered to limit its identification
of goods, but the TTAB found it had done so too late.  And this holding further expands B&B—if one can imagine limiting the
registration in a way that avoids likely confusion, one should have done so
already.  Thus, the noninfringement
counterclaim was dismissed.
The court declined to rule on Encore’s counterclaim about
priority of registration because it doubted it had jurisdiction over a
registration issue for a registration that had yet to issue; the court sought
more briefing.

The court also struck affirmative defenses that concerned
the same issues, including Encore’s abandonment defense, but it did not strike
the defense that Buzz hadn’t used Flite, or made more than de minimis use, in
certain regions of the US and that therefore Encore was the senior user in
those regions.  The TTAB held that Buzz
could succeed in its opposition without proving priority of use on a
state-by-state basis, as long as there was prior use in the US, and thus the
TTAB didn’t resolve that priority question. 

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TM question of the day, we all scream edition

I’m reasonably sure Joy ice cream cones aren’t not owned by the owner of rights in Pepperidge Farm goldfish or Teddy Grahams, so how should we think about these suggestions on the back of the package?

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Failure to plead with particularity dooms supplement false advertising claim

Nutrition Distribution, LLC v. New Health Ventures, LLC, 2017
WL 2547307, No. 16-cv-02338 (S.D. Cal. Jun. 13, 2017)
Nutrition Distribution sued New Health for false advertising
of supplement products containing various “Selective Androgen Receptor
Modulators (“SARMS”)” such as “Ostarine.” After New Health moved to dismiss,
Nutrition Distribution filed a proposed amended complaint for false advertising
(and RICO violations, of which no more will be said), based on New Health’s sale
of products containing Dimethazine (“DMZ”). 
Applying Rule 9(b), the court denied leave to amend on grounds of
futility and dismissed the complaint.
The court first found that the proposed complaint wasn’t futile
as barred by the primary jurisdiction doctrine. 
The basic claim was that New Health’s failure to disclose DMZ’s health
effects was misleading.  This claim doesn’t
depend on whether DMZ is “safe” or not. 
Instead, it is about misleading consumers through lack of disclosure; determining
misleadingness doesn’t require the FDA’s technical and policy expertise (as Pom Wonderful indicated).
Nutrition Distribution also sufficiently pled that DMZ was a
controlled substance because it is derived from, and structurally similar to,
Methastorone—a chemical already deemed to be an anabolic steroid under federal
law.  However, New Health’s alleged
failure to disclose that DMZ is banned by anti-doping organizations was legally
insufficient because it wasn’t an actionable omission. Under the Lanham Act,
omissions are only actionable if they render affirmative statements false or
misleading, and Nutrition Distribution didn’t identify any such statements,
only claims that New Health’s product was “hands down the strongest anabolic
Pre-Workout on the market today!” and “an extremely potent, high-intensity,
high-stimulant and highly anabolic pre-workout concoction.”

Likewise, pleading that New Health  “purposely made false and misleading
descriptions of fact concerning the nature, characteristics and qualities of
its DMZ products by … failing to disclose their status as controlled
substances and failing to disclose the overwhelming clinical evidence that such
products pose extreme health risks” was insufficient to plead a misleading
advertisement with particularity.  The
same was true with the initial complaint.

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