DOJ 230 workshop part 3

Panel 3: Imagining the Alternative
The implications on competition, investment, and speech of
Section 230 and proposed changes.    
Moderator: Ryan Shores, Associate Deputy Attorney General
Professor Eric Goldman, Santa Clara University: (c)(1) means
no liability for 3d party content. Difference between 1st/3d party content isn’t
always clear. (2) protects good faith filtering and (2)(b) also helps providers
of filters. Exclusions: IP, federal criminal law, federal privacy, FOSTA sex
trafficking. No prerequisites for immunity as w/DMCA, no scienter required for
(1). Not claim-specific unless excepted. Common-law exceptions: (1) Roommates:
when sites encourage/require provision of illegal content. (2) Failure to warn?
(3) Promissory estoppel. (4) Anticompetitive animus.
Neil Chilson, Senior Research Fellow, Charles Koch Institute:
Taxonomy of possible regimes: what type of bad thing are we concerned about? Is
it illegal already or should it be? Who should be held liable? Person doing,
person providing tools? In what situations: strict, participation in creation,
knowledge, unreasonability? Can you get immunity back by taking action, e.g. by
takedown after notice? Concerns about incentives created. How do we protect
speech/public participation? Other countries don’t have 1A. Over-removal: ideal
outcome is sorting legal/illegal, but it’s hard to align incentives to do that.
Who makes the decision about legit speech remaining? Can companies decide for
themselves to remove legal speech? Does our approach disadvantage specific
business models?  What affects on legal
certainty are there?
Possible legislative alternatives: (1) exemptions approach,
like PLAN Act focusing on homesharing sites, (2) bargaining chip proposals:
keep 230 if you do X; Hawley’s proposal for politically neutral content
moderation/EARN IT for commission to define X.
David Chavern, President, News Media Alliance: 230 was
designed to nurture new industry, became distortion: punishes folks who are
willing to take responsibility for their content. News publishers’
responsibility for content wasn’t hindrance to our growth; we were pretty good
at it [but see: Alabama in the civil rights era].  230 means our content is subject to extreme
editorial control by major platform cos. Google News: someone has decided to
surface different content for you than for me. Their business value is
algorithmic judgments; they should be responsible for their judgments. They also
make decisions about reach. Small slander w/no impact could reach 10 people or 10
million, they should be responsible for that. Anonymity: a design factor that
prevents going after a speaker. If you’re a journalist, part of your job is
being abused online w/no redress, esp. if you’re a female journalist.  Need incentives for quality, investment in
quality content. Zuckerberg says FB is b/t a newspaer and a telecom pipe—but they
can’t be neither. Not impressed by the billions of pieces of content:
they built it, that’s their problem.
Julie Samuels, Executive Director, Tech:NYC: As we think
about landscape, think through lens of smaller cos. Need to incentivize competition;
230 is crucial for that. Printing press allowed one to many and we’re in another
fundamental shift moment to many to many. Worried that we think we can put
genie back in bottle. It’s hard if certain industries don’t work like they used
to but that can be ok.
Goldman: Elevate existing benefits, even if there are also
costs. It is balancing; easy to overlook benefits. Millennials don’t know what
they have: don’t take for granted what the internet provides. Benefits haven’t
changed; we didn’t know what tech could do when 230 was enacted, but we don’t
know what it can do now. 230 preserves freedom to see where we can go.
Solves moderator’s dilemma, that if you try and fail you’ll be liable for
having tried. 230 still lowers barriers to entry. Baseline is not “can we
eliminate all online harms.” Internet as mirror: people are awful to each other
all the time. Might be able to find ways to make us kinder: Nextdoor is trying
algorithms to suggest kindness.
Chilson: Conservative principle of individual responsibility,
not tool responsibility: the normal way we do things in the US. Tort law
generally favors punishing actors over intermediaries—authors, not bookstores—social
media users, not platforms. Unusual to hold one person responsible for acts of
others; need good reason to do that. 230 doesn’t immunize produced content, as
newspapers are liable for their own content. Google is liable for its own
content; they just do different things. Services connect people on
unprecedented scale. Participation in group for people parenting a child with
clubfoot: b/c FB didn’t have to vet any post, that group exists and is greatly
beneficial to participants. Can’t build a business model around that alone, but
can build FB.
Pam Dixon, Executive Director, World Privacy Forum: Promoting
voluntary consensus standards. Just finished a multiyear study on FERPA, has
lessons learned. Striking that this area suffers from (1) lack of systems
thinking and (2) lack of research on fact patterns. Systems thinking: people
called in w/privacy harms in about 3-4 categories including (1) victims of
domestic violence/rape, fleeing/trying to stay alive; (2) people with genetic
based illness. It is rare to find a situation with one platform/issue; need
system analysis: public records, health records, educational records, other
platforms. Lack of fact patterning is a problem. OECD principles on AI: we all
learned that we were correct in our own way. Disagreement is ok but can we find
consensus? Individuals and organizations can lose trust in systems, platforms
can lose trust in gov’t. In our interest to solve trust problems. Voluntary
consens standards as a solution: not self-regulation. What if a more formal
process allowed all stakeholders, not just the big guys, to find consensus on a
discrete, observable, solvable problem? 
Ability exists under OMB rules. FDA has recognized it for medical
devices.
Q: some proposals have carveouts for small & medium
entities. OK?
Samuels: size carveouts are worrisome. Small isn’t
automatically good. Swiss cheese approach. Small startups have big legal costs for
handling all kinds of issues; 230 is good at the pleading stage by making MTDs
relatively cheap, otherwise survival becomes difficult. Compare to the patent
troll problem: cottage industry of suing SMEs.
Chavern: we’re the only business mentioned in the 1A.
Incremental approach is justified. A few platforms matter more to society. Not a
lot of search, or social media, startups. Great scale = great responsibility.
Not irrational to start there.
Chilson: threshold concern: current antitrust investigation
is about search/social media killzone. If you have a threshold at which content
moderation becomes required, then the only safe way to cross that threshold
will be to get acquired. That’s not good. Big players are younger than many in
this room; they can come and go if competitive environment doesn’t cement their
market power into place.
Dixon: carveouts have unintended consequences. Right now no
unitary privacy test done by carveouts: should do that. Voluntary standards can
ID all stakeholders & discuss better solutions. Standard would be there if
you want to adopt it, not if you don’t.
Goldman: there are small companies in top 15 services, like
Craigslist, Wikipedia, Reddit. Some large cos have small UGC presence. Easy to
wrongly trip threshold. Concept great, translating hard.
Q: F/x on speech?
Chavern: Many complaints about speech we don’t like, not all
of it illegal. Freedom of speech isn’t freedom of reach. No inherent problem
with asking companies to be accountable about the act of deciding what to
disseminate. They’re deciding what you get to see, should be accountable for
that like a publisher. Weird that they get immunity for commercial decisions
that help their product. Unsustainable.
Samuels: That looks like a fundamentally different internet
experience. [Consider if you, an individual, had to have your posts go through
FB’s libel review before they’d post.] Social networks would be total chaos
without moderation etc. Real impact on users. Social movements and connections
happen now in incredible ways. Need to talk about end user experience.
Goldman: 230 can be the solution of how we interact as
humans; enables developments of better tools, services taking action on Gab.
Users on Gab, however, did have chilled conversations as a result. This is not
free. 230 enables diversity of editorial practices, not all like traditional
media. Finding communities that understand one another.
Dixon: Points to need for additional research and fact
patterning. Predictive speech is a coming issue.

from Blogger https://ift.tt/2wDGGCB

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

DOJ 230 workshop part 2

Panel 2: Addressing Illicit Activity Online
Whether Section 230 encourages or discourages platforms to
address online harms, such as child exploitation, revenge porn, and terrorism,
and its impact on law enforcement.
Moderator: The Honorable Beth A. Williams, Assistant
Attorney General Office of Legal Policy
Yiota Souras, Senior Vice President and General Counsel,
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children: One main program is Cyber
Tipline, reporting mechanisms for public/ISPs to report suspected child sexual
exploitation. We analyze and make available to law enforcement. Receive reports
including CSE, trafficking, enticement, molestation. Largest category: CSAM.
Tremendous growth in reports: 2019, just under 17 million, w/over 69 million
files including video and images. Continues to grow. Many preverbal children as
well as younger teens.
Professor Mary Anne Franks, University of Miami: Cyber Civil
Rights Initiative: aimed at protecting vulnerable populations, online
exploitation, harm to women/sexual minorities/racial minorities. Civil rights
relate to tech. On nonconsensual pornography, active in (1) legislation where
needed, (2) working with tech cos on policies, (3) general social awareness.
For all tech’s good, have to be attentive to social media amplifying abuse and
civil rights violations. Bad actors, bystanders, accomplices, those who profit
from bads and hide under shield. Model statute issue: faced pushback from tech
& civil liberties groups. Many states take this issue seriously, thanks to brave
victims; rapid development in state law. Now up to 46 states & DC with
restrictions. Not solving problem: in many states the law is too narrow. Many
states require personal intent to harm victim, which is not how the internet
works. Average revenge porn site owner doesn’t intend to harm any given person,
just doesn’t care/interested in profits/voyeurism. 79% cases aren’t personal
intent to harm.
230 is the other big problem: trumps state criminal law.
Only way to maneuver around is federal criminal law on nonconsensual porn. We’ve
introduced a bill, not voted on yet.
Q. re reposting as harm to victims.
Franks: That’s one of the most severe aspects of attack: infinite
replicability. Much is initially obtained nonconsensually, via assault or secret
recording, or distribution without consent. It’s a harm each time. What happens
when a search on one’s name reveals all porn. 230 isn’t fulfilling its goals
for good samaritans. 230 doesn’t distinguish between helpers, bystanders, and
thieves. Intermediaries solicit, encourage, amplify violations. Also domestic
terrorism, misogyny, disinformation: harm to democracy/erosion of shared
responsibility for terrible actions.
Q: FOSTA/SESTA tried to address this for CSE. Impact?
Franks: we don’t see impact b/c we deal with adult victims,
not trafficking but privacy. Piecemeal tinkering on one bad form isn’t best way
to reform, makes unwieldy and sets up hierarchy of harms. Sex trafficking isn’t
the only bad.
Souras: we’ve seen Backpage go down, overlapped w/enactment
of FOSTA/SESTA. Immense disruption in market for child sex trafficking, which
continues. Feds did move against Backpage, no single co has risen up to fill
that lucrative gap. We’d love to see more federal action but there is
deterrence.
The Honorable Doug Peterson, Attorney General of Nebraska:
Trafficking online: federal prosecutors were very active in Nebraska; developed
a state law. No revenge porn prosecutions yet but can see issues with drug
sales and fraud, limited by 230. Nat’l Ass’n of AGs proposal: allow states and
territories to prosecute, just like feds: simple solution. Acceleration of
online crimes is significant, especially for young people targeted by apps.
Feds require a certain threshold; need to get aiders/abettors.
Q: challenges to law enforcement?
Peterson: some platforms: good cooperation. Murder case on
Tinder, which was v. helpful. Google & others have informed us and allowed
prosecution, esp. child porn. Enabled more thorough investigation.
Matt Schruers, President, Computer & Communications
Industry Association: What platforms are doing: over 100,000 people focused on
trust and safety. Large services have elaborate & sophisticated tech tools,
frequently made available to others. Participates with NCMEC and other private sector
initiatives. 10s of millions of reports to law enforcement. More investement
can and should be done—not industry alone. Many cases industry refers to law
enforcement don’t result in action: fewer than 1500 cases.
Q: why do companies report?
Schruers: no one wants service to be used for illegal
activity, regardless of law. There are bad actors, but a number of cases
illustrate that services that solicit/participate in unlawful content lack 230 protection.
Q: what about bad samaritans who don’t report their
knowledge: should industry set standards?
Schruers: There’s a role for best practices, much of which
is going on now. Don’t generalize a few bad actors.
Q: does 230 mean companies aren’t obligated to remove
harmful content?
Soares: most companies have separate reporting obligation
for CSAM. But co can choose to moderate or not; protected if they moderate or
they can moderate sporadically. Incentive promise has become aspirational.
There are cos that are partners, do tremendous work, but others turn the other
way recklessly.
Q: when did industry recognize existing problem and what did
it do?
Professor Kate Klonick, St. John’s University: doesn’t represent
any co. Her work doesn’t focus predominantly on illegal content but on harmful/violation
of community standards. There’s a huge difference in top 3 cos and many sites
discussed today. Different incentives to keep up/take down. FB etc. seek to
make platforms what people want to see over breakfast. Many incentives to
remove bad content—economic harms from bad media, users, advertisers who don’t
want ads to run against CSAM or revenge porn. Techlash in which it’s easy to
gang up on platforms. Since 2008 FB has been very robust on systems &
processes to avoid these. Not all tech/platforms are the same.
Peterson: AG of Pa had Tree of Life mass shooting; D was
using Gab before he struck. Looked at Gab’s engagement, but Paypal and GoDaddy
reacted quickly and industry response was so quick there was nothing to go
after.
Schruers: 230 protects those decisions by service providers.
Undermine that=no incentive to cut off.
Franks: distinguish b/t (c)(1) and (c)(2) [of course if you
only had (2) then any failure is held against you if you were correct once
before]. No incentive to act like good samaritans. They only grew a conscience
after public pressure in response to victims. Could have been avoided in first
place if design had been less negligent. Why should any of us be at the mercy
of corporations to see whether firearms are sold to a mass shooter? (c)(1)
doesn’t do anything to encourage cos to do better. Google is not a clean, well
lit place, nor is Twitter, if you’ve been attacked. Some people have always had
privacy, free speech, and ability to make money. But civil rights is about who’s
been left out. Descriptively not true that internet is by and large a good
place.
Q: Klonick says economic incentives align with moderation
for some. What to do about other companies where there’s a market for revenge porn
and CSAM?
Klonick: agree w/Shield Act: there are things to be done
with regulation and companies. This is a norm setting period: what to make of
what’s happening. Tech moves forward and our expectations change again. Concern
over acting quickly; hard to know ramifications.
Q: does 230 address safety?
Schruers: these trust and safety programs are not new. More
can & should be done. Prepared to engage w/ law enforcement; predate recent
bad press, part of doing business. There are a few bad actors, not entitled to
230, which creates exactly the right incentives by allowing policing w/o fear of
liability. (c)(1) does create issues when content is not taken down, but if it
were gone, there’d be nothing but takedowns, suppressing marginal voices and
unpopular views. We see this in other jurisdictions; no protection for lawful
but unpopular viewpoints. Requires balancing; there will be missed calls.
Q: what does more can & should be done mean?
Schruers: Asymmetry between reports & prosecutions; new
tools to be shared. Engaging w/IGOs around the world, OECD cooperation to
measure and respond to problems.
Q: CSAM reports grew a lot last year. How is there still so
much?
Souras: there is tremendous work being done by largest
companies, typically the best screeners & reporters. Once we drop off top
4-6 companies, there are 1000s of platforms around the world—chat, filesharing.
One problem: there is no level set. Moderation is helpful but completely
voluntary. Many choose not to screen. Larger companies also inconsistent over
time/across platforms/lack transparency.  
When we talk about 100,000 duck bites, there’s a harmed person behind
every one of those cases even if also a business cost.
Q: Is automation/AI the answer? Small business burdens?
Souras: We have supported tests of AI/ML. We are far away
from that eliminating the proliferation.
Q: why so far away? Zuckerberg says 5-10 years.
Franks: there will always be promises around the corner.
Human judgment is required. Have to stop illusion of control from tech tools.
Problems are structural/design problems. Whether cos recognized the problem 10
years ago or now, this is the world 230 built. Do we think we’re living in best
possible world? Only people who aren’t sent death/rape threats can speak freely
because laws don’t stop threats and abuse from happening. Imagine any other
industry killing people w/toxic products getting away w/it and promising to fix
it later. FB Live was used to livestream murderes and rapes. Zuckerberg didn’t
think it would be misused. That’s unacceptable as an answer. Industry has been
treated like gun industry—immune from all harm caused. How long will we allow
this? Don’t look to tech for how serious the problem is. Industry keeps
promising tools but law is about changing human behavior for good. We’ve seen
that status quo has failed.
Klonick: The internet is everything that makes you mad about
humanity. Zuckerberg didn’t murder or rape anyone. He created transparency so
now we see how terrible we all are and now you want tech cos to clean it up for
you. Tech cos don’t make murder a product, they surface action that has already
taken place.
Schruers: Role of tech: sometimes held out as perfectable,
but not a cureall for humans. Journey, not a destination; ML/AI is being
deployed as we speak. They have false positives and false negatives. This
requires both tech and people.
Peterson: talk is cheap. Deeds are precious. Mississippi AG’s
concerns about prescription drugs, for which he sent Google CIDs, were rejected
and Google went immediately to 230. Message to AGs: you wont’ see behind our
walls. Tired of good intentions; would prefer cooperation.
Q: carveouts for federal prosecution?
Peterson: we work w/DOJ a lot; complement each other. We can
deal with smaller operations where DOJ may not have bandwidth. [Smaller
operations … like Google?]  Request to
add states/territories to exclusion is important b/c a lot of these are small
operators. [There’s a lot of slippage here: is there a website that is just one
guy trafficking that isn’t also a content provider?]
Franks: No one is saying Zuckerberg is responsible for murder,
but there is accomplice/collective liability. [So FB is responsible for
murder?] Intermediaries aren’t directly causing, but promoting, facilitating,
and profiting from it. Collective responsibility: it takes a village to harass,
cause a mass shooting, use revenge porn. No need for complete difference from
real world rules.
Q: Encryption and CSAM: even if services don’t want it, they
can’t see it.
Schruers: Volume of reports shows that’s not the case. These
aren’t the only threats: beyond problematic content, fraud, crime, foreign
adversaries mean that other tech tools are required, one of which is encryption.
Safe communications protects user info: 82d Airborne in Iran is using E2E app
Signal widely used for secure communications because overseas communication
networks could be penetrated and transmissions b/t gov’t devices aren’t secure.
Encryption has a variety of lawful purposes: protestors, jurisdictions
w/problems w/rule of law. Balancing needs to be done but encryption is a
critical tool.
Q: FB Messenger could hide millions of reports.
Souras: E2E is necessary for some things but there has to be
a balance. 17 million reports: if we were in E2E environment for Messenger we’d
lose 12 million reports—children raped, abused, enticed undetected. There has
to be a compromise w/encryption rollout, or we lose 12 million children. [Each
report apparently reflects a different child. It is clearly correct to say that
encryption can be used for bad things as well as good. But the whole day I
never heard anyone explain what the balance would be if we have to balance: do
we only allow people we trust to use encryption? How does that work, especially
given what we know about how trust can be abused? Do we only allow financial
services to use encryption? How does that work? I don’t know whether encryption
does more harm than good or how you’d even weigh the bads against the goods.
But “there must be a balance” is not a plan.]
Klonick: PhotoDNA worked for a while; deplatforming means
that groups move and get smaller and narrower. Encryption does allow that. Autocrats
have learned to use platforms for surveillance and harm, and E2E helps with
that too. We need to think about full ramifications.
Q: should 230 be amended?
Klonick: works as intended. Was not just for startups: was
explicitly for telecoms, libraries, public schools. Nor was encryption not
contemplated: 1996 was mid-Crypto Wars I. Lots of sources exist outside of
encryption. These are critical tools for other equally serious threats. Mistake
to amend.
Peterson: Our proposal is simple: give us ability to support
criminal laws.
Schruers: 230 doesn’t prevent law enforcement action by states.
Prevents action against ISPs. If they’re direct actors, states can go after
them too. Fundamentally interstate commerce protection: services should be
dealt w/at federal level. If answer is resources, provide more federal
resources.
Peterson: let us go after bad actors aiding/abetting criminal
acts to clean up industry instead of waiting for industry to clean up itself.

from Blogger https://ift.tt/2Tb44Pt

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

DOJ 230 workshop

Section 230 – Nurturing Innovation or Fostering
Unaccountability? DOJ Workshop
These are copied from my handwritten notes, so will likely
be terser than usual.
Introduction of the Attorney General
The Honorable Christopher Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation
Tech is critical for law enforcement. Tech facilitates speech
& enriches lives & poses serious dangers. As our use increases, so does
criminals’. Extremists, drugs, child solicitation. Like much infrastructure,
the internet is largely in private hands, leaving vital public safety in their
hands. Will they guard elections against foreign influence? [I’m
not optimistic
.] Will they identify child victims? Can have entrepreneurial
internet and safety.
Welcome
The Honorable William P. Barr, Attorney General
DOJ’s interest came out of review of market leading online
platforms. Antitrust is critical, but not all concerns raised fall within
antitrust. Need for enforcement to keep up with changing tech. Internet changed
since 1996, when immunity was seen as nurturing nascent tech. Not underdog
upstarts any more; 230’s immunity may no longer be necessary in current form.
Platform size has left consumers with fewer options: relevant for safety and
for those whose speech has been banned [because the platforms deem it unsafe].
Big platforms often mondetize through targeted ads, creating financial incentives
for distribution rather than for what’s best for users. 230 immunity is also
implicated by concentration. Substance has also changed. Platforms have
sophisticated algorithms, moderation. Blurs line between hosting and promoting.
No one—including drafters—could have imagined, and courts have stretched 230 beyond
its intent and purpose, beyond defamation to product sales to terrorism to
child exploitation, even when sites solicited illegal content, shared in its
proceeds, or helped perpetrators hide. 
Also matters that the rest of the CDA was struck down: unbalanced regime
of immunity without corresponding protection for minors on the internet.  Not here to advocate a position, just
concerned and looking to discuss. [Said w/a straight face, if you’re
wondering.]
(1) Civil tort law can be important to law enforcement,
which is necessarily limited. Civil liability produces industry wide pressure
and incentives. Congress, in Antiterrorism Act, provided for civil redress on
top of criminal. Judicial construction diminished the reach of this tool. (2) Broad
immunity is a challenge for FBI in civil envorcement that doesn’t raise same concerns
as mass tort liability. Questionable whether 230 should apply to the federal
gov’t [civilly]. (3) Lawless spaces online: cocnerned that services can block
access to law enforcement and prevent victims from civil recoverly, with no
legal recourse. Purposely blind themselves and law enforcement to illegal conduct=no
incentives for safety for children. Goal of firms is profit, goal of gov’t is to
protect society. Free market is good for prices, but gov’t must act for good of
society at large. We must shape incentives for companies to shape a safer environment.
Question whether incentives need to be recalibrated, though must recognized 230’s
benefits too.
Panel 1: Litigating Section 230
The history, evolution, and current application of Section
230 in private litigation.  
Moderator: Claire McCusker Murray, Principal Deputy
Associate Attorney General
Q: History?
Professor Jeff Kosseff, United States Naval Academy: Disclaimer:
views are his own. Misinformation in debate over lack of factual record.
Development out of bookstore cases prosecuted for distributing obscene
material. SCt said that ordinance can’t be strict liability, but didn’t clearly
establish what the scienter standard could be. Reason to know standard existed
in lower courts. Worked for 30 years or so until early online services.
Compuserve found not liable because did little monitoring; Prodigy was found
liable because it moderated other content. Perverse incentive not to moderate;
concern that children would access porn. 
Early on it wasn’t clear whether distributor liability would still be
available after 230 or whether distributor liability was a special flavor of
publisher liability.
Patrick Carome, Partner, WilmerHale: Zeran was a garden variety
230 case, buit it was the first. Zeran was the subject of a cruel hoax. Zeran’s
theory: negligence/his communications put AOL on notice. Ruling: distributor
liability is a subset of publisher liability. Absent 230, 1A would be the main
defense. Platforms would still probably win most cases. Smith v. California:
free of liability absent specific knowledge of content, which would create
strong incentive to avoid becoming aware of problems. W/o 230 platforms would
be discouraged from self-moderation and they’d respond to heckler’s veto; would
not have successful, vibrant internet. Would discourage new entrants; need it
for new companies to get off ground.
Professor Benjamin Zipursky, Fordham University School of Law:
Zeran itself ok, subsequent decisions too far. American system: normally dealing
with state tort law, not just defamation, before we go to 230/1A. Common law of
torts, not just negligence, disginguishes bringing about harm from not stopping
others from harming. Misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction. But for causation is
not enough. For defamation, publication is normally an act. NYT prints copies.
Failing to force person to leave party before he commits slander is not
slander. Failing to throw out copies of the NYT is not defamation.
But there are exceptions: schools, landlords, mall owners
have been held liable for nonfeasance. Far less clear that common law of libel
has those exceptions as general negligence does, and not clear that they
survived NYT v. Sullivan if it does.  There
are a few cases/it’s a teeny part of the law. Owner of wall (bathroom stall) on
which defamatory message is placed may have duty to remove it. No court willing
to say that a wire carrier like AT&T can be treated as publisher, even with
notice. Not inconsistent with Kosseff’s account, but different.
In 90s, scholars began to speculate re: internet. Tort
scholars/cts were skeptical of the inaction/action distinction and interested
in extending liability to deep pockets. Unsurprising to see expansion in
liability; even dicta in Compuserve said online libraries might be liable with
notice. Prodigy drew on these theories of negligence to find duty to act; one
who’s undertaken to protect has such a duty because it is then not just nonfeasance.
Internet industry sensibly went to DC for help so they could continue to
screen.
Punchline: state legislatures across the country faced an
analogous problem with negligence for decades. Misfeasance/nonfeasance
distinction tells people that strangers have no duty to rescue. But if you
undertake to stop and then things go badly, law imposes liability. Every state
legislature has rejected those incentives by creating Good Samaritan laws.  CDA 230 is also a Good Samaritan law.
[Zipursky’s account helped me see something that was
previously not as evident to me: The Good Samaritan-relevant behavior of a platform
is meaningfully different from the targets of those laws about physical injury
liability, because it is general rather than specific. Based on the Yahoo case,
we know that making a specific promise to a user is still enforceable despite
230; the argument for negligence/design liability was not “you stopped to help
me and then hurt me,” but “you stopped to help others and not me, proving that you
also should have stopped to help me”/ “you were capable of ordering your activities
so that you could have stopped to help me but you didn’t.” Good Samaritan
protection wasn’t necessary to protect helpful passersby from the latter
scenarios because passersby didn’t encounter so many of those situations as to
form a pattern, and victims just wouldn’t have had access to that information
about prior behavior/policies around rescue, even if it existed. In this
context, Good Samaritan and product design considerations are not
distinguishable.]
(c)(2) isn’t actually bothering most people [just you wait];
(c)(1) does. Problem is that there was no baseline for liability for platforms,
no clear rule about what happens if you own the virtual wall.  Implications: (1) Zeran is correctly decided.
(2) This isn’t really an immunity. (3) If a platform actually says it likes a
comment, that’s an affirmative act to project something and there should be a
distinction. The rejection of active/passive was a mistake.  [Which means that having something in search
results at all should lead to liability?] 
(4) This was mostly about defamation, not clear how rest of common law should
be applied/what state tort law could do: 230 cut off development of common law.
Carrie Goldberg, Owner, C. A. Goldberg, PLLC: Current scope
limitless. Zeran interpreted 230 extravagantly—eaten tort law. Case she brought
against Grindr, man victimized by ex’s impersonation—thousands of men sent to
his home/job because of Grindr. Flagged the account for Grindr 50 times.
Services just aren’t moderating—they see 230 as a pass to take no action. Also
goes past publication. We sued for injunction/product liability; if they couldn’t
stop an abusive user from using the app for meetings that use geolocation, then
it’s a dangerous product. Foreseeable that product would be used by predators. Grindr
said it didn’t have tech to exclude users. Big issue: judge plays computer
scientist on MTD.
Annie McAdams, Founder, Annie McAdams PC: Lead counsel in
cases in multiple states on product liability claims. Our cases have horrible
facts. Got involved in sex trafficking investigation. Tech plays a role: meet
trafficker on social media, was sold on website, sometimes even on social
media. “Good Samaritan” sites process their credit cards, help them reach out.
Sued FB, IG; still pending in Harris County. Sued FB in another state court.
Still fighting about Zeran.  FB doesn’t
want to talk about FOSTA/SESTA. Law has been pulled away from defamation using
languages from a few cases to support theories about “publisher.”  Knowingly facilitating/refusing to take down
harassing content. Waiting on Ct of Appeals in Texas; Tex SCt ruled in their
favor about staying the case. Courts are embracing our interpretation of Zeran.
Saleforce case in Texas was consolidated in California; in process of appealing
in California.
If Congress wanted immunity, could have said torts generally,
not publisher, which is from defamation law not from Good Samaritan law.
Jane Doe v. Mailchimp: pending in Atlanta federal court. We
were excited to see DOJ seize Backpage but another US company assisted a
Backpage clone in Amsterdam.
Carone: Complaint on expansion beyond defamation is mistaken:
Congress intended breadth. Didn’t say defamation; wrote specific exceptions
about IP etc that wouldn’t have been necessary if it had been a defamation law.
Needs to be broad to avoid heckler’s veto/deterrent to responsible self-regulation.
Problem here is extraordinary volume of content. Kozinski talked about saving platform
from 10,000 duck bites; almost all these cases would fail under normal law.
Terrorism Act cases for example: no causation, actually decided on that ground
and not on 230.  Victims of terrorism are
victims, but not victims of platforms. 
Not speaking for clients, but sees immense efforts to deal with
problematic content. Google has over 10,000 eomployees. FB is moderating even
more but will always be imperfect b/c volume is far more than firehose. Need
incentives and policies that leave space for responsible moderation and not
destruction by duck bites. 230 does make it easy to win cases that would
ultimately be won, but only more expensively. 
230 puts focus on wrongdoers in Goldberg’s case: the ex is the person
who needs to be jailed.
Kosseff: based on research with members, staffers, industry,
civil liberties groups: they knew it was going to be broad. No evidence it was limited
to defamation. 2d case argued was over a child porn video marketed on AOL. Some
of this discussion: “platforms” is often shorthand for YT, FB, Twitter, but
many other platforms are smaller and differently moderated. Changes are easier
for big companies to comply with; they can influence legislation so that (only)
they can comply.
Zipursky: Even though publisher or speaker suggests basic
concern with libel, agrees with K that it’s not realistic to understand 230 as
purely about defamation. Compromise? Our tort law generally doesn’t want to
impose huge liability on those who could do more to protect but don’t, even on
big companies. But not willing to throw up hands at outliers—something to protect
against physical injury. [But who, and how? Hindsight is always 20-20 but most
of the people who sound bad online are false positives.  It’s easy to say “stop this one guy from creating
an account” but you can’t do that without filtering all accounts.]
Q: what changes do you see in tech and how does that change
statutory terms?
McAdams: broad statements about impossibility of moderation,
10,000 duck bites—there’s no data supporting this not paid for by big tech. Who
should be responsible for public health crisis? Traffickers and johns can be
sent to jail, but what about companies that knowingly benefit from this
behavior? May not need much legislative change given her cases. [Big lawyer
energy! Clearly a very effective trial lawyer; I mean that completely sincerely
while disagreeing vigorously with her factual claims about the ease of moderation/costs
of litigation for small platforms and her substantive arguments.]
Goldberg: Criminal justice system is a monopoly. It’s tort
that empowers individuals to get justice for harm caused. When platform
facilitates 1200 men to come & harass and platform does nothing, that’s an
access to justice issue. Not about speech, but about conduct. It’s gone too
far. Need injunctive relief for emergencies. Limit 230 to publication torts
like obscenity and defamation.  Needs to
be affirmative defense. Plaintiffs need to be able to sue when companies violate
their own TOS. Grindr said it could exclude users but didn’t have the
tech.  Exception for federal crimes is a
misnomer: these companies don’t get criminally prosecuted.
Carome: 230 isn’t just for big tech. 1000s of websites
couldn’t exist. If you want to lock in incumbents, strip 230 away. What’s allowed
on street corners is everything 1A allows: a lot of awful stuff. Platforms
screen a lot of that out. 230 provides freedom to do that.
Zipursky: caution required. Don’t go too crazy about
liability. Don’t abandon possibility of better middle path.
Kosseff: 230 was for user empowerment, market based
decisions about moderation. Is that working? If not, what is the alternative?
Too much, too little moderation: how do we get consensus? Is there a better
system?

from Blogger https://ift.tt/2HPIhrr

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

They chose unwisely: court blows another hole in Rogers by refusing to say that explicit means explicit

Chooseco LLC v. Netflix, Inc., No. 2:19-cv-08 (D. Vt. Feb.
11, 2020)
Explicit doesn’t mean explicit in yet another sign of the
pressure the Rogers test is under. 
Chooseco sued Netflix for infringement (etc.) of its rights in Choose
Your Own Adventure in the dialogue (!!) of its film Black Mirror: Bandersnatch.
Chooseco’s registration covers various types of media
including books and movies. Netflix’s Bandersnatch “is an interactive film that
employs a branching narrative technique allowing its viewers to make choices
that affect the ‘plot and ending of the film.’” You know there’s a problem when
the opinion says “[t]he pivotal scene at issue in this litigation occurs near
the beginning of the film.”  The main character
is trying to develop his own videogame based on a book also called Bandersnatch.
His father remarks that Jerome F. Davies, the author of the fictitious book in
the film, must not be a very good writer because Butler keeps “flicking
backwards and forwards.” The character responds: “No, it’s a ‘Choose Your Own
Adventure’ book. You decide what your character does.” “Of note, the subtitles
for the film couch the phrase in quotation marks and capitalize the first
letter of each word,” allegedly provided by Netflix.

The complaint alleged that Netflix promoted Bandersnatch with
a similar trade dress as that used by CHOOSE YOUR OWN ADVENTURE books in
multiple marketing campaigns. Chooseco is claiming the “rounded double frame”
as a trade dress. (Its exemplar seems to have a problem in that most of those
look like foreign, not US versions, on which you couldn’t base a US trademark
claim, but good news for Chooseco: the court doesn’t care.)

Thus, the complaint alleges, Netflix created a website for
Tuckersoft, the fictional videogame company where the main character developed
his videogame, displaying multiple fictional videogame covers that have a
“double rounded border element,” a few of which also appear in the film itself.

Netflix also allegedly used images of the videogame covers
while promoting Bandersnatch in the United Kingdom, and used the cover for the
Bandersnatch videogame as one of a few thumbnails for the film on its website.
Chooseco argued that Bandersnatch wasn’t a purely artistic
work, but was also a data collecting device for Netflix, and that “Netflix may
have sold product placement opportunities as a form of advertisement, which
would also suggest the film is not purely artistic.” This argument, at least,
fails. You get to sell art for money and it’s still art.  Furthermore, the use had artistic relevance. “Choose
Your Own Adventure” had artistic relevance “because it connects the narrative
techniques used by the book, the videogame, and the film itself.” It was also
relevant because the viewer’s control over the protagonist “parallel[ed] the
ways technology controls modern day life,” so the reference “anchors the
fractalized interactive narrative structure that comprises the film’s
overarching theme.” And further, “the mental imagery associated with the book
series promotes the retro, 1980s aesthetic Bandersnatch seeks to elicit.” Chooseco
suggested alternative phrases that Netflix could have used, but that’s not the
right analysis.
So, was the use explicitly misleading? The court proceeds to
reinterpret “explicitly” to mean not explicitly, quoting subsequent cases that
don’t apply Rogers that say that the relevant question is whether the
use “‘induces members of the public to believe [the work] was prepared or
otherwise authorized’ by the plaintiff.” Louis Vuitton, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 179
(quoting Twin Peaks Prods., Inc v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d
Cir. 1993)) (a title v. title and thus a non-Rogers case, because in the
Second Circuit Rogers doesn’t apply to title v. title claims; the court
also quotes Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleplay Dell Publ’g. Group, Inc.,
886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989), another non-Rogers title v. title case).
 

Then the court says that likely confusion must be “particularly compelling” to
outweigh the First Amendment interests at stake, and that “the deception or
confusion must be relatively obvious and express, not subtle or implied”
(quoting McCarthy, and then the odious Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d
257 (9th Cir. 2018)). The court acknowledges that, “[n]ot surprisingly, in most
cases in which a disputed mark was used in the content rather than the title of
an expressive work . . . the results favored the alleged infringer, on the
basis that the use was not explicitly misleading.” Michael A. Rosenhouse,
Annotation, Protection of Artistic Expression from Lanham Act Claims Under
Rogers v.
Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989), 22 A.L.R. Fed. 3d
Art. 4 (2017).
Nonetheless, Netflix doesn’t win its motion to dismiss,
because Chooseco “sufficiently alleged that consumers associate its mark with
interactive books and that the mark covers other forms of interactive media,
including films.” The protagonist in Bandersnatch “explicitly” stated that the
fictitious book at the center of the film’s plot was “a Choose Your Own
Adventure” book.  [That’s not the same thing
as explicitly, extradiegetically stating there’s a connection with the film—the
court considers the Fortres Grand case to be almost on all fours, but
there Catwoman “explicitly” says that the program she’s after is called “Clean
Slate.”]  Also, the book, the videogame,
and the film itself “all employ the same type of interactivity as Chooseco’s
products.” The similarity between the parties’ products increases the
likelihood of consumer confusion. [Citing Gordon v. Drape, so you can
see the kind of damage it’s doing.]  And
Bandersnatch “was set in an era when Chooseco’s books were popular—potentially
amplifying the association between the film and Chooseco in the minds of
consumers.”  And Netflix allegedly used a
similar trade dress for the film and its promotion; though the court didn’t
think this was “particularly strong,” it “adds to a context which may create
confusion.” How any of this is “explicit” is left as an exercise for the
reader. Implied or contextual confusion is not explicit falsehood.
The court decided to allow discovery.  Question: Discovery about what?  What evidence is relevant to whether the film
is “explicitly” misleading about its connection with Chooseco?
Unsurprisingly, Netflix’s descriptive fair use defense was also
not amenable to a motion to dismiss. Here, the character in Bandersnatch held
up a book and stated, “it’s a ‘Choose Your Own Adventure Book.’”  “The physical characteristics and context of
the use demonstrate that it is at least plausible Netflix used the term to
attract public attention by associating the film with Chooseco’s book series.”
There were allegations that Netflix knew of the mark and used the mark to
market for a different program until Chooseco sent a cease and desist letter. That
could support “a reasonable inference that Netflix intended to trade on the good
will of Chooseco’s brand,” as could intentional copying of “aspects”
[protectable aspects?] of Chooseco’s trade dress.  And Netflix could have used numerous other
phrases to describe the fictitious book’s interactive narrative technique,
making bad faith plausible.
That holding makes sense, given the doctrine.  But worse is to come.  Netflix argued, quite correctly, that
dilution requires (1) that the defendant use the term as a mark for its own
goods or services, and (2) commercial speech, which the film is not. The court
rejects both arguments.
The court quoted the federal definition of dilution by
tarnishment as an “association arising from the similarity between a mark or
trade name
and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark,”
but didn’t explain why Netflix was plausibly using the term as a mark, as opposed
to using it to label the book in the film. Netflix correctly pointed out that “[t]he
Second Circuit does not recognize an action for dilution where the defendant
uses the plaintiff’s mark not to denote the defendant’s good or services, but
rather to identify goods or services as those of the plaintiff,” but the court thought
that didn’t apply here because Netflix used the mark to refer to a fictitious
book.  But the important part here is
the first half: it wasn’t using Choose Your Own Adventure to brand its own
goods or services; it was using it as part of a fictional work.  The implication—and it is not a good one—is that
if, in my work of fiction, my character disparages a Choose Your Own Adventure
book that doesn’t actually exist, I may have tarnished the CYOA mark. This is defamation
without any of the limits on defamation that the First Amendment has imposed.
Nonetheless, the court found that “Netflix’s use of Chooseco’s mark implicates
the core purposes of the anti-dilution provision” (citing Hormel, which
is not a federal dilution case and which has been treated as superseded by
federal dilution law, see Tiffany v. eBay).  
Netflix then, correctly, pointed out that “the Lanham Act
expressly exempts dilution claims based on a ‘noncommercial use of a mark’ of
the type at issue here.” Despite the fact that in discussing Rogers the
court correctly noted that profit-motivated speech is often noncommercial and Bandersnatch
is noncommercial speech, the court still stated that “Netflix’s use of
Chooseco’s mark
may qualify as commercial speech” (emphasis added), which
is not the test. And it so reasoned because Chooseco’s complaint alleged that “Netflix’s
motivations in including its mark in the film were purely economic,” that
Chooseco’s product is popular, and that Netflix used “elements” [protectable
elements?] of Chooseco’s trade dress in promotion and marketing.  More discovery!

from Blogger https://ift.tt/3bPrgLL

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Even in default, damages must still be shown

NITV Fed. Servs., LLC v. Dektor Corp., 2019 WL 7899731 No.
18-80994-Civ-Brannon (S.D. Fla. Dec. 16, 2019)
This is a default judgment, but it still has interesting
bits. The parties compete to sell truth verification technology, which will
become ironic. NTIV sued Dektor and its principal Herring for false advertising/product
disparagement/defamation/tortious interference. Bankruptcy stayed the proceedings,
and later the court ruled that Herring deliberately deprived NITV of
discoverable evidence, such that the extraordinary sanction of default was
warranted.  In contesting NITV’s
multimillion-dollar damage claims, Herring largely contended that NITV’s lie
detector was “a fake or fraud” and that NITV was blaming Herring for its own problems.
Facts (based on the allegations): NITV makes a patented
Computer Voice Stress Analyzer that is “the most widely used truth verification
tool in the United States law enforcement community,” used by approximately
2,000 local, state, federal, and international law enforcement agencies.  An older company, Dektor, patented a “Psychological
Stress Evaluator,” but went out of business; defendant Dektor is unrelated. Defendant
Dektor reverse-engineered the older product and began selling its own “PSE”
voice stress analyzer product while capitalizing on the name and history of the
original Dektor, including by claiming that “[s]ince 1969, all PSE models
[detect stuff]… Thousands of various PSE models have been sold worldwide for 45
years. For 50 years, PSE has been known worldwide because PSE constantly proves
it is the most superior system for truth verification. Only the Dektor system
has proven it is the real technology for Voice Stress Analysis.”
Dektor also disparaged NITV on its website, in emails to law
enforcement agencies, telephone calls, and professional speaking engagements,
including by stating that NITV’s products were proven unreliable/no more
reliable than a coin toss and disparaging NITV’s founder. Herring contacted the
Dallas Crimes Against Children’s conference and got NITV disinvited (even
though it had already paid to attend) by making false claims, such as that an
employee scheduled to speak at the conference had been dishonorably fired from
his prior position as a sex crimes investigator when in reality that employee
retired.
The court found NITV’s witness on damage credible, including
a recent incident where one sheriff’s department told the NITV marketing person
(not the witness) that, due to information received from Dektor, they were
discontinuing purchases of CVSA systems (to avoid hearsay on hearsay, I think
the marketing person should’ve been on the stand, but it’s been a long time
since civil procedure and maybe you can do that with a default?).
Anyway, the well-pled facts entitled NITV to victory on its
Lanham Act and FDUTPA claims, as well as business defamation/disparagement and
tortious interference. NITV was entitled to a permanent injunction and damages,
the latter of which required a legitimate basis.  NITV sought nearly $6 million in damages, trebled
for willfulness. The court declined to go so far. NITV had upped its demands
from $1.3 million to $6 million within less than a year, and the numbers were speculative.  NITV suggested that 10-15% of existing/prospective
customers would choose not to buy from NITV because of defendants’ conduct, but
the court didn’t see a basis for this.
And then a puzzling bit: “Although Mr. Herring and Dektor
pointed out alleged defects and disseminated materially false information about
Plaintiff’s product to existing and prospective customers who would not have
heard of any issues, other customers may have learned of these items by their
own searches. In the internet age, it is fair to say that clients buying truth
verification technology will check that technology on the internet.” I say
puzzling because if customers did their own searches and found false stuff planted
by defendants, defendants are still causally responsible.  But if customers also would have found
non-false stuff, or even false stuff for which defendants were not responsible,
that might also lead them to question their purchases, then the court’s hesitance
makes more sense.
The court found the testimony about that one sheriff’s
office to be “reliable hearsay,” as well as the lost conference attendance,
totalling about $50 thousand. The court didn’t agree that Herring was the only
reason that the state of Texas didn’t change its polygraph-only laws to allow
the use of NITV’s technology. The court accepted that at least ten customers had
been lost, for base damages of nearly $425,000 total. It then doubled the
damages, based on the intentional false advertising, to nearly $850,000.
Giving some sense of what’s been going on, the permanent
injunction prohibited any false or disparaging statement including “any
statement comparing or equating Plaintiff, its product, or its employees to the
German Nazi party or Joseph Goebbels specifically.”  Although the court didn’t make specific findings
about how this harmed NITV, the court also enjoined representations or
suggestions that Dektor had any relationship or affiliation to old Dektor/had
been in business since 1969/sold a product related to old Dektor’s product, etc.

from Blogger https://ift.tt/2V1QTD9

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , , | Leave a comment

No Lanham Act causation in another timeshare exit case

Westgate Resorts, Ltd. v. Reed Hein & Assoc., LLC, 2020
WL 674108, No: 6:18-cv-1088-Orl-31DCI (M.D. Fla. Feb. 11, 2020)
Yay, another time share exit opinion. As relevant here, the
court rejected the timeshare company’s Lanham Act claim because the allegedly false
advertising didn’t proximately cause the asserted harm (people stopping paying
their timeshare obligations). The identified false advertising statements included
that timeshare owners can exit their contracts for any reason; that defendant TET
has a 100 percent success rate; and that TET provides a money back guarantee. But
none of the identified statements “direct (or can reasonably be construed to
direct) timeshare owners to stop making payments.” Westgate didn’t argue that
the ads harmed its reputation, and it didn’t show proximate cause for the harm
it did allege.

from Blogger https://ift.tt/2SSJLX7

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | 1 Comment

“Kids” in product name represents that product is safe for children to use

Mirza v. Ignite USA, LLC, 2020 WL 704791, No. 19 C 5836
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 2020)
Ignite sells reusable beverage containers, coffee mugs,
water bottles, and kids’ cups under the Contigo brand name. Plaintiffs bought Contigo
Kids Cleanable Water Bottles. At some point thereafter, the bottles’ clear
silicone spout detached, posing a choking hazard to plaintiffs’ children. Ignite
issued a recall, offering to replace the lid on the water bottles but not any
monetary relief.
  
Plaintiffs alleged that they relied and understood the name
on the water bottles’ packaging, “Contigo Kids,” to represent that the bottles
were safe for children to use, and that naming the water bottles “Contigo Kids”
was false and deceptive in violation of several consumer protection laws.
The plaintiffs adequately alleged that they paid more for
the water bottles than they would otherwise pay for a dangerous and defectively
designed product, and that the recall didn’t provide minimal notice to class
members or adequately compensate for the lost use of the product while a
replacement lid was processed. The recall/free replacement didn’t obviate the
Article III injuries here. A financial injury creates standing, and plaintiffs
didn’t participate in the recall and thus didn’t get a product worth what they
paid for it.
NY breach of implied warranty claims failed for want of
privity; the exception for harmful products didn’t apply because plaintiffs
weren’t alleging that they’d been physically harmed, only that they paid too
much. NY unjust enrichment failed as duplicative of claims under New York’s GBL
§§ 349 and 350, though Pennsylvania unjust enrichment claims survived.
Ignite argued that there was no Pennsylvania UTPCPL violation
because, among other things, “Contigo Kids” wasn’t an actionable
misrepresentation, and that no reasonable consumer would read the name to imply
that the product was free from defect. The court disagreed.  Somewhat mushing causes of action together,
the court appeared to consider only whether the name could be false (not
misleading). But it doesn’t matter: plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a false
representation as to a product’s characteristic, quality, or standard, as required:
The name “Contigo Kids” signals to
consumers that the water bottles are designed for children. One would expect
products made for children, at the very least, to be free from defects that
would pose a choking hazard given the frequency of choking incidents for this
age group. Absent a warning to the contrary, the presence of the term “Kids” on
the label misleads consumers into believing that the product is safe for
children. And contrary to Ignite’s argument, “[a] ‘literally false’ message may
be either explicit or ‘conveyed by necessary implication when, considering the
advertisement in its entirety, the audience would recognize the claim as
readily as if it had been explicitly stated.’ ”
… The name signals that the water
bottles were made for children, and a necessary implication of products made
for children is that they are safe for their use. Accordingly, a reasonable
consumer looking for water bottles for her children could be reasonably misled
by the product’s name.
[Note: consumer protection law hasn’t historically made, and
really shouldn’t make, the Lanham Act’s false/misleading distinction, making reference
to falsity by necessary implication unnecessary here. The plaintiffs sufficiently
pled falsity or misleadingness.]
The same analysis also applied to NY GBL §349 and §350
claims, though fraudulent omission claims failed for failure to allege
knowledge of the defect at the time of sale.

from Blogger https://ift.tt/2vJKS3v

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

false advertising as compulsory counterclaim

Creative Impact Inc. v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., 2019 WL
7906430, No. CV 19-07009 AG (ASx) (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2019)
The parties compete in the toy business. Creative Impact
makes 5 Surprise, while MGA makes a similar toy called L.O.L. Surprise! In July
2019, MGA sued plaintiff Zuru in California state court alleging state law trade
dress and trademark infringement claims.

Six days later, MGA’s CEO posted several messages on
LinkedIn, such as, “ZURU Toy Company #Thieves of the Year of others #IP. Just
look at the pictures. WHY are retailers supporting these thieves? I don’t get
it.” Plaintiffs then sued for false advertising under the Lanham Act and other claims
based on these posts, as well as on the IP issues in the state court dispute.
Under the circumstances, the Lanham Act claim was a compulsory
counterclaim in the earlier-filed state court action.  Under California law, a “related” cause of
action has to be alleged in a cross-complaint. A claim is “related” if it
“arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences” as the claims asserted in the earlier-filed complaint; this is to
be “liberally construed” to accomplish the statute’s purpose “of avoiding a
multiplicity of actions” through “piecemeal” litigation.
Here, the thrust of the state court complaint was that plaintiffs’
5 Surprise toys infringe MGA’s trademark and trade dress in L.O.L. Surprise! Toys.
The false advertising claim was “logically interrelated” because it was based
on statements that “reiterate the core allegations of Defendant’s state court
complaint—namely, that Plaintiffs are infringing on Defendant’s trademark and
trade dress rights.” There were some additional relevant facts, but perfect
factual overlap isn’t necessary. The Lanham Act claim “shares enough of a
logical relationship with Defendant’s state law claims to be considered part of
the same series of transactions or occurrences,” especially given the proximity
in time between the state court suit and the statements and given that Creative
can only win its false advertising claim by also defeating MGA’s infringement
claim; otherwise the challenged statements aren’t false. That legal
relationship speaks directly to the purpose of avoiding piecemeal litigation.
The presence of an additional plaintiff didn’t help in these
circumstances, where the two plaintiffs were part of the same group of companies
and constitute a single larger entity together. Fortunately for plaintiffs,
they probably can still add a counterclaim, given California’s liberal approach
to amending to add compulsory counterclaims.

from Blogger https://ift.tt/2uW6o4W

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

when you buy a business whose mark is the owner’s photo, make sure you get all the rights

Minott v. Wichita Water Conditioning, Inc., No.
18-cv-01656-MSK-SKC, 2020 WL 616359 (D. Colo. Feb. 7, 2020)
Minott used to own Fluid, which operated a water
conditioning business under the trade name Chuck, The Water Man. Fluid made
extensive use of a photograph of Minott’s face as “a sort of logo,” displaying
it prominently in its promotional materials, on billboards, on the side of
trucks, on customer-facing equipment, and so on. In 2016 defendant WWC bought
Fluid, including “all of [Fluid’s] right, title and interest in and to the assets
owned by [Fluid] and used in connection with [the Chuck business]” and
specifically including all “trade names (including ‘Chuck, the Water Man’)
[and] trademarks” held by Fluid.
Minott alleged that during negotiations over the Asset
Purchase Agreement, he explained to WWC that Fluid held only a license to use
the photo of his face, not ownership of that likeness, and that therefore, “use
of my personal likeness was not included in Fluid’s” assets. He offered a
one-year license for a separate payment of $100,000, which WWC allegedly
rejected. “Notwithstanding that discussion, the Asset Purchase Agreement
contained no language excluding Mr. Minott’s likeness – to the extent it was
used as a trademark – from the terms of the sale.”
WWC eventually merged Chuck with its Culligan brand (e.g.
referring to the business as “Chuck’s Culligan” or “Chuck the Culligan Man”). In
2017, WWC prepared a promotional image that used the photo of. Minott’s face,
edited onto the body of another model (who wore a Culligan-branded shirt),
alongside the statement “Chuck The Water Man is now Chuck The CULLIGAN Man.”
WWC sent a version of the image to Minott and “invited comment,” and Minott responded,
“unless [you’re] hiring me as a professional model (very expensive) NO…Our
discussion was a verbal chat. We discussed that you could use that one picture
of my face as the logo for one year from acquisition date…You dismissed those
discussions without conclusion…I do appreciate you asking and I like the fact
that you see value in my name & face being attached to the company, but
NO.”
Nonetheless, and perhaps as a result of a slip-up, WWC sent
out a series of mailers to its customers, using the photo of Mr. Minott’s face
(and the model’s body). In response to Minott’s complaint, WWC responded that
it had instructed its marketing vendor to “change all future mailers to not use
your picture,” but also advised that “there may be some [existing mailers] in
the system to be mailed but it has been changed.” The relevant employee also
e-mailed WWC’s marketing vendor to determine how many mailers featuring Minott
had already been printed; since the December mailers had been printed, he
instructed the vendor to “leave it.”
Minott sued for misappropriation of likeness under Colorado
common law, false endorsement under the Lanham Act, and deceptive advertising
under in violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act.
WWC argued, among other things, that (1) the photo was a
trademark that was transferred, (2) the mailers lacked an effect on interstate
commerce so there was no Lanham Act claim, (3) because of the noncompete Minott
signed, he couldn’t experience cognizable harm from the mailers, and (4) there
was no evidence of deceptiveness.
Misappropriation: consent is an affirmative defense; WWC has
the burden of proof. Here, this requires proof that: (i) Minott, by words or
conduct, led WWC reasonably to believe that he had authorized WWC to make use
of his photograph as a trademark; and (ii) WWC acted in a manner and for a
purpose to which Minott agreed. It’s true that Fluid established a use of
Minott’s photograph as a trademark, but that didn’t “overcome all other
intellectual property rights that might attach” to the photo.  [I think it’s pretty sharp dealing, at best,
on these facts where he’s also the owner of the company doing the transfer of
rights. But:] Minott testified that Fluid never owned the image and was only a
licensee, and the record didn’t disclose the terms of the license. “WWC
acquired nothing more than Fluid had. WWC did not acquire rights to the
photograph itself, nor the right to depict Mr. Minott’s likeness.”  If anyone wants to use a photo as a mark, they
have to be sure that neither copyright nor the right of publicity preclude such
use. There was at least a disputed issue of fact on whether there was a terminable-at-will
license (apparently both for the copyright and for the right of publicity) that
was terminated on transfer of Fluid. There was also at least a disputed issue
whether Minott specifically told WWC at the time of the purchase that Fluid
didn’t own rights to his likeness. Likewise, WWC failed to establish that its
use was consistent with the scope of any consent that WWC reasonably believed
Minott had given, given the parties’ emails.
JA Apparel Corp. v. Abboud, 682 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y.
2010), was not to the contrary. There, Abboud was a party to the sale of his clothing
business and its trademarks; here, Minott was not a party to the Fluid-WWC
transaction.
False endorsement under the Lanham Act:  The rare lack of use in interstate commerce! It
was undisputed that Chuck’s only provided service in Colorado. Minott didn’t
claim to have trademark rights extending outside of Colorado, so there was no
effect on interstate commerce that way. Though WWC itself operated interestate,
“the record is so scant as to how WWC’s mailers here may have advanced WWC’s
business interests outside of Colorado as to preclude a finding of an effect on
interstate commerce simply because WWC has interstate operations.”
In terms of interstate effects, Minott argued only that, of
the roughly 3,600 relevant mailers WWC sent out, 9 went to addresses in
Wyoming, South Dakota, or New Jersey. That wasn’t a “substantial” effect on
interstate commerce. The recipients were “current customers” according to its
billing software, and, given the geographic limits of service provision, the record
suggests that out-of-state addresses were unintentional, erroneous, or forwarding
addresses for final bills. “Given the minimal number of advertisements
involved, and the clear indication that any stray mailings leaving Colorado
were inadvertent oversights, the Court concludes that Mr. Minott has not come
forward with evidence indicating that any false endorsements perpetrated by WWC
occurred in interstate commerce.”
CCPA deceptive advertising: even assuming deception in the
course of WWC’s business with an impact on the public, as required by state
law, Minott failed to show the requisite injury. He was neither a deceived
consumer nor a current competitor.
It was speculative to allege only a belief that his
reputation has been harmed and that this harm may manifest when the noncompete
expires in mid-2021, at which point he intends to return to Colorado and start
another water conditioning business. He cited Yelp reviews, but even putting
aside “substantial hearsay concerns as to whether such reviews are admissible
as proof of the reviewer’s perception” of Minott, several of those made clear
they were aware of and distinguished between the Minott iteration and WWC’s
version, while other bad reviews related to the period Minott himself ran the
business. Thus, the Yelp reviews could not show harm to his reputation resulting
from WWC suggesting his affiliation with or endorsement of WWC.
Among other things, there was no evidence that the mailers caused
harm to his reputation; there was no evidence that disgruntled WWC customers
contacted him, or that surveys showed lost respect for “Chuck, the Water Man.”
And his future plans merely highlighted the lack of present injury. Further, he
testified that he didn’t intend to solicit past customers, which meant his
prior reputation would be irrelevant. 

from Blogger https://ift.tt/37xlJ97

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , , , , | Leave a comment

DMCA at 22: my notes from the Senate hearing

Senate Judiciary Committee, Intellectual Property
Subcommittee, The
Digital Millennium Copyright Act at 22: What is it, why was it enacted, and
where are we now
(archived video; apparently you have to wait 13 minutes
before the hearing actually starts, though)
Sen. Tillis: DMCA was passed when Chumbawumba and Myspace
were popular. Time to hear about modernization. Protection was given to new
platforms in exchange for quick removal. Almost everything has changed in 22
years. Goal: introduce reform bill w/bicameral, bipartisan consensus. Top
priority for him. Today: background and level-setitng.
Panel I
The Honorable Edward J. Damich, Senior Judge, United States
Court of Federal Claims
Damich was chief IP counsel for Senate Judiciary at the
time; not providing views of judiciary but recollections as staffer. Internet
just coming into its own: 36 million web users in 1996. Highlights: (1) ISP liability
for users’ infringement, (2) TPMs were key issues. Sen. Hatch didn’t want to
disturb common law of secondary infringement; wanted to focus on practical reality
of internet at the time: email, system caching. Hosting required more care: notice
& takedown or actual knowledge requried action. Middle ground b/t duty to monitor
and actual knowledge: red flag provision. ISPs should not ignore clear indications
of infringement however discovered & should cooperate w/copyright owners.
Anticircumvention: controlling access was becoming more important than making
copies. Exceptions included periodic rulemaking for temporary exemptions.
Mr. Jonathan Band, Owner, Jonathan Band PLLC
TPM control appeared in EU Software Directive. Problem:
legitimate reasons to unlock TPMs, including for interoperability; he worked on
exceptions. Safe harbors for basic online functions: Yahoo provided the
then-leading directory, but arguably fell outside the info location tool safe
harbor, so negotiated legislative report language to make clear that it was
covered. Database protection was also proposed by the DMCA House version,
fortunately failed. DRM and safe harbors were a compromise: you can’t consider
the effectiveness and fairness of either in isolation. Each industry believes
its own section was successful; each title includes internal compromise, but that
was a grand bargain between each one. Congress made policy choices w/open eyes
and courts have generally complied with Congressional intent. Note also term
extension at the same time: windfall to © owners.
Mr. Robert S. Schwartz, Partner, Constantine Cannon
Road began in 1981 with 9th Circuit’s ruling against VCRs.
Even after the SCt overturned that, content industry proposed levies on tech.
Consumer groups formed home recording rights organization. Negotiated serial
copy management system designed to prevent impact on general computers—AHRA—which
became a dead letter quickly. Computers have to be covered, so there was a copy
protection working group.  Bad experience
with mandatesàTPM
provisions. Should have tied circumvention to copyright infringement; should be
limited to expressive uses and allow for uses like vehicle repair. Trafficking
provisions inhibit fair use and vehicle repair. Even with an exemption, user
can’t get lawfully produced software to take advantage of exemption b/c of
trafficking provisions.
Mr. Steve Metalitz, Partner, Mitchell, Silberberg &
Knupp LLP
Speaking in personal capacity though represented © industries
in negotiations. Implementing WIPO digital treaties: 1201 was for that. On the
whole, remarkably successful: lots of access to content, due in large part to
TPMs [now wait until he tells you about what the creative environment is like
due to 512]—allowed creation of marketplace, not thieves’ bazaar. Congress got
this right.  512 was a different story:
politically necessary, not necessary for treaty compliance. Telcos wanted
payback for the IP carveout in 230. Copyright owners didn’t need or want 512.
Goal: provide incentives for © owners and services to work together.
Infringement is pervasive and so are infringement-based business models. Close
to blanket immunity for OSPs if they take relatively minimal steps out of scale
with the infringement problem; can base their business models on infringement.
Dominant online businesses have to shoulder responsibility for bad behavior,
including IP theft. Increased volume of infringement, increased velocity, need
for voluntary arrangements that haven’t yet materialized.
Sen. Coons: This is the most active subcommittee of
Judiciary. Core © industries add $1 trillion to GDP. [And core OSP industries?]  Google didn’t exist in 1992. Digital piracy
has exploded. Unauthorized copies are just a click away. [Yep, 1201 totally
worked.] Digital video piracy costs $29 billion/year and 250,000 jobs.
Tillis: what areas are most contentious? Given where we are
now, is there opportunity to bridge the gap with modernization?
Damich: Ethically can’t give opinions on future legislation.
Tillis: root causes of differences?
Damich: did try to compromise on 512 & 1201. Hatch broke
impasse: made sure there was a core group of stakeholders then a larger group
of interested parties like libraries, reverse engineering researchers, law
enforcement were allowed to comment.
Band: 1201, 512, databases all happening together. Most of
the focus was probably on safe harbors b/c players were bigger on both sides:
telcos v. big content providers. Hard to get focus on 1201/databases. Hard to
get researchers to believe 1201 would happen: encryption researchers insisted Congress
would never do anything so stupid. More people are familiar now with 1201 and
auto repair type problems.
Schwartz: Home Recording Rights Coalition was included up to
a point, then excluded from negotiations. We were considered too tough to make
a final deal with. Sen. Ashcroft worked with us to work on legislative history.
Didn’t anticipate that at most recent triennial rulemaking we’d be there on
behalf of farming bureaus. With short growing seasons + distant repair
facilities run by manufacturers, a software-dependent equipment breakdown means
a waiting list for authorized repair, while independents would do it if they
could. It’s not trafficking to obtain and use software; the Copyright Office
has gone as far as it thinks it can go in allowing repairers to act on behalf
of owners but still needs guidance on trafficking.
Metalitz: also surprised to represent auto manufacturers at
the triennial rulemaking. 1201 speaks in very general terms of all TPMs. Stood
the test of time better than 512, which depended on the tech of the time. Storage
at the direction of the user was straightforward at the time. Other functions
were added: indexing, highlighting content for users. [This is ahistorical,
albeit algorithmic discovery was in its infancy; indexing and highlighting were
definitely known at the time.] Unfortunately courts said this was all ok but
that wasn’t intended. Legislation in general terms (except for the exceptions
in 1201, which are good) last longer v. tech-specific 512.
Panel II
Professor Sandra Aistars, Clinical Professor Senior Scholar
and Director Copyright Research & Policy, Center for the Protection of IP, Antonin
Scalia Law School, George Mason University
Informed by clients’ epxerience but views are her own. 512
hasn’t helped creators; the bargain Congress expected was not achieved. Twin
goals of quick removal and support for innovation. No blind eye to infringement—red
flag provisions have been misinterpreted and eviscerated, especially in 2d and
9th Circuits [those hotbeds of hostility to the © industries]. Perfect 10 v.
CCBill—“illegal/stolen” label wasn’t a red flag [to credit card
processors].  Viacom v. YouTube limited
obligation to knowledge of specific infringing activity, and UMG v. Shelter
Capital agreed. Capitol Records v. Vimeo: red flag not triggered by full length
copies of © works, even when leaders winkingly encouraged infringement. Notice
and takedown alone isn’t enough. Representative list requirement isn’t enforced.
Works with artists and small businesses; even trained and coached, students
found removal frustrating and time consuming; searches led to phishing sites
[note that this is already illegal; these sites aren’t likely to be complying
with the DMCA and it has yet to be explained to me why they’d comply with
DMCA-Plus.] CASE Act would allow recipients of bad notices to sue in small
claims court.  Cox is a good case: they
failed to enforce even a toothless repeat infringer policy.
Professor Rebecca Tushnet, Frank Stanton Professor of the
First Amendment, Harvard Law School
I would like to start with some perhaps surprising numbers
that illustrate what §512 has meant for creativity and innovation online.  I work with a nonprofit, the Organization for
Transformative Works (OTW), that doesn’t have a single paid employee. With a
budget of under $400,000 per year, it operates a website for user-generated
content that currently has over four million creative works from over a million
registered users. Those millions of works attract 1.12 billion page views per
month. That’s more than double what it was only three years ago, and rapid
growth continues. Last year we were honored by the World Science Fiction
Society with a Hugo Award for our service to the global community of fans.
Despite the large numbers of works posted on our site, we
get less than one DMCA notice per month. Most of those notices are invalid,
such as attempts to claim rights in a title or name. At the cost of significant
amounts of volunteer lawyer time—something very few services can afford—we
carefully review each notice and explain to the senders of the invalid notices
why their claim is mistaken. Unfortunately, our experiences with mistaken and
abusive notices designed to suppress noninfringing and critical speech are
common among service providers.
Empirical research reveals that most of the internet service
providers who rely on §512 are like us: Most service providers receive
relatively few notices and handle them individually. Only a few entities receive
millions of notices. While market pressures and business decisions have led a
few large sites like YouTube to rely on automated systems and sometimes on
filters, it is important not to treat YouTube as a model for the internet at
large. If we did, the only online service to survive would be YouTube.
If there is one message I would ask the members of the
Committee to take away today, it is that most beneficiaries of §512 are not
like Google or Facebook. Big or small, most sites that use §512 don’t need and
couldn’t survive a requirement to use technologically complex mechanisms to
filter out the relatively rare infringements.
There are serious problems of market concentration in the
content and telecommunications industries, and §512 has been vital to preserving
the competition that exists. If Congress changes §512 to target Google and
Facebook, or because of rogue overseas sites that already ignore the law, it
will ensure that only Facebook, Google and pirate sites survive, making the
problem of market concentration even worse without protecting creators. A
mandate for filtering, whether called “staydown” or something else, would
destroy the small and medium entities that are vital to innovation, creativity,
and competition on the internet.
The system is by no means perfect—there remain persistent
problems with invalid takedown notices used to extort creators or suppress
political speech—but, like democracy, it’s better than the alternatives that
have been tried.  The numbers of
independent creators and the amount of money spent on legitimate content are
growing every year. Changes to §512 would be likely to make things much worse.
My written testimony addresses some other specific issues,
including section 1201. Section 1201 is broken: it is mostly used to suppress
competition rather than protect copyrighted works from infringement. It would
benefit from requiring a nexus between circumvention and copyright
infringement. Otherwise it will continue to be used to prevent diabetics from
getting information from their own medical devices and researchers from
investigating security vulnerabilities in voting machines.
Professor Jessica Litman, John F. Nickoll Professor of Law, University
of Michigan Law School
Three points: (1) In 22 years since DMCA, anticircumvention
hasn’t lived up to its promise. Immense symbolic value, not effective v. piracy.
No additional deterrent to people who are already infringing. DRM is not
impregnable and it is buggy—prevents licensed uses. Americans believe that if
they buy a copy, they should get to use it. If they need to repair it, they
often try to find fixes and usually succeed. Circumvention tools are widely available.
Meanwhile, businesses that embed software have harmed aftermarket parts and independent
repair. It’s unreasonable to tell a farmer who wants to repair a tractor to
petition the Librarian of Congress for permission to do so. That has nothing to
do with © piracy.
(2) 512 safe harbor tradeoff worked well for longer than we
had any right to expect. Courts have been good at interpreting it. Principal
weakness: imagined human judgment applied in good faith to send and receive
notices. That didn’t scale for large © owners and [some] large services.  Automated solutions are buggy with false
positives/wrongness. Larger © owners and services have negotiated private
deals, but smaller services without the ability to strike private deals still
find 512 essential.
(3) © owners complain about “value gap” based on market
power of ISPs leading to lower license fees. I get why © owners are upset, but
this is a bargaining power/competition problem, not a © problem. Antitrust
would be a better solution.
Professor Mark F. Schultz, Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Company Chair in Intellectual Property Law Director, Intellectual Property and
Technology Law Program, University of Akron School of Law
Good intentions—sought to shield infant industry, which is
grown up now into world’s most wealthy and powerful businesses; outdated
assumptions. Courts narrowed service providers’ responsibility too much.
Congress assumed ISPs would be indifferent to infringement, not supportive of
it. Infringement notices in billions, files spread fast. Not just one upload,
nonstop uploading by many users. Finding one copy is worthless. Many online
services profit from availability of infringing material. [I always wish they’d
name names. Lots of services that did profit in this way have been sued out of
existence, and also Veoh, which didn’t; who exactly do they think, other
than Google, is an illegitimate business that survives only because the DMCA
doesn’t have a filtering mandate?]  Courts
have excused businesses from many duties intended by the DMCA even where they
knew of and profited from infringement—not what laypeople would call knowledge.
Red flag now meaningless. [This is the specific knowledge/general knowledge
distinction: general knowledge that infringement is most likely occurring on
your platform is not red flag knowledge. 
I wonder whether he thinks the University of Akron has red flag
knowledge, defined as he would like to redefine it.]
Solutions: (1) amend 512 to require notice and styadown. (2)
Revise to define willful blindness; not encouraged to ignore infringement.
Sen. Tillis: What did you learn from panel 1?
Schultz: Metalitz is right: red flags.
Litman: 512(m) explicitly relieved sites of a duty to
monitor; that was a good idea; courts have been really careful to limit
knowledge so as not to interfere with 512(m).
RT: These red flag claims are not right. Viacom seeded YT
with apparently leaked footage; what counts as red flag knowledge is
appropriately determined case by case. 
On the volume of infringement: Almost all the sites you’ve heard of,
including Wikipedia and Amazon Kindle/digital, have very few problems with
actual infringement. Most can’t afford and don’t need filtering.
Aistars: 1201 engendered cross industry cooperation; worked
w/entertainment and computer industry to not burden consumers and build new
businesses. 512 didn’t engender affordable tech to filter works before they
were uploaded. Court decisions around 1201 have hewed to parties’ expectations.
We didn’t expect printer cartridges and courts didn’t apply 1201 to them.
Lacked same luck for 512.
Sen. Leahy: Success reflected a years long bipartisan
process. To RT: is it working?
RT: Yes: Most sites don’t have problems.  Google receives billions of notices, but it
is doing a lot/used to get other sites not searched.
Coons: Does 512 discourage sites from gaining knowledge?
RT: No, it encourages them to monitor for other bad things
like terrorist content without fear that if they see something else they’ll be
liable for infringement.
Litman: also encourages monitoring for ©: if they catch one
infringement, 512 means they can’t be held liable for the ones they missed.
Coons for Schultz: is burden on rightsholders to police
fair?
A: should be shared burden. YT had scroll showing one Comedy
Central clip after another on homepage. Knows content owner objects; that’s
wrong.
For Aistars: repeat infringers/whack a mole?
A: (1) isn’t a shared burden to find infringement; (2) there
has been some success against ISPs that don’t implement their own extremely
lenient policies, but that’s not much of a victory—14 notifications before
action is taken, and customer can just start again; sets us up for bad actors
trampling small businesses. Have to decide on creating v. sitting at home
searching for infringement.
Coons: working together on voluntary measures?
Aistars: STMs are supposed to be accommodated, but there’s
no process to ID tech though many could qualify, like Audible Magic. For a # of
years, relatively inexpensive [$10,000/month for small websites, yay]. 1201
worked b/c there were incentives for cross industry cooperation. 512=no
incentives for anyone. No requirement to work together.
Coons: are there easy modernizations to improve balance?
Aistars: red flag.
RT: (1) apply antitrust to © and telecom. (2) 1201
infringement nexus.
Litman: narrowing 1201 would help. 512: these are computers,
they aren’t as smart as us. They don’t recognize what humans would. Can’t tell
who uploaded content. Can’t simply assume that online services perceive as
humans do.
Schultz: red flag. Willful blindness isn’t just computers;
Vimeo says employees can interact w/famous content, but b/c they’re not ©
experts, can’t hold them to objective knowledge. Every layperson knows where to
go to get infringing content. [Is it Vimeo?]
Sen. Tillis: What are decisions that are problematic?
Aistars: See her testimony: Perfect 10 v. CCBill, Viacom,
UMG v. Shelter Capital, Capital Records v. Vimeo.
RT: those cases were rightly decided. Perfect 10 was
specific to sexual content, Viacom had those “leaked” uploads.  The alternative, filtering via staydown is
terrible. Google spent $60 million [correction:
now $100 million
] on a system that is 60% effective according to the major
labels who use it, and we’re better at ID’ing music than at other types of
works.
Litman: dislikes some results. In Cox, they lost the safe
harbor for not terminating users, which could be right, but Cox was receiving automated
takedown notices with thousands of dollar-demanding settlement letters
attached. They wrote back refusing to forward the settlement letters. The court
considered these to be notices that Cox ignored.
Schultz: dislikes same cases as Aistars. The understanding
of what constitutes knowledge defies common sense/most other areas of law.
Staydown should only occur after notice. [I don’t know why
people think this is an argument in favor of filtering. The primary problem
with filtering is not that there’s no list, it’s the expensive and error-prone apparatus
of filtering that most sites can’t afford and don’t need. It’s as if the police
came to every business on Main Street and said, we’ll be sending you a list of our
10 most wanted, and if you don’t employ facial recognition at each entrance to
catch them you’ll be breaking the law, but don’t worry, it won’t be burdensome
because we’ll send you the pictures.] 
Affordable filters exist but there’s no market demand; if there were a
duty we’d see more systems [magic, or Audible Magic?]. Congress can make
exceptions.
Tillis: infringement online is big; number of notices is
difficult for new entrants [again, this is not true in the way he thinks—most entrants
don’t get big numbers of notices, but quality screening can be a big deal]. Neither
is wrong but the DMCA is not working in every case.

from Blogger https://ift.tt/2vuHRE7

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | Leave a comment