WIPIP Session 1: AI

Nikola Datzov,
Can AI Keep a (Trade) Secret?

We’ve funneled IP
protection for AI generated inventions/information to trade secrecy w/o patent
or copyright for human authors/inventors. But it’s narrow protection b/c there
are no choices.

How can we trust
AI generated trade secrets? Concerns for bias, discrimination, unfair
competition, antitrust. Disclosure to the government has risks for the trade
secret owner; Elizabeth Rowe notes that the risk falls on the owner. Will
companies rely on such limited protection? Is there sufficient incentive for AI
generated innovations?


Disclosure is
not the same thing as transparency: having the trade secret doesn’t mean
understanding it—it’s just turning a black box over to the government.


Instead,
proposes trust but verify: register to certify compliance with regulations,
including limited government inspection, similar to source code review in litigation.
Enforced w/penalties, including litigation/whistleblower protections.


Lisa Macklem, Harnessing
the Robot in the Room

Generative AI
could be a boon for Open Educational Resources. Want to be globally available
so need to consider more than US, EU, UK guidance. Trying to come up with best
practices. International framework does consider education. Transparency
requirements: disclosing that content was generated by AI, designing to prevent
it from generating illegal content.


Don’t use
infringing data; use databases to which you have legitimate access; edit AI generated
work for accuracy and to make sure not too much of the original is used. License
when absolutely necessary but watch for restrictions on purpose or geography.


In response to
Irene Calboli suggesting that this didn’t seem like it would be less
resource-intensive: There’s a difference in effort required for assembling materials
and checking AI output for accuracy.


Victoria Schwartz,
AI Virtual Influencers

ROP covers the
issue of real influencers. Virtual influencer names can be trademarks; actual
images/AV works are copyright-protected as long as human-created. Some VI can
likely receive copyright protection as characters, though not clear what the “work”
is—a body of social media posts? Really a spectrum from unfiltered person with
no makeup in photos, to carefully posed in makeup, to photoshop and filters, to
avatar, to “human created” using CGI, to fully AI created. Claim is that we’re
at the end of the spectrum; we may be near that but not quite today (cf. George
Carlin brouhaha).


If © is
difficult, what about ROP? Lots of people on social media claim to be
AI-generated and complain about “stealing my pics.” McCarthy and INTA say ROP
is for humans; Nimmer in 1954 suggested that animals, inanimate objects, and
business and other institutions could be endowed with “publicity values,” so
there should be publicity rights for them. State laws tend to specify living or
deceased. California common law doesn’t specify that a “plaintiff” has to be human.
Most caselaw on character ROP asks whether an actor playing the character gets
a ROP claim without owning the ©; not on point. © is strong enough that it’s
usually superior to ROP.


Maybe this is an
issue for © preemption.


Eric Goldman: animals
and buildings don’t have access to the courts; and there are cases saying no
ROP for corporations. (I would also note that the common law clearly doesn’t
apply to deceased persons, which suggests something about the meaning of “plaintiff.”)


Tyler Ochoa: why
won’t TM law be more valuable? AI generation has nothing to do with TM
protectability, and TM need never expire, unlike ROP (in most circumstances). For
entertainment or whatever services they offer.


Zahr Said: Precision
about what we’re trying to protect is useful! Is it the money, the music,
something else? Is there an equitable estoppel element if there’s something
deceptive going on? If AI-generated is inaccurate/puffery, should that bother
us?


A: disclosure
model is already popular for influencers.


Q: will it
matter if more polities grant “citizenship” to virtual AIs? Saudi Arabia
already did it.


Laura Heymann:
Why not start w/potential harms, and then map them onto rights/remedies,
instead of starting w/ the idea that there is something to be protected?


A: good idea: we
don’t think of ROP as protecting consumers.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/02/wipip-session-1-ai.html

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reliance can be presumed in NY from material misleadingness, as in California

Polvay v. FCTI,
Inc., — F.Supp.3d —-, 2024 WL 322050, No. 22-cv-4315 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
29, 2024)

The court certified
a class of New York consumers who were assessed multiple fees for making
balance inquiries at one of defendant FCTI’s ATMs at 7-Eleven stores. During
the relevant period, all New York customers who used one of defendant’s ATMs
saw the same initial prompt: “Would you like to view your account balance?” If
they said yes, a balance inquiry fee would be assessed to the customer. And if
the customer selected an account, a prompt would appear and ask the customer,
“Would you like to print your Balance and continue the Transaction?” If they
continued, this would be treated as a second balance inquiry and a second
balance inquiry fee would be assessed, earning another interchange fee for
FTCI; interchange fees are a major source of its revenue. 
The class alleged that “Continue/Cancel Prompt” screen was deceptive because it
didn’t reasonably appear to be a second balance inquiry, but defendant FCTI
treated it as such. (Who thought this was ok?!) They brought claims under NYGBL Sections 349 and 350.

FTCI’s key argument
was that causation must be determined on an individual, rather than class,
basis. Instead, the court applied a presumption of reliance.

The court ruled
based on three relevant principles used by the New York Court of Appeals: First,
Sections 349 and 350 do not require proof of reliance. Second, causation is
required. Third, there is a relationship between reliance and causation. This
relationship, the court predicted, was best understood as allowing a
presumption of reliance on a materially misleading statement at the class
certification stage.

The New York Court
of Appeals has explained that under Section 349, an allegation “that
defendant’s material deception caused [plaintiffs] to suffer [a monetary] loss”
is sufficient for purposes of causation; “[p]laintiffs need not additionally
allege that they would not have otherwise entered into the transaction” (as
would be required for showing reliance). Materiality is what satisfies the
causation requirement, as in securities fraud cases and in California consumer
protection cases.

Here, then, if a
plaintiff could prove that (1) each class member was automatically shown the
“Continue/Cancel Prompt” before pressing the “Continue” button and (2) that the
“Continue/Cancel Prompt” was objectively material and misleading, then a
presumption of reliance for purposes of showing causation would apply. Plaintiff
showed (1) and there was enough to go to a jury on (2). Among other things, the
Compliance Department at Pulse Network, an ATM Network, found that the
“Continue/Cancel Prompt” screen violated its rules and that no “reasonable
person would interpret this question to mean the cardholder is actually
requesting a second Inquiry.”

FTCI didn’t rebut
this presumption, merely speculating that some customers were aware that
printing their account balance would result in a second balance inquiry fee
based on agreements, disclosures, and account statements they received from
their banks. But there was no evidence that these disclosures or agreements
stated that printing an account balance would constitute a second balance
inquiry. Moreover, evidence that certain customers incurred two balance inquiry
fees on multiple occasions, was insufficient to show the “Continue/Cancel
Prompt” screen had no effect on their decision to press “Continue.” It was just
as plausible that they didn’t know or understand why they were charged twice.

I’m not going to run
through the rest of the certification analysis, but a declaration from
plaintiff’s expert stated that he could ascertain the members of the class and
calculate damages using an algorithm and that the necessary transactional
information to do so is in possession of defendant and the banks. He didn’t
need to design the algorithm before certification; ascertainability is a
“modest threshold requirement [that] will only preclude certification if a
proposed class definition is indeterminate in some fundamental way.” Speculation
that some third-party banks may refuse to turn over the necessary data wasn’t sufficient
for finding lack of ascertainability.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/02/reliance-can-be-presumed-in-ny-from.html

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no summary judgment on “non-toxic” and “Earth friendly”

Bush v. Rust-Oleum
Corp., 2024 WL 308263, No. 20-cv-03268-LB (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2024)

Bush alleged that Rust-Oleum
falsely labeled of its “Krud Kutter” cleaning products as “non-toxic” and
“Earth friendly.” Rust-Oleum sought summary judgment on the California
consumer protection claims
based on the argument that likely deception was
refuted by disclaimers on the labels themselves and testimony from the
plaintiff and his expert toxicologist. The court declined to grant summary
judgment.

At the pleading
stage in this case, the court held that the plaintiff’s definition of
“non-toxic” — that “the product[s] did not pose any risk to humans, animals, or
the environment” — was sufficient. But “the plaintiff and his expert
toxicologist said during their depositions that risk can never be completely
eliminated (for example, even water can be toxic in excess amounts),” so no
reasonable consumer would believe the Krud Krutter products to be totally free
of risk. Here, whether the plaintiff’s asserted definitions are reasonable were
for the jury to decide as part of the overall reasonable-consumer test.

For the challenged
claim “non-toxic,” Rust-Oleum argued that the plaintiff’s expert toxicologist’s
theory of toxicity is disclosed on the front labels of its products, which say
“Caution: Eye and Skin Irritant” next to the words “Non-Toxic.” But the expert
opinion goes beyond eye and skin irritation, creating a genuine dispute of fact.

For the challenged
claim “Earth friendly,” the rear of the product labels provide a definition of
the claim. “But the definition is in small type and the defendant’s own surveys
provide evidence that most consumers do not read it.” Again, a fact issue, and “Earth
friendly” was not so general or nonspecific as to make it “extremely unlikely”
that a consumer would rely on it. The defendant’s own surveys suggested as much,
and California law did as well. White v. Kroger Co., No. 21-cv-08004-RS, 2022
WL 888657, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2022) (“California view[s] terms on the
label or container of a consumer good like … ‘earth friendly’ … to mean
that the product is not harmful to, or is beneficial to, the natural
environment. While … [this] California statute [does not] directly create[ ]
a private cause of action, [it] do[es] undermine any argument that ‘reef
friendly’ can be dismissed as mere puffery.”) (cleaned up).

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/01/no-summary-judgment-on-non-toxic-and.html

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New article: Three Sizes Fit Some: Why Content Regulation Needs Test Suites

 At the Berkeley Tech LJ: 

ABSTRACT

The European Union’s
Digital Services Act (DSA) offers a new model for regulating 
online services that
allow users to post things. It uses size-based tiers to delineate the different
levels of obligation imposed on various services. Despite the tiers of
regulation in the DSA, and very much in its copyright-specific companion
Article 17, it’s evident that the broad contours of the new rules were written
with insufficient attention to variation. Instead, regulators assumed that “the
internet” largely behaved like YouTube and Facebook. Using three examples of
how that model is likely to be bad for a thriving online ecosystem—counting users,
providing due process, and implementing copyright-specific rules—this Article concludes
that, to improve policymaking, regulators should use test suites of differently
situated services to ensure that they are at least considering existing
diversity and properly identifying their targets.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/01/new-article-three-sizes-fit-some-why.html

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Reading list: geolocation data increased incivility online

Civilizing social media: The effect of geolocation on the incivility of news comments

Yufan GuoYuhan Li, and Tian Yang, New Media & Society (2023)

Abstract

Many social media affordances can affect the quality of online discourse, but such an effect remains understudied for the visibility of geolocation, which is available on most social media platforms. We looked at the event in which Weibo started to display users’ IP locations on 28 April 2022, which was supposed to reduce incivility as the deindividuation hypothesis predicted. Leveraging a natural experiment, we examined the effect of IP location visibility, with special attention to COVID-19-related news posts and location-based, uncivil name-calling. We found that displaying the IP location in the comments section increased location-based incivility, as geolocation can function as an effective cue that signals ideological affiliation and fuels conflicts between users holding different political positions on the Chinese Internet. Meanwhile, we characterized a moderating effect of audience size on this decivilizing effect. Our study suggests that diverse social media affordances can fuel group identification and facilitate intergroup behaviors.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/01/reading-list-geolocation-data-increased.html

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mistaken calls from nonpurchasers have little weight in real estate TM case

Rampart Resources,
Inc. v. Rampart/Wurth Holding, Inc., 2024 WL 195999, No. 23-6895 (E.D. La. Jan.
18, 2024)

The court, grappling
with the Fifth Circuit’s rather inconsistent law on misdirected communications,
denies a preliminary injunction (subject easily guessable by party names).

Rampart Resources
was founded in 1989 in Baton Rouge. It provides land and real estate services
including right-of-way acquisition, servitudes, real estate brokerage,
permitting, land services, and property management across several industries
including utilities, oil and gas, renewable energy, and public works. Most of its
current business involves land use issues but does not involve any property
management, though it previously managed residential properties for ExxonMobil
and multifamily apartment units for the City of Baton Rouge. Its website
states: “Our core services include right-of-way acquisition, surveying,
permitting, project planning, and E&P land rights management.” Its clients
are predominately corporate entities and municipalities. Nonetheless, as part
of its business, Rampart Resources regularly interacts with non-client
individual landowners to assist its clients in acquiring land. It has a
registration for its logo, comprising stylized wording and a graphic of roads.
(Note that the current website seems to have removed “resources” from the logo,
which I expect is a big enough change that a new registration ought to be required.)

registered RAMPART RESOURCES mark

today’s website

Rampart/Wurth
Holding is a Louisiana-based real estate company offering: (1) multifamily
management services for multifamily units; (2) commercial management services;
and (3) single-family and small multifamily management and maintenance services,
handled respectively by (1) Rampart Multifamily Management; (2) Rampart
Commercial Management; and (3) Wurth Real Estate Services. Its principal
clients are owners of commercial and residential real estate, but R/W also
occasionally interacts with the residents and tenants of their clients. Its
services include rent collection, resident/tenant placement and screening,
property maintenance and repairs, property inspections, and eviction services.
Its website states: “Property Management is All We Do.” It adopted the
Rampart/Wurth branding in 2023. This lawsuit followed after a FedEx delivery
driver told Rampart Resources’ president that “another Rampart” had recently
opened in Baton Rouge and that she had mistakenly gone to Rampart/Wurth’s
office instead of Rampart Resources.


Several Rampart Resources employees told the president that they had received seven
telephone calls in September and October 2023 from individuals attempting to
contact Rampart/Wurth. The calls generally follow the same pattern: a call asks
about services that Rampart Resources doesn’t provide; the caller is informed
of their mistake. One caller stated that Jefferson Lakes Apartments had given
her Rampart Resources’ phone number to refund a deposit.

Rampart Resources’
mark was legally protected and arbitrary. The evidence didn’t (at this stage) support
a finding of geographic descriptiveness based on the prominence of Rampart
Street in New Orleans, where Rampart Resources was not based. “Unlike, say, ‘Carondelet,’
‘Tchoupitoulas,’ or a host of other well-known New Orleans streets, ‘Rampart’
has no inherent connection to New Orleans or to any specific geographical
feature.”

Strength of mark:
weighed in plaintiff’s favor, though not heavily so, given the arbitrariness of
the mark balanced against substantial third-party use of “Rampart,” albeit
perhaps only one in real estate. “Plaintiff’s sponsorship of certain events and
promotion of branded items does little on its own to counteract Defendant’s
evidence of widespread usage of the key portion of Plaintiff’s mark.”

Similarity: Defendant
used “a key design with its branding of Rampart Multifamily Management and
Rampart Commercial Management,” along with an unchallenged key design with two
Rs and no other text. The only similarity between the two marks was the term
“Rampart.” That was not substantial given the other elements of the marks. The
total effect of the marks was dissimilar, favoring Rampart/Wurth.

not sure this is exactly what is litigated but it’s what I found

Similarity of
services: Where the respective services “are noncompeting, the [possible] confusion
at issue is one of sponsorship, affiliation, or connection.” “The danger of
affiliation or sponsorship confusion increases when the junior user’s services
are in a market that is one into which the senior user would naturally expand.”
Importantly, “[t]he actual intent of the senior user to expand is not
particularly probative of whether the junior user’s market is one into which
the senior user would naturally expand…Consumer perception is the controlling
factor.”

Rampart/Wurth
pointed out that Rampart Resources didn’t even bother to register its mark for “property
management.” There was only a “minor overlap” in services. Property management
constituted “only a small and infrequent portion of Plaintiff’s business.” Still,
an expansion into the property management market was plausible, especially
since Rampart Resources had done it in the past. “Moreover, the diverse array
of services offered by the Plaintiff increases the likelihood of confusion
among the consuming public.” This somewhat weighed in favor of finding
confusion.

Similarity between
parties’ consumers/clients: There was minimal overlap. “Plaintiff’s clientele
includes municipal and corporate entities, particularly those in the utilities,
oil and gas, renewable energy, and public works sectors. Meanwhile, Defendant’s
customers are real estate developers and owners of commercial and multifamily
property.” It was plausible, nonetheless, that there was some overlap.

Advertising
campaigns: Rampart Resources alleged that it promotes its services primarily
through its website, its “sponsorship of prominent charity and other events,”
through branded marketing items such as shirts, cups, jackets, banners, signage
at its offices, fliers, and folders, and, on occasion, print advertising. Both
parties are findable online, and “both parties indicated that word-of-mouth
advertising among their respective customer bases is perhaps their strongest
form of advertising.” This factor wasn’t particularly probative, even though
reliance on word-of-mouth might “diminish the importance of the dissimilarity
between the trademarks.” Without much evidence, this factor was neutral.

Intent: There was no
evidence of bad faith, making this factor neutral. Failing to stop use after
receiving a C&D doesn’t mean bad faith.

Actual confusion: “[T]the
Fifth Circuit requires more substantial evidence of confusion where the
confusion does not result in swayed purchases,” and this should be weighed
against the parties’ total sales volume. “[I]solated instances of confusion
about the affiliation of two companies that do not result in redirected
business are not enough to sustain a finding of actual confusion.”

The evidence here
was entirely anecdotal. The FedEx driver wasn’t a customer/potential customer
of either party and was only “briefly confused” about the names. “Proof of
actual confusion requires more. For the seven phone calls, since they weren’t
about overlapping services, Rampart Resources’ employees quickly identified the
mistake. Maybe they were even calling about Rampart Apartments; there was
limited evidence that they conflated the defendant with the plaintiff.

Even assuming they
were all trying to reach Rampart/Wurth, this wasn’t particularly weighty, given
the lack of evidence that actual customers were confused or swayed into doing
business with Rampart/Wurth. Rampart/Wurth averred that it hadn’t received any
mistaken inquiries or questions about association. Thus, the examples showed only
a “fleeting mix-up of names” by persons who weren’t direct customers of either
party. Also, when weighed against the volume of business conducted by the
parties, the weight of seven phone calls was lessened. “[B]oth parties operate
in several states, provide complex services to sophisticated clients, and
interact with a wide swath of the public. Moreover, the Defendant claims to
manage over 10,000 multifamily units and over eighteen million square feet of
commercial real estate space.”

After all that, the
court still weighed this factor slightly in Rampart Resources’ favor.

Consumer care: High,
given the expense and sophistication of the relevant transactions. Rampart
Resources argued that it “routinely works with property owners who are
laypersons.” But none of these allegedly “unsophisticated” persons were actual
clients or customers; rather they are persons whom Rampart Resources interacts
with “in order for [its] clients to successfully acquire land.” This factor
would become moot if this argument were accepted, given that “nearly every
company, no matter how sophisticated their customers are, necessarily interacts
in some capacity with unsophisticated members of the public.” The factor was
the care exercised by potential purchasers, not the care exercised by anyone who
interacts with the plaintiff. (This argument would be bolstered if the court
were to talk about the reason
we care about potential purchasers
and not random people—the potential for harm.) Plus, even if landowners are
unsophisticated, there was no evidence that they had been confused, even
fleetingly.

Ultimately, the
plaintiff showed only a “mere possibility” of confusion, not a “probability.” “The
Court finds it is unlikely that the parties’ sophisticated clientele would
confuse Plaintiff’s mark with that of the Defendant, especially given the
limited similarity of the marks.”

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/01/mistaken-calls-from-nonpurchasers-have.html

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Reading list: Trademarks in an Algorithmic World

 “Consumers used to watch ads; now, ads watch them.” So says Christine Haight Farley in her intriguing new article.

Christine Haight Farley, Trademarks in an Algorithmic World, 98 Wash. L. Rev. 1123 (2023). 

Abstract:

 According to the sole normative foundation for trademark protection—“search costs” theory—trademarks transmit useful information to consumers, enabling an efficient marketplace. The marketplace, however, is in the midst of a fundamental change. Increasingly, retail is virtual, marketing is data-driven, and purchasing decisions are automated by AI. Predictive analytics are changing how consumers shop. Search costs theory no longer accurately describes the function of trademarks in this marketplace. Consumers now have numerous digital alternatives to trademarks that more efficiently provide them with increasingly accurate product information. Just as store shelves are disappearing from consumers’ retail experience, so are trademarks disappearing from their product search. Consumers may want to buy a product where the brand is the essential feature of the product such that the brand is the product, but they no longer need the assistance of a trademark to find the product. By reflexively continuing to protect trademarks in the name of search costs theory, courts give only lip service to consumer interests without questioning whether trademarks are fulfilling any useful information function. In many cases, trademarks may actually misinform consumers by masking the identity of the producer or its distanced relationship with the trademark owner. Without having deliberately decided to do so, trademark law is now protecting “brands as property” without any supportive normative rationale. Removing the veil of search costs theory will enable courts to consider whether trademark protection is justified in particular cases. 

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/01/reading-list-trademarks-in-algorithmic.html

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prospective injunctive relief for consumers hangs on in 9th Circuit for now

Clark v. Eddie Bauer LLC, 2024 WL 177755, No. 21-35334 (9th
Cir. Jan. 17, 2024)

This unpublished opinion has a dissent from Judge Bea
indicating further disruptions in standing may be coming.

Clark appealed the dismissal of her putative class action
complaint based on a “fake discount” theory, alleging that Eddie Bauer never
sold the relevant items at the “normal” prices. After a question was certified
to the Oregon Supreme Court, it ruled that

[A]n “ascertainable loss” within
the meaning of the [Oregon] UTPA can, under some circumstances, flow from a
consumer’s decision to purchase a product in reliance upon the retailer’s
misrepresentation as to price history or comparative prices. Thus, plaintiff’s
purchase price theory is a viable theory of ascertainable loss even in the
absence of a showing that the seller misrepresented some characteristic or
quality of the product sold.

Thus, the panel reversed Clark’s claims for money damages. Clark
failed to state a claim for retrospective equitable relief because her
complaint didn’t allege the absence of an adequate remedy at law for her
disgorgement and restitution claims. But prospective injunctive relief was
still possible because she alleged future harm (the failure to be able to rely
on Eddie Bauer’s advertising). TransUnion didn’t clearly reject that circuit
precedent.

Judge Bea dissented on the prospective relief part,
reasoning that Clark hadn’t identified a sufficiently close common-law or
historical analogue for her asserted injury. Inability to trust Eddie Bauer
wasn’t enough. The closest historical analogue was misrepresentation, but “[f]or
centuries, misrepresentation torts have required a showing of justifiable
reliance and actual damages.” (Just imagine if courts treated trademark harm
theories this way!) And Clark wasn’t justified in relying on Eddie Bauer’s
prices because she knew the truth; plus, she didn’t have actual pecuniary
damages. Prior circuit precedent relied on cases finding informational injuries
sufficient for standing, which the Court has now disavowed: TransUnion said
that “receipt of inaccurate information” wasn’t itself an injury where there
was no duty to disclose and no resulting monetary harm.

I have to admit, I thought that TransUnion was the
Supreme Court arrogating control over what constitutes an injury away
from legislatures. But, once we’ve defined a good enough injury (harm from
false advertising), the question of standing for injunctive relief seems to me
to be a different type of question. Perhaps the Court will also ultimately ditch
9th Circuit precedent on this point, but it’s not logically
required.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/01/prospective-injunctive-relief-for.html

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call for submissions: Harvard/Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Forum, June 3-4, 2024

 Request for Submissions

Harvard/Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Forum

June 3-4, 2024, Stanford Law School

Harvard, Stanford, and Yale Law Schools are soliciting submissions for the 2024 Harvard/Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Forum, to be held at Stanford Law School on June 3-4, 2024. Twelve to twenty junior scholars (with one to seven years in teaching) will be chosen, through a double-blind selection process, to present their work at the Forum. A senior scholar will comment on each paper. The audience will include the participating junior faculty, senior faculty from the host institutions, and invited guests. The goal of the Forum is to promote in-depth discussion on the selected papers and more general reflections on broader methodological issues, as well as to foster a stronger sense of community among American legal scholars, particularly by strengthening ties between new and veteran professors.

 

TOPICS: Each year the Forum invites submissions on selected topics in public and private law, legal theory, and law and humanities topics, alternating loosely between public law and humanities subjects in one year, and private law and dispute resolution in the next. For the upcoming 2024 meeting, the topics will cover the following areas of the law:

– Antitrust

– Bankruptcy

– Civil Litigation and Dispute Resolution

– Contracts and Commercial Law

– Corporate and Securities Law

– Intellectual Property

– International Business Law

– Private Law Theory and Comparative Private Law

– Property, Estates, and Unjust Enrichment

– Taxation

– Torts

A jury of accomplished scholars will choose the papers to be presented. There is no publication commitment. Stanford Law School will pay presenters’ travel expenses, though international flights may be only partially reimbursed.QUALIFICATIONS: Authors who teach law in the U.S. in a tenured or tenure-track position and have not been teaching at either of those ranks for a total of more than seven years are eligible to submit their work. American citizens or permanent residents teaching abroad are also eligible provided that they have held a faculty position or the equivalent, including positions comparable to junior faculty positions in research institutions, for less than seven years and that they earned their last degree after 2014. We accept jointly authored submissions, but each of the coauthors must be individually eligible to participate in the Forum. Papers that will be published prior to the Forum are not eligible. There is no limit on the number of submissions by any individual author. Faculty from Harvard, Stanford, and Yale Law Schools are not eligible.

PAPER SUBMISSION PROCEDURE: Electronic submissions should be sent to Corissa Paris cparis@law.stanford with the subject line “Junior Faculty Forum.” The deadline for submissions is February 23, 2024Remove all references to the author(s) in the paper. Please include in the text of the email and also as a separate attachment a cover letter listing your name, the title of your paper, your contact email and address through June 2024, and the topic under which your paper falls. Each paper may only be considered under one topic. Any questions about the submission procedure should be directed to Prof. Norman W. Spaulding, nspaulding@law.stanford.edu.FURTHER INFORMATION: General iquiries concerning the Forum should be sent to Norman Spaulding (nspaulding@stanford.law.edu) at Stanford Law School, Christine Jolls, (christine.jolls@yale.edu) or Yair Listokin (yair.listokin@yale.edu) at Yale Law School, Matthew Stephenson (mstephen@law.harvard.edu) or Rebecca Tushnet (rtushnet@law.harvard.edu) at Harvard Law School.

Christine Jolls

Yair Listokin

Matthew Stephenson

Rebecca Tushnet

Norman Spaulding

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/01/call-for-submissions.html

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over dissent, 6th Circuit holds that large player in fragmented market could show proximate cause under Lexmark

Campfield v. Safelite Gp., Inc., — F.4th —-, 2024 WL
164976, Nos. 22-3204/3225 (6th Cir. Jan. 16, 2024)

Over a dissent in relevant part, the court revived plaintiff
Ultra Bond’s Lanham Act claim relating to vehicle glass repair and replacement
(VGRR). Safelite provides windshield repair and replacement services, while
Ultra Bond supplies proprietary bonding resin to repair windshield cracks.
Ultra Bond alleged that Safelite violated the Lanham Act by falsely advertising
that windshield cracks longer than six inches could not be safely repaired and
instead required replacement of the entire windshield. Safelite counterclaimed
that Ultra Bond stole trade secrets. The district court granted summary
judgment against all claims, finding no valid causes of action. I won’t discuss
the trade secret issues, though the court of appeals revived some as not
time-barred.

Safelite is the VGRR market leader: in 2016, it had 35.4% of
the market; its closest competitor had just 3%. Safelite won’t repair
windshield cracks that are longer than six inches (“long cracks”). “Windshield
replacement is where Safelite makes its money, while its repair business
operates at break-even or at a loss. Ultra Bond makes patented products for
vehicle glass repairs, specifically for long cracks, and performs those repairs;
it accounts for over 50% of national long-crack repair product sales.

Safelite promoted its policy of repairing only cracks six
inches or shorter under a marketing campaign of “the dollar-bill rule”—if the
crack is shorter than the length of a dollar bill (approximately six inches),
Safelite can repair it. In 2007, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI),
in a process that included both Safelite and Ultra Bond, conducted a safety
study and concluded that cracks up to fourteen inches could be safely repaired
without requiring windshield replacement. It set that as the best practice nationally,
and Safelite voted to support that standard, but continued to market the
“dollar-bill rule” as the safety standard for windshield repairs and continued
to tell consumers that cracks longer than six inches require windshield
replacement.

The vast majority of Safelite’s sales come from insurance
reimbursement. “And while insurance companies ultimately set the standards for
what kinds of damage it will cover, Safelite knows that its dominant market
position meant that it can set the standard for insurance companies.” It told
its insurance company clients that crack repair could not be safely performed
on cracks longer than six inches. “And although it told insurance companies
otherwise, Safelite never conducted its own technical study on the safety of
long crack repairs to support its assertions.” (Monopoly power has many defects;
here the anti-innovation face of monopoly also appears as misleading
advertising.) “Safelite made these statements to insurance companies knowing
that its insurance clients’ policyholders would choose long crack repair if it
were covered,” and it admitted that “its insistence on setting as strict a
crack repair standard as possible was tied to protecting its higher-margin
windshield replacement business.”

The district court found that Safelite’s statements to
insurers and directly to customers counted as commercial advertising or
promotion, but that statements made by Safelite through ghostwritten insurance
brochures and to customers purely in its capacity as a third-party
administrator for insurers did not. It found that there was no genuine issue of
material fact on whether the false advertising harmed Ultra Bond, and that
laches partly barred the claims because Ultra Bond delayed nearly two decades
before suing.

Faced with this story, the court of appeals found that Ultra
Bond’s Lanham Act claim should have survived Safelite’s motion for summary
judgment. Laches “bars only recovery of pre-filing damages; it does not prevent
Ultra Bond from obtaining injunctive relief or post-filing damages.”

Commercial advertising or promotion: The court of appeals
upheld the ruling that Safelite’s statements in ghostwritten brochures and
statements in its capacity as a third-party administrator for insurance
companies weren’t commercial advertising or promotion. They didn’t have any
indication that they were made with “the purpose of influencing customers to
buy the defendant’s goods and services.” Instead, it was the statements to insurance
companies and agents that led insurance companies to set their standards, which
were then set forth in the brochures and statements made by third-party administrators.
“Thus, Safelite, when functioning as a [third-party administrator] or providing
ghostwritten informational brochures to insurance companies, was simply acting
on the success of its allegedly misleading or false earlier statements.”

Causation: Under Lexmark, proximate cause can be
alleged by “a supplier of a company’s direct competitor where the decreased
demand caused by false advertising directly harms the supplier.” Proximate
cause doesn’t require any one specific fact pattern or theory. “In this case,
the structure of the market suggests that there is unlikely to be a more
directly injured commercial victim than Ultra Bond. (Safelite’s direct
competitors are VGRR businesses, often small shops, that provide both crack
repair and windshield replacement, so false statements that favor one service
over the other would not necessarily harm them.)”

Consumer affidavits and expert evidence also supported the causal
relationship between Safelite’s statements and decreased demand for Ultra Bond
products:

First, nine commercial customers
stated that they have experience with customers hearing from Safelite that long
crack repair is not safe, educating those individuals that such repair is safe,
and having those individuals choose long crack repair, which these customers
perform using Ultra Bond products. Second, when misleading ads regarding crack
repair were ordered to be removed from the marketplace in New Zealand, Ultra
Bond’s direct sales and distribution sales to the country doubled. Third, Ultra
Bond’s second expert … conducted a consumer survey and estimated that 24.5% to
30.6% of respondents who replaced windshields would have had them repaired
but-for Safelite’s allegedly false statements.

Safelite argued that the declarations from commercial
customers were conclusory and repeated claims about demand for Ultra Bond with
only slight variations across the declarations: “[I]f customer demand for long
crack repair were to increase as a result of customers being informed that long
crack repairs can be safely done … up to 14 inches, I would most certainly
have to compete for this increased customer demand by buying more … Ultra
Bond, Inc. products[.]” But this statement wasn’t presented alone: the VGRR
shop owners “explain how they have consistently met customers who learned from
Safelite that their long cracks could not be repaired. Some shop owners have
successfully reeducated customers and completed a long-crack repair using Ultra
Bond products, but others have detailed how they have lost customers who called
their insurance, were directed to Safelite as the TPA, and were told that long
crack repair is unsafe or that the windshield must be replaced.”

This created a genuine issue of material fact on injury
causation. “While Lexmark itself involved an alleged 1:1 ratio between
sales gained by the defendant and sales lost by the plaintiff, it does not hold
that § 1125(a) requires such a ratio in order to establish causation.” Plus,
the New Zealand evidence was “additional evidence” that would allow a jury to
find causation. Because reasonable minds may differ “as to the foreseeability
of a particular risk or the character of an intervening cause, the question is
one for submission to the jury under proper instructions as to proximate
cause.”

The court also upheld the dismissal of Safelite’s unfair competition
claim based on statements that, e.g., insurance companies “dupe[ ]” customers
“into paying $350 for a $20 windshield,” and that Safelite’s repair tool was
intentionally imperfect “as there is no way they could not know when it appears
to not work on two out of three repairs.” But Safelite didn’t show falsity, or sales
diversion.

Judge Bush dissented only on Lanham Act causation and would
have found no proximate cause. The dissent said that proximate cause usually
only allows the most direct victim to sue, and that Lexmark created a “narrow”
exception where there was a one-to-one decrease in sales for every increase for
the false advertiser. (Lexmark reasoned that the victims of false
advertising are always harmed by third parties withholding their
business because of the false advertising, and thus proximate cause encompasses
their injuries—which seems exactly the scenario here.)

Judge Bush wasn’t willing to attribute customer beliefs
about the safety of long crack repair to Safelite’s advertising, making the
declarations speculative. It’s always possible to linguistically extend a causal
chain, and Judge Bush did:

One must assume first that there
are customers with long cracks in their windshields who would seek to get them
repaired rather than replaced but decided not to because of Safelite’s
statements; second, that those customers would choose one of Ultra Bond’s
commercial customers for repair services; and third, that this untapped
customer base is so substantial that commercial customers, who ostensibly use
Ultra Bond for repairs under six inches, would have to buy additional product
from Ultra Bond. And, for the injury caused by Safelite’s statements to
insurers, Ultra Bond’s theory additionally requires one to accept without proof
that, absent Safelite’s statements, the insurers would opt to change their
policies to cover repair for cracks longer than six inches for their customers.
This extended inferential chain is a far cry from the “automatic” injury at
issue in Lexmark.

Also, most of the declarants state that long crack repair is
only a small part of their business, so the causal chain also requires that
Ultra Bond’s direct customers could and would have absorbed their customers’
added demand for long crack repairs.

Ultra Bond’s own expert explained that the crack repair
industry is “highly fragmented,” which “makes assessing the particular impact
of Safelite’s actions to Ultra Bond difficult,” especially since Ultra Bond’s
products can be used to repair both long cracks and cracks under six inches. The
New Zealand evidence was only “a bare assertion from Ultra Bond’s owner to [an]
expert and, more importantly, does not translate into a triable issue that
Safelite’s advertisements in the United States ‘more or less automatically’
cause an injury to Ultra Bond as in Lexmark.” (Seems to me that the
empirical evidence takes the place of logic in showing injury, and that logic
is not the only or indeed, given judicial fallibility, the best way of
showing injury.) Thus, Ultra Bond wasn’t a “direct victim.”

The real weakness of the dissent, it seems to me, is the “if
not them, then who?” question. Maybe insurance companies, but given standard
principal/agent problems, they don’t necessarily have the right incentives
either. Ultra Bond seems like a good candidate!

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/01/over-dissent-6th-circuit-holds-that.html

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